Opinion
D083429
04-22-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEVEN ANTHONY WEKERLE, Defendant and Appellant.
Bruce L. Kotler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside, Super. Ct. No. RIF2204240 Mark E. Johnson, Judge. Affirmed as modified and remanded for resentencing.
Bruce L. Kotler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
McCONNELL, P. J.
I
INTRODUCTION
Steven Anthony Wekerle appeals a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of one count of willful infliction of corporal injury (hereafter, domestic violence) with a prior domestic violence conviction (Pen. Code,§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1); count 3); one count of false imprisonment (§ 236; count 4); one count of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (c); count 5); and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (Health &Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a); count 6). For the domestic violence charge, the jury returned a true finding on a sentencing enhancement allegation that Wekerle personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, Jane Doe (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)).
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Wekerle contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury it could find (but was not required to find) that he was likely to commit, and did commit, the domestic violence charge alleged in count 3 based, in part, on evidence that he suffered a prior domestic violence conviction. He also claims the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he stole property exceeding $950 in value and, therefore, the grand theft conviction must be modified to reflect a petty theft conviction. Finally, he argues the court erred by imposing a punishment on him for the false imprisonment conviction, which he claims arose from the same act or indivisible course of conduct that gave rise to the domestic violence conviction.
We agree with Wekerle that the evidence was insufficient to support the grand theft conviction. Therefore, we modify the grand theft conviction to reflect a petty theft conviction and we remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing purposes. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment as modified.
II
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Wekerle and the victim, Doe, met each other in January 2022, and began a sexual relationship in April 2022. They were rarely sober when they were together. During a typical visit with one another, they drank beer and a fifth of hard alcohol. Their relationship lasted until July 2022.
At trial, Doe described two instances of domestic abuse Wekerle perpetrated against her on July 22, 2022, and August 12, 2022. The following accounts of these incidents are derived from Doe's testimony.
On July 22, Wekerle showed up at Doe's residence in the late afternoon and she invited him inside. He got angry about something (Doe could not recall why), and he grabbed her by the arms, pulled her hair, smacked her, and called her names. He threw her to the ground and pulled her back up by her hair. After about an hour of this abusive behavior, Wekerle allowed Doe to leave to go to work. Doe sustained a swollen lip and bruising on her arms from the incident.
On August 12 (a few weeks after Wekerle and Doe broke up), Doe got drunk in the morning and slept for most of the day at her home. She awoke that evening to find Wekerle standing at her bedroom doorway. She had not invited him in and he did not have permission to be there. She asked him why he was there and he started calling her vulgar names. Doe stood up, but Wekerle pushed her to the ground and caused her to hit her head on wooden furniture in the room. He smacked her with his open-faced palms, pulled her by the hair, and pushed her onto the bed-over and over.
After about 30 minutes, Doe talked Wekerle into letting her go to the bathroom. She tried to lock herself in the bathroom, but Wekerle pushed her onto the toilet and started smacking her and pulling her hair again. As Doe left the bathroom, Wekerle stood in the three-foot-wide hallway and blocked her from escaping through the front or back doors. Once Doe was back in her bedroom, she tried to wedge a piece of furniture in the doorway as a makeshift barricade, but Wekerle smashed through it, smacked her some more, picked up the furniture, and threw it on her.
Shortly after, Wekerle grabbed Doe's purse, her phone (an iPhone 12), and an antique plate, and left. The purse contained $600 in cash. After Wekerle left, Doe drove to a friend's house and used her friend's phone to call her parents and report the incident to 911. She also drank alcohol-likely two shots of hard alcohol-to calm her nerves. Doe's parents drove around in search of Wekerle, found him at a nearby park, and reported his whereabouts to the police. When officers arrived on the scene, they observed Doe's purse and phone in plain sight in Wekerle's pickup truck. They also conducted a pat-down search of Wekerle and recovered a methamphetamine pipe from his clothing pocket.
The officers interviewed Doe, who had a cut under her eyelid and a bruised arm. She complained of pain behind her ear and in her ribcage area. According to the officers, Doe emitted an odor of alcohol, slurred her speech, and appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. She presented as angry, frantic, and upset. During the interview, Doe had difficulty answering some of the officers' questions and providing a chronological account of the day's events. At one point, she stated she woke up from her daylong sleep, ran errands, and returned home to find Wekerle inside her residence-a report that was at least partially inconsistent with her later testimony that Wekerle was inside her residence when she awoke.
The day after the incident, Doe went to the hospital complaining of dizziness, lightheadedness, and continuous vomiting. A CT scan showed an 8- to 9-millimeter subdural hematoma on her brain. A second CT scan from a month later showed the subdural hematoma had expanded to 13 millimeters. A third CT scan performed a week later showed the subdural hematoma had grown to 14 millimeters. Based on Doe's account of the incident, her symptoms, and the CT scan results, Doe's treating neurologist determined she might have post-concussion syndrome.
B. Procedural Background
After a trial, a jury found Wekerle guilty of four crimes arising from the events of August 12, 2022: one count of domestic violence with a prior domestic violence conviction; one count of false imprisonment; one count of grand theft; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury also found true an allegation that Wekerle personally inflicted great bodily injury on Doe in the commission of the domestic violence charge. It acquitted Wekerle of two crimes: one count of domestic violence based on the alleged incident on July 22, and one count of burglary of an inhabited dwelling from the August 12 incident.
At a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court found three aggravating sentencing factors to be true: Wekerle was on post-release community supervision at the time of the crimes (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4)); his convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness (id., rule 4.421(b)(2)); and his acts involved great bodily injury and revealed a high degree of cruelty or viciousness (id., rule 4.421(a)(1)). The court sentenced Wekerle to an aggregate term of 11 years and four months in prison, consisting of a five-year term for the domestic violence conviction (the upper term), plus a consecutive five-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement (the upper term), a consecutive eight-month term for the false imprisonment conviction (one-third the middle term of two years), and a consecutive eight-month term for the grand theft conviction (one-third the middle term of two years). The court also imposed a concurrent 180-day term for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction.
III
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury About Wekerle's Prior Domestic Violence Conviction
Wekerle contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 852A for the charge of domestic violence with a prior domestic violence conviction (count 3). The instruction allowed the jury to consider evidence that Wekerle committed uncharged domestic violence acts when assessing whether he was likely to commit, and did commit, the domestic violence charge. As we shall explain, the court did not err.
1. Additional Background
Before trial, the prosecution and the defense filed dueling motions in limine concerning the admissibility of evidence of Wekerle's prior uncharged acts of domestic violence pursuant to Evidence Code section 1109.
In his motion in limine, Wekerle stated he suffered domestic violence-related convictions on two prior occasions: (1) misdemeanor convictions from 2016 for battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) and threatening to commit a crime which would result in death or great bodily injury (§ 422) in case no. RIF1603782 (hereafter, the 2016 convictions); and (2) a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction from 2021 in case no. RIF2102645 (hereafter, the 2021 conviction). According to Wekerle, he pleaded guilty to the 2021 charge, which was "almost identical" to the current case. In the 2021 case, Wekerle picked up a female victim and drove her to a parking lot, where the victim was heard screaming for Wekerle to stop hitting her. Wekerle argued the court should exclude evidence of the 2021 conviction, as well as the 2016 convictions, as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.
The prosecution's motion in limine described two prior uncharged acts of domestic violence perpetrated by Wekerle: (1) the 2021 conviction; and (2) an alleged incident involving Doe, from July 22, 2022 (hereafter, the July 22 incident). According to the prosecution, Doe was inside her residence on July 22, looked outside, and saw Wekerle walking toward the residence. Wekerle approached the door, kicked it, walked to the backyard, kicked the rear door, and broke Doe's window with a shovel. The prosecution argued the evidence of both uncharged acts was admissible under Evidence Code section 1109 because the incidents were "1 year apart" and "similarly violent in nature," and the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential prejudicial impact.
The trial court considered both motions in limine at a pretrial hearing. When discussion turned to the in limine motions, the prosecutor stated the July 22 incident was "the 1109 [she] would . . . elicit factually," and she did not plan "to introduce [the 2021 conviction] under 1109." She said she would "introduce [the 2021 conviction] solely . . . for impeachment purposes if the defendant were to testify." Thereafter, the court ruled the July 22 incident was admissible under Evidence Code section 1109, and stated its "tentative" ruling was to admit the 2016 and 2021 convictions "for impeachment." The court then invited comments from counsel.
During the same discussion, the court excluded from evidence two of Wekerle's other prior convictions (convictions from 1990 and 2000).
In response, defense counsel argued the 2016 and 2021 convictions were "incredibly similar" to the present case and they were "more prejudicial than probative ...." The prosecutor, for her part, reiterated that she did "not intend[ ] to elicit the underlying facts" of the prior convictions; rather, she "intend[ed] to enter the actual conviction[s] if the defendant were to testify."
After these responses, the court repeated its tentative ruling, but asked the parties to clarify which "one of [the prior convictions] was going to be 1109 too[.]" In response, the prosecutor referenced the 2021 conviction-an apparent change from her earlier statement she planned to introduce evidence of the 2021 conviction for impeachment purposes only. The prosecutor added that she did not intend "to elicit the underlying facts explicitly," but would do so to "confront with the . . . conviction."
After the prosecutor said she planned to introduce evidence of the 2021 conviction under Evidence Code section 1109, the court stated, "That's the ruling. I don't see under [Evidence Code] 352 the prejudicial impact substantially outweighs the probative value. You know, if Mr. Wekerle had had not much of a record, I might rule differently, but I'm trying to balance it a little here. They need to be given some flavor because otherwise that would be unfair to the [P]eople. So that's the ruling." The written order memorializing the hearing stated, "Motion in Limine re: [Evidence Code section] 1109 evidence.... Court rules . . . 2016 and 2021 cases are admissible."
In a separate motion in limine, and again at trial, the prosecution requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the 2021 conviction, which was pertinent to establish that Wekerle suffered a prior domestic violence conviction within the last seven years for purposes of count 3. The court granted the request for judicial notice and instructed the jury it must "accept this as evidence in the case."
Separately, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 852A- the instruction Wekerle now challenges on appeal. In relevant part, the court instructed the jury: "The People presented evidence that the defendant committed domestic violence that was not charged in this case, specifically a conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence in case number RIF2102645 and the alleged vandalism of [Doe's] window [on July 22]. [¶] . . . You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the uncharged domestic violence.... [¶] If the People have not met this burden, you must disregard this evidence entirely. If you decide the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, you may, but are not required to, conclude from that evidence that the defendant was disposed or inclined to commit domestic violence and based on that decision also conclude the defendant was likely to commit and did commit domestic violence against [Doe], as charged here. If you conclude the defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove the defendant is guilty of domestic violence against [Doe], as charged here. [¶] The People must still prove each charge and allegation beyond a reasonable doubt."
2. Analysis
Wekerle argues the court improperly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 852A, thus allowing the jury to consider the 2021 conviction to find he had a propensity to commit acts of domestic violence. He claims the court erred because, in his view, the instruction ran "contrary to the [court's] in limine [ruling] and the understanding of the parties that the [2021] prior would not be used to prove propensity." Wekerle does not assert the court erred by admitting evidence of the 2021 conviction; instead, he focuses his challenge exclusively on the court's use of CALCRIM No. 852A. We reject Wekerle's instructional error argument for several reasons.
Preliminarily, we discern no conflict between the court's in limine ruling and its instruction that the jury could consider evidence of the 2021 conviction as propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1109. To be sure, the prosecution's arguments from the pretrial hearing were not the model of clarity. The prosecution initially argued in its written motion in limine that the court should admit evidence of the 2021 conviction as propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1109. The prosecutor seemingly withdrew or limited the scope of this argument at the outset of the hearing, claiming she intended to use the 2021 conviction for impeachment purposes only. However, the court asked which "one of [the convictions] was going to be 1109 too," and the prosecutor referenced the 2021 conviction. Thereafter, the court said, "That's the ruling," and found the evidence should not be excluded under Evidence Code section 352. Thus, whatever uncertainty there may have been at points during the hearing, the court-at the end of the discussion-expressly ruled the 2021 conviction "was going to be 1109"-i.e., it could be used as propensity evidence. Indeed, the court order from the pretrial hearing memorialized this ruling, as follows: "Motion in Limine re: [Evidence Code section] 1109 evidence.... Court rules . . . 2016 and 2021 cases are admissible."
Even if the court had ruled the jury could not use evidence of the 2021 conviction as propensity evidence, or there was lingering uncertainty as to whether the jury could use the evidence for this purpose, that fact alone would not establish that the court erred when it later instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 852A. There is a "general rule that in limine rulings are not binding because the trial court has the power to reconsider, modify or set aside its order before submission of the cause." (People v. Chacon (2007) 40 Cal.4th 558, 565; see People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 850 ["In limine rulings are not binding."].) To the extent Wekerle believes the court instructed the jury in a manner that was inconsistent with its in limine ruling, or left unclear by the in limine ruling, the court had the power to reconsider its in limine orders, including any ruling concerning the purposes for which the jury could use the evidence of his 2021 conviction.
Moreover, the court's instruction did not run afoul of Evidence Code section 1109. Under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), "[c]haracter evidence, sometimes described as evidence of propensity or disposition to engage in a specific conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person's conduct on a specified occasion." (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 841.) Evidence Code section 1109 presents an exception to this rule. In part, it provides, "[I]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352." (Evid. Code, § 1109, subd. (a)(1).) Evidence Code section 352, in turn, states, "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (Id., § 352.)
In the present case, Wekerle stood accused of two offenses involving domestic violence (in counts 1 and 3). The 2021 conviction was a conviction for domestic violence. Further, the trial court expressly ruled that Evidence Code section 352 did not require the exclusion of evidence of the 2021 conviction. Thus, Evidence Code section 1109 was, by its plain terms, satisfied. Moreover, Wekerle does not claim that the text of CALCRIM No. 852A, as given, was ambiguous or inaccurate in any manner.
Finally, although Wekerle does not challenge the court's analysis under Evidence Code section 352, we note for the record that the court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence of the 2021 conviction. The evidence was especially probative of Wekerle's guilt on the domestic violence charge, given the similarities between the 2021 case and the present one. (See People v. Merchant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1192 [the Legislature "determin[ed] that in domestic violence cases, similar prior offenses are uniquely probative of a defendant's guilt on a later occasion."].) Even the defense admitted the two cases were "almost identical." Further, the evidence was germane to, and separately admissible to prove, an element of the domestic violence charge-specifically, the fact Wekerle was convicted of domestic violence within the past seven years. (§ 245, subd. (d)(1).) Finally, the admission of the evidence consumed hardly any time, and it resulted in minimal prejudice to Wekerle, as the court simply took judicial notice of the 2021 conviction without delving into any potentially harmful facts giving rise to the conviction.
For all these reasons, we reject Wekerle's contention that the trial court erred by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 852A.
Because we reject Wekerle's instructional error argument on the merits, it is unnecessary for us to assess whether he forfeited his claim by failing to object to the instruction contemporaneously, and if so, whether his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting.
B. There Was Insufficient Evidence to Support the Grand Theft Conviction
The jury found Wekerle guilty of grand theft in violation of section 487, subdivision (c), for taking $600 in cash, a purse, an iPhone 12, and an antique plate from Doe. Wekerle argues there was insufficient evidence to sustain the grand theft conviction because substantial evidence did not support a finding that the taken property had a fair market value exceeding $950. The People agree with Wekerle and concede the evidence was insufficient to support the grand theft conviction. We accept the People's well-taken concession.
To prove Wekerle committed grand theft, the prosecution was required to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he stole property valued at more than $950. (People v. Grant (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 323, 328 (Grant).) The value of the taken property is based on its fair market value. (Ibid.; see § 484.) "The fair market value of an item is 'the highest price obtainable in the market place' as between 'a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither of whom is forced to act.' [Citation.] 'Put another way, "fair market value" means the highest price obtainable in the market place rather than the lowest price or the average price.'" (Grant, at p. 329.)
Wekerle was found guilty of violating section 487, subdivision (c), which defines grand theft to include the taking of property "from the person of another." (§ 487, subd. (c).) This statutory provision does not expressly require the prosecution to prove that the stolen property exceeded $950 in value. However, section 490.2-a statutory provision enacted by the voters as part of Proposition 47-imposes this requirement. (§ 490.2, subd. (a) ["Notwithstanding Section 487 or any other provision of law defining grand theft, obtaining any property by theft where the value of the money, labor, real or personal property taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950) shall be considered petty theft and shall be punished as a misdemeanor"].)
When we assess the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212.) Under that standard,"' "we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." '" (People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 144.)" 'Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.' [Citation.] However, '[a] reasonable inference may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guesswork; a finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.' [Citation.] '" 'By definition, "substantial evidence" requires evidence and not mere speculation.'" '" (Grant, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 330.)
Here, the prosecution elicited evidence that Wekerle stole $600 in cash, as well as an iPhone 12, a purse, and an antique plate. However, the prosecution did not introduce any evidence concerning the fair market value of the iPhone 12, the purse, or the antique plate, let alone evidence from which it could rationally be inferred the collective value of these items exceeded $350 (such that the total value of the taken property exceeded $950). In fact, the value of these items arose only once at trial when the prosecutor asked Doe if she knew how much the stolen iPhone 12 cost. She replied, "No. I have no idea." In the absence of any evidence concerning the value of these stolen items, a trier of fact could only infer the value of the items exceeded $350-and that the value of all the stolen property exceeded $950-based on conjecture. Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support the grand theft conviction.
Where, as here, "an appellate court . . . finds that insufficient evidence supports [a] conviction for a greater offense[,] [it] may, in lieu of granting a new trial, modify the judgment of conviction to reflect a conviction for a lesser included offense." (People v. Navarro (2007) 40 Cal.4th 668, 671.) Therefore, we modify Wekerle's grand theft conviction (count 5) to reflect a conviction for the lesser included offense of petty theft. (Grant, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 332 [modifying grand theft conviction to reflect petty theft conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence to support finding that value of stolen property exceeded $950]; People v. Simpson (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 223, 229230 [reducing grand theft conviction to petty theft conviction due to insufficiency of evidence to support finding regarding stolen property value].)
C. The Trial Court Properly Imposed a Separate Consecutive Sentence for the False Imprisonment Conviction
The trial court sentenced Wekerle to a five-year prison term for the domestic violence conviction (count 3) and it imposed a consecutive eightmonth term for the false imprisonment conviction (count 5). The court found the "false imprisonment was independent of the assault," and it therefore declined to stay punishment for the false imprisonment conviction under section 654.
Wekerle contends the trial court violated section 654 by declining to stay the punishment for the false imprisonment conviction because, he claims, the domestic violence and false imprisonment convictions arose from an indivisible course of conduct and he harbored a single criminal objective. Although we are remanding the matter for resentencing, we address this sentencing issue to assist the trial court and the parties on remand.
In relevant part, section 654 provides, "An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision." (§ 654, subd. (a).) Section 654"' "precludes multiple punishment for a single act or for a course of conduct comprising indivisible acts." '" (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143 (Jones).) In so doing, section 654" 'ensure[s] that a defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his culpability.'" (People v. Bolanos (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1069, 1085.)
"[S]ection 654 applies not only where there was but one act in the ordinary sense, but also where there was a course of conduct which violated more than one statute but nevertheless constituted an indivisible transaction. [Citation.] Whether a course of conduct is indivisible depends upon the intent and objective of the actor. [Citation.] If all the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not for more than one." (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551.) "On the other hand, if the evidence discloses that a defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for the independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct." (Ibid.)" 'Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible . . . depends on the intent and objective of the actor.'" (Jones, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1143.)
"The question of whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making this determination." (People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1113.) "We uphold the trial court's ruling when substantial evidence supports it. [Citation.] This standard of review is exceedingly deferential." (People v. Venegas (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 32, 38; see People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618 ["A trial court's express or implied determination that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence."].)
Applying the deferential substantial evidence standard of review, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding the false imprisonment and domestic violence convictions were distinct. According to Doe, she went to the bathroom after Wekerle had smacked her and pulled her hair for about 30 minutes-i.e., after he had accomplished the crime of domestic violence. Doe testified he stood in the narrow three-foot-wide hallway after she left the bathroom, "making sure [she] [could not] get out of the hallway or the front door or back door." Shortly after, following an episode in which Doe tried to barricade herself in the bedroom, Wekerle grabbed her purse, her phone, and an antique plate-items she begged him to leave behind-and walked out of the residence.
From this evidence, a court could rationally find that Wekerle falsely imprisoned Doe for the distinct purpose of ensuring she did not report his consummated crime of domestic violence or, alternatively, to ensure she did not leave her residence with the personal property he soon planned to steal. (See People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162-163 ["The trial court could properly conclude that defendant committed the assault with the intent and objective of preventing the victim from sounding the alarm about the murder, and that this intent and this objective were separate from, not incidental to, the robbery."]; People v. Foster (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 20, 27 [section 654 did not require stay of punishment for false imprisonment convictions because "[t]he imprisonment of the victims occurred after the robbers had obtained all of the money, and therefore was not necessary or incidental to committing the robbery."].) Because a court could rationally find the false imprisonment and domestic violence crimes were distinct, the trial court did not err in declining to stay punishment for the false imprisonment conviction under section 654.
IV
DISPOSITION
The grand theft conviction (count 5) is modified to reflect a conviction for petty theft. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed as modified. The matter is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
WE CONCUR: CASTILLO, J., RUBIN, J.