Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The trial court's finding that the People's postreadiness delay was attributable in part to the fact that the court was not in session during the Christmas and New Year's holidays is borne out by the record ( cf., People v. Collins, 82 N.Y.2d 177). Such postreadiness delay cannot be charged to the People ( see, People v. Goss, 87 N.Y.2d 792, 797; People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59, 63; People ex rel. Sykes [Rodriguez] v. Mitchell, 184 A.D.2d 466). An additional two-day period of postreadiness delay did not warrant dismissal pursuant to CPL 30.30, because "a less corrective action, such as preclusion or continuance, would have been available had the People's postreadiness default occurred during trial" ( People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 534). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 was properly denied.

Rosenblatt, J. P., Ritter, Copertino and McGinity, JJ., concur.