The trial court reasonably could conclude based on Sarmiento’s multiple relapses that she is not committed to sobriety and would not respond to treatment. (See Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 214, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 370 [defendant’s 14-year history of abusing methamphetamine and prior related arrests made "his resolve to stop using the drug … dubious"]; People v. Watts (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 830, 837, 295 Cal.Rptr.3d 189 (Watts) [defendant’s history of noncompliance with treatment justified denial of pretrial diversion].) In any event, the NIDA publication is of little value in predicting whether Sarmiento would respond favorably to additional treatment and avoid criminal behavior, because it says nothing about the causes or likelihood of relapse in any particular case or the connection between relapse and criminality.
But it was harmless, and we need not determine whether the court would have exercised its residual discretion to deny diversion regardless, because the court provided other valid grounds for its decision, as we explain next. (See People v. Watts (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 830, 837 (Watts).)
Even if a defendant meets all of the eligibility and suitability requirements set forth in section 1001.36, the court still retains the discretion to deny diversion. (People v. Watts (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 830, 834-835; People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888.) Moreover, the court may rely on the evidence pertaining to the circumstances of the charged offenses in deciding whether to grant mental health diversion.
Indeed, the court cited the "insufficien[cy]" of the treatment plan as one basis for denying diversion, though its reasoning is a bit unclear. (See People v. Watts (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 830, 837 [insufficiency of case plan may serve as an independent basis for denying diversion].) Nonetheless, we can infer from the court's comments that it found the plan insufficient in large part because there was no concrete plan for Smith's mental health treatment.
Indeed, the court cited the "insufficien[cy]" of the treatment plan as one basis for denying diversion, though its reasoning is a bit unclear. (See People v. Watts (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 830, 837 [insufficiency of case plan may serve as an independent basis for denying diversion].) Nonetheless, we can infer from the court's comments that it found the plan insufficient in large part because there was no concrete plan for Smith's mental health treatment.
(B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 11 [cases are not authority for propositions not considered].) Nor is People v. Watts (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 830, cited in the People's reply, helpful because it similarly involved the denial of diversion based on other section 1001.36 criteria. (See id. at pp. 836-837 [affirming denial of diversion for "multiple reasons," including that the defendant's disorder was not a significant factor in committing the offense and that the case plan was insufficient].)