Opinion
Appeal No. 3-15-0040
04-28-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL A. WALTON, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 12th Judicial Circuit, Will County, Illinois,
Circuit No. 14-CF-399
Honorable Daniel J. Rozak, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Carter concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The court failed to comply with the three-step process for addressing defendant's Batson challenge.
¶ 2 Defendant, Michael A. Walton, appeals from his conviction for bringing contraband into a penal institution. Defendant argues that: (1) the circuit court erred in denying his Batson claim without completing the required three-step analysis; (2) the circuit court erred in allowing the State to elicit testimony regarding his involvement in an unrelated murder; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its rebuttal argument; and (4) he was denied his
constitutional right to be present and represented by counsel in postsentencing proceedings. We vacate the denial of defendant's Batson challenge and remand with directions to conduct a new Batson hearing.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 The facts in this order are limited to those necessary to resolve the issue of whether the circuit court erred in denying defendant's Batson challenge. After the State used two of its peremptory challenges to excuse venirepersons Dricco Day and Thermon Young, defendant raised a Batson challenge. Defendant argued that the State had struck Day and Young, the only African American venirepersons, due to their race. The State responded that it was not sure if Day was African American. The State explained that it struck Day because Day knew two defense attorneys, one of which worked in the same office as defense counsel, Day was reading a religious book, and Day was a teacher. The State struck Young because it preferred the potential jurors listed on the panel after Young. Young also gave vague answers regarding the individuals who lived in his home and whether he or anyone he knew was the victim or perpetrator of a crime. The State thought that Young was not a good communicator. Defense counsel disagreed with the race-neutral reasons proffered by the State. Defense counsel argued that Young's responses were clear and the question was vague. Defense counsel contended that Young was trying to be complete, accurate, and thorough. The court ruled
"[a]ssuming that we will actually get to the second part of Batson, I am not so sure we do, but I will say I made the same observations of Mr. Day that [the State] indicated, and I am assuming that Mr. Day is, in fact, African American, although I mean for lack of a better way of putting, I wouldn't bet my next pay check on it. He is—he's extremely light complected. And as to Mr. Young, and
[the State] has indicated that he's not satisfied with the prospective juror's misdemeanor and answers to questions, I think those are all race neutral reasons and so the Batson challenge is denied."
¶ 5 The jury found defendant guilty of bringing contraband into a penal institution (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(a)(1) (West 2014)) and possessing contraband in a penal institution (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(b) (West 2014)). Pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the court sentenced defendant to 10 years' imprisonment.
¶ 6 ANALYSIS
¶ 7 Defendant raises four issues on appeal. However, our resolution of the first issue has rendered discussion of the remaining issues unnecessary. Defendant argues that remand is required for a complete Batson hearing because the court did not follow the procedure articulated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-98 (1986). We find that the court did not follow the three-step Batson procedure and it did not make a finding as to the genuineness or persuasiveness of the State's race-neutral reasons.
¶ 8 Batson prescribes a three-step process for evaluating whether the State used its peremptory challenge to excuse a venireperson on the basis of race. First, defendant must make a prima facie showing that the State exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. People v. Davis, 231 Ill. 2d 349, 360 (2008). That is, defendant must produce sufficient evidence for the court to infer that discrimination has occurred. Id. at 361. Second, the State must provide a race-neutral reason for striking the venireperson in question. Id. at 363. Defendant then has an opportunity to rebut the State's explanation as pretextual. Id. Third, the court must determine whether defendant has shown that the State purposefully discriminated in excusing the venireperson. Id. at 363-64. At this step, the court "weighs the evidence in light of
the prima facie case, the prosecutor's reasons for challenging the venireperson, and any rebuttal by defense counsel. [Citation.] The court must determine whether the defendant has met his or her burden of proving purposeful discrimination." People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 324 (2000). The court must "assess the genuineness of the State's explanation along with the State's credibility in offering the explanation [Citation.]." People v. Martinez, 335 Ill. App. 3d 844, 853 (2002).
¶ 9 Here, the court did not follow the Batson procedure. The court implicitly found that defendant had made a prima facie showing. However, the court's ruling eroded this finding when it stated that it was "not so sure" that the Batson challenge had made it to the second step. It is unclear what the court's ruling was with regard to the first Batson step, whether defendant made a prima facie showing that the State moved to excuse Day and Young on the basis of race. The matter does not proceed past this step absent such a showing. The court's inconsistency in answering this initial question constitutes error.
¶ 10 If we excuse the error at the first stage, we find that the subsequent proceedings were not compliant with the Batson proceedings. Specifically, the second-stage proceeding complied with the Batson requirements, but the third-stage proceeding did not conform. In its ruling, the court stated that it was not sure if Day was African American because Day was "extremely light complected." The court did not assess the State's reasons for excusing Day, assess the genuineness of the State's argument, or consider defendant's argument against Day's excusal. Instead, the court relied solely on its own perception of whether day was African American. This is not a ground for denying a Batson challenge.
¶ 11 Accordingly, the court's procedure in the instant case failed to comply with the three-step Batson analysis. We therefore vacate the Batson ruling and remand for the limited purpose of
conducting new Batson proceedings. In doing so, we retain jurisdiction to review the court's ruling after remand and to address the remaining issues raised by defendant in this appeal. People v. Martinez, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1046 (2000). The court shall file its findings and conclusion with the clerk of this court within 60 days of its decision along with a report of proceedings occurring after the remand. People v. Blackwell, 164 Ill. 2d 67, 76 (1995). Then, defendant and the State will be allowed to supplement their briefs that are presently before this court. Martinez, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1046.
¶ 12 CONCLUSION
¶ 13 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is vacated in part and remanded with directions to conduct a new Batson hearing.
¶ 14 Vacated in part and remanded with directions.