Opinion
April 20, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (John Stackhouse, J.).
The People established a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges when they established that the defense had used five of its seven challenges to exclude white persons on the panel (People v Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638, cert denied 498 U.S. 824). Thereafter, defendant failed to give a nonpretextual race-neutral reason for his challenges (People v Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550, 556) where the criteria he claimed were the basis for his challenges were not objectionable in nonwhite jurors he found acceptable (People v Vega, 198 A.D.2d 56, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 932). We decline to remand for further fact finding defendant's unsupported and belated Batson claim, which was a visceral response to the People's Kern objection.
While the third-degree possession count for which defendant was convicted is not a lesser included offense of the sale count for which he was convicted, dismissal of the possession count is an appropriate exercise of discretion under CPL 300.40 (3) (a) (People v Mesa, 195 A.D.2d 422, 422-423, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 899). The judgment is modified to reverse the possession conviction and dismiss count two of the indictment.
Defendant has failed to provide any evidence that the imposition of the mandatory felony surcharge would work an unreasonable hardship upon him or his family as required by CPL 420.35 (2) (see, People v Rada, 160 A.D.2d 552, 553; People v Lewis, 134 A.D.2d 286), and thus there is no basis to conclude that the surcharge was improperly imposed.
Concur — Rosenberger, J.P., Rubin, Kupferman, Nardelli and Tom, JJ.