Opinion
April 28, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Agresta, J.).
Judgment affirmed.
The hearing court properly found that the statements by the deceased naming the defendant as her attacker were admissible at trial as a dying declaration, since they were made while she was in extremis and under a sense of impending death (see, People v Liccione, 63 A.D.2d 305, affd 50 N.Y.2d 850; People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222; cf. People v. Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125).
In addition, the fact that the deceased was beaten, shot six times, once in the chest, and left bleeding in a park at night, was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to infer that the defendant intended to cause her death (see, People v. Jackson, 18 N.Y.2d 516; People v. Nelson, 110 A.D.2d 858; People v. McDavis, 97 A.D.2d 302).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions, including the one regarding the waiver by the defendant of his right to counsel and his exercise of his right to proceed pro se, and find them to be meritless. Rubin, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and Spatt, JJ., concur.