People v. Watts

2 Citing cases

  1. People v. Walters

    26 N.Y.S.3d 726 (2d Cir. 2015)   Cited 1 times

    Although the broadly construed definition of the “public place” element in Penal Law § 221.10(1) (see Penal Law § 240.001 ) may not be coextensive with the term as used in the public lewdness statutes (see People v. Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 746–747 2012 ), in People v. McNamara (78 N.Y.2d 626, 634 1991 ), the Court of Appeals held that the mere reference to a street address is insufficient to establish the public place element because “the address could as readily refer to a private driveway as to a residential street” (e.g. People v. Matthews, 115 AD3d 625, 625 2014; People v. Sherman, 24 Misc.3d 344, 350 [Crim Ct, N.Y. County 2009]; see also People v. Watts, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op 50957[U], *4 [Crim Ct, N.Y. County 2012] “inside” an address insufficient ). While courts have found accusatory instruments sufficient under the Penal Law § 240.00(1) standard where there is some factual assertion, in addition to the address, supporting the otherwise conclusory assertion that the offense occurred in a public place (see e.g. People v. Campbell, 41 Misc.3d 143[A], 2013 N.Y. Slip Op 52057 [U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013] [“sidewalk”]; People v. Wilson, 30 Misc.3d 138[A], 2011 N.Y. Slip Op 50221[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011] [“sidewalk”]; People v. Jackson, 26 Misc.3d 133[A], 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 50092[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010 [“in front of” the address]; People v. W.J., 27 Misc.3d 1222[A], 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 50841[U], *2 [Crim Ct, N.Y. County 2010] [“opposite” the address]; People v. Jackson, 17 Misc.3d 788, 792–793 [Crim Ct, N.Y. County 2007] [“at the corner” of two streets]; see also People v. Reynoso, 77 AD3d 528, 52

  2. People v. Walters

    2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 51463 (N.Y. App. Term 2015)   Cited 5 times

    Although the broadly construed definition of the "public place" element in Penal Law § 221.10 (1) (see Penal Law § 240.00 [1]) may not be coextensive with the term as used in the public lewdness statutes (see People v Jackson, 18 NY3d 738, 746-747 [2012]), in People v McNamara (78 NY2d 626, 634 [1991]), the Court of Appeals held that the mere reference to a street address is insufficient to establish the public place element because "the address could as readily refer to a private driveway as to a residential street" (e.g. People v Matthews, 115 AD3d 625, 625 [2014]; People v Sherman, 24 Misc 3d 344, 350 [Crim Ct, NY County 2009]; see also People v Watts, 2012 NY Slip Op 50957[U], *4 [Crim Ct, NY County 2012] ["inside" an address insufficient]). While courts have found accusatory instruments sufficient under the Penal Law § 240.00 (1) standard where there is some factual assertion, in addition to the address, supporting the otherwise conclusory assertion that the offense occurred in a public place ( see e.g. People v Campbell, 41 Misc 3d 143[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 52057[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2013] ["sidewalk"]; People v Wilson, 30 Misc 3d 138[A], 2011 NY Slip Op 50221[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011] ["sidewalk"]; People v Jackson, 26 Misc 3d 133[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50092[U], *1 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2010 ["in front of" the address]; People v W.J., 27 Misc 3d 1222[A], 2010 NY Slip Op 50841[U], *2 [Crim Ct, NY County 2010] ["opposite" the address]; People v Jackson, 17 Misc 3d 788, 792-793 [Crim Ct, NY County 2007] ["at the corner" of two streets]; see also People v Reynoso, 77 AD3d 528, 528 [2010] ["entry