Opinion
D081539
04-18-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESSE ELI VILLA, Defendant and Appellant.
Belinda Escobosa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. SCD291012 Daniel F. Link, Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Belinda Escobosa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KELETY, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Jesse Eli Villa challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence discovered by police officers during an inventory search of his vehicle following a traffic stop. He contends that the initial stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that the inventory search of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Respondent argues that Villa waived his challenge to the initial stop and that the inventory search was proper. We agree that Villa waived his right to challenge the initial stop because he did not challenge it below, but we conclude that the resulting inventory search was not valid as a function of community caretaking. Accordingly, we reverse.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Villa was arrested in September of 2020, after he was pulled over by police for a tinted taillight violation.
At the preliminary hearing, San Diego Police Officer Timothy Arreola testified that while on afternoon patrol, he saw a vehicle with tinted taillights, so he made a U-turn behind the defendant's vehicle. The car pulled into a medium-sized shopping center parking lot in a high traffic area. The car parked on the line between two parking spaces. As Villa got out of the vehicle, Villa noted to the officer, "I just bought this car." The officer noted that the windows were tinted.
Villa agreed that the officer could pat him down; no weapons were found. The officer requested Villa's driver's license, and Villa responded that he had a license but not with him. He provided his name, and officers ran a records check, which revealed that Villa had a criminal history; that his driver's license had expired recently; and that he had a nonextraditable warrant for felony theft from Florida. Officers also learned that Villa was not the registered owner of the vehicle. Villa explained that he had recently purchased it from an unidentified male on Craigslist, and that he had not yet been able to "get it smogged," presumably so that it could be properly registered. He had no proof of the purchase. The officer confirmed that the vehicle had not been reported as having been stolen. Officer Arreola agreed that he walked around the vehicle "looking for illegal contraband." Officer Arreola acknowledged that at the time of the stop (in September 2020), the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) had stopped renewing driver's licenses because DMV offices were operating with restricted services due to the COVID pandemic. The officer testified that nonetheless, he retained discretion to enforce driver's license renewal violations.
Upon learning that Villa's driver's license had expired, officers decided to impound the vehicle. Officer Arreola conceded that he did not have probable cause to search the vehicle.
Officer Arreola testified that one of the reasons for his decision to exercise his discretion to enforce Villa's driver's license expiration (notwithstanding the DMV's COVID closures) was "that [he] believed something illegal was in the car" and he "wanted to get in that car to find something illegal." The "main reason" for impounding the car was the expired license, and the "secondary reason" was Villa's criminal history. "For me, you impound a car off of his driver's license status. That's why I impounded it." He added that he believed that the vehicle could possibly be an unreported stolen vehicle and "that there could be something illegal in the car." He told Villa that he was going to tow the vehicle, and Villa asked if he had to. Officer Arreola asked Villa "[d]o you have anything illegal in there," and Villa told him no. Villa asked if he could call his wife, without specifying why he wanted to call her, but Officer Arreola did not permit him to do so.
The inventory search revealed small quantities of drugs, a forged license, and over $12,000 in cash.
The People charged Villa in a complaint with possession of heroin with intent to sell (count 1); possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell (count 2); possession of a forged driver's license (count 3); unlawful use of the personal identifying information of another person (count 4); obtaining personal identifying information with intent to defraud (count 5); and possession of fentanyl (count 6).
In March 2022, Villa filed a motion to suppress officer observations, Villa's statement, and evidence seized in the inventory search. The motion identified the issue as follows: "ISSUE: The inventory search conducted by [San Diego Police Department] Officers Arreola and Gibson was pretextual. Impounding the vehicle did not serve a community caretaking function because it was safely and legally parked in a public parking lot and Mr. Villa's wife could have safely moved the vehicle." The motion argued that suppression was required under People v. Lee (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 853 (Lee) and People v. Torres (2010)188 Cal.App.4th 775 (Torres). In response, the People argued that the vehicle stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and that the inventory search was proper.
Villa's motion to suppress was heard concurrently with the preliminary hearing.
In denying Villa's motion, the trial court noted that Villa initially lied about having a valid driver's license, and he had no proof that he was the registered owner of the car other than his claim to have recently purchased it, raising concerns that it was stolen. The court concluded that "I do not find that the primary reason that they searched the car was to conduct criminal searches or activity but rather to truly inventory the car that they were going to impound."
After the preliminary hearing, Villa pled guilty to two counts in the complaint. On the change of plea form, Villa stated that he wished to retain his right to appeal. Apparently realizing that he would not be able to appeal from the ruling (see People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 895-896; People v. Richardson (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 574, 584), and with the acquiescence of the prosecution and the court, Villa withdrew his plea. He then made an oral motion to suppress the evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5 and an additional motion to dismiss the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995. Using the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, the court denied both motions. Villa then pled guilty, retaining his right to appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Villa has forfeited his right to challenge the initial detention.
On appeal, Villa contends that his initial detention by the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and that "there are no facts in the record to support reasonable suspicion that [Villa] was in violation of any law when he was pulled over by police." However, Villa's motion did not raise the issue of reasonable suspicion, and therefore the parties did not focus on the issue during the hearing on the motion. Instead, the prosecutor asked the arresting officer only two brief questions regarding the reason for the detention, and defense counsel similarly limited his questions on the issue to a few questions referencing "tint" before moving on to questions regarding the inventory search. Further, during argument on the motion, Villa's counsel never raised any issue as to the initial stop.
By failing to raise the issue below (which failure no doubt resulted in the paucity of evidence in the record on the issue), Villa has forfeited his appellate challenge to it. (See People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130 ["if defendants detect a critical gap in the prosecution's proof or a flaw in its legal analysis, they must object on that basis to admission of the evidence or risk forfeiting the issue on appeal"].)
B. The impound of Villa's vehicle was not reasonable as a matter of law, and therefore the inventory search of it was not reasonable.
We review the trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079.) We review de novo whether a search was unreasonable, exercising our independent judgment on the issue. (Blakes v. Superior Court (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 904, 910 (Blakes).) Here, we credit the trial court's finding that "the primary reason" of the search was to inventory the car that the officers had decided to impound. However, we focus on a preceding step: whether it was reasonable to impound Villa's car.
"When a vehicle is impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody, an officer may conduct a warrantless search aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle and its contents." (Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.) The Lee court noted that such a search" 'must be justified by a community caretaking function . . . because inventory searches are "conducted in the absence of probable cause." '" Inventory searches may not be used as a pretext to search for incriminating evidence. (Ibid.)
In reviewing the constitutionality of an inventory search pursuant to an impound, we consider both objective and subjective factors. (See Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at pp. 786-788 [reviewing court may consider both the officers' subjective motivation for impounding the vehicles as well as the objective reasonableness of the impound]; Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.)
Our analysis of objective reasonableness focuses on the reasonableness of the purpose of the impound, i.e., whether it is intended to secure or protect the car and its contents (the "community caretaking function"). (Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 787.) This function looks to noncriminal factors such as whether the vehicle is blocking traffic or pedestrians; at risk of vandalism; or whether a licensed driver is available to move the vehicle, obviating the need to impound.
Thus, for example, in People v. Benites (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309, 326, the court found the impound decision to be reasonable where the traffic stop was late at night, in an isolated area in which the vehicle could be vandalized, and no licensed driver was available to move the vehicle.
In contrast, in Lee, the court concluded that the impound was not reasonable because the car was not blocking any roadway, driveway or sidewalk. (Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 868.) The court in Torres similarly pointed out: "[t]he prosecution failed to show the truck was illegally parked, at an enhanced risk of vandalism, impeding traffic or pedestrians, or could not be driven away by someone other than defendant." (Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 792; see also People v. Williams, (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 762-763) [impound decision was unreasonable where car was parked at curb in front of appellant's home].)
Similarly, in Blakes, the court concluded that there was no community caretaking function served by the impound of a vehicle that was legally parked in a public parking lot and was not at risk of theft or vandalism. Further, the detectives "did not afford [Villa] the opportunity to call someone to drive his car to another location." (Blakes, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 914).
Here, the undisputed evidence established that Villa's car was parked in daylight hours in the medium-sized parking lot of a busy shopping area. It was not blocking any driveway or sidewalk. Although it was parked on the painted line between two spaces, the officer raised no concern about the parking issue. Further, Villa protested the impound decision ("so you guys have to tow it?") and asked if he could call his wife, but Officer Arreola did not follow up to inquire whether she might be available to come take possession of the vehicle. (Cf. Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 868; Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 792.)
Apart from Villa's expired driver's license, Respondent focuses on Officer Arreola's suspicions that the car might be stolen, suggesting that the officers' "desire to safeguard potentially stolen property is a caretaking purpose." We disagree. "The decision to impound the vehicle must be justified by a community caretaking function 'other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.'" (Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 787, quoting Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 375.) If the officers wished to further detain Villa or search the vehicle to investigate their suspicions of additional crimes, including whether the vehicle was stolen, they could do so in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, e.g., by establishing reasonable suspicion for a detention or probable cause to obtain a warrant. The community caretaking function does not exist for the purpose of aiding a criminal investigation. (See, e.g., People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1050-1051 [noting that the community caretaking function does "not create a generalized exception to the warrant requirement" and, as to vehicle searches, "[t]he caretaking function entailed only the securing of items in those vehicles"].)
The cases cited by the Attorney General do not stand for such a broad proposition. (See People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 721 [officer had arrested defendant, whose vehicle registration had expired more than six months earlier]; People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887, 892 [car was blocking a driveway and there was no other licensed driver available].)
In sum, the undisputed facts show that Villa's vehicle was not impeding or blocking traffic and was not at particular risk of vandalism, and the officers made no effort to give Villa an opportunity to have someone else pick up the car. Under these facts, the impound was unreasonable, and therefore the resulting inventory search was unreasonable. (See Blakes, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 913; Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 786 ["an inventory search conducted pursuant to an unreasonable impound is itself unreasonable"].)
Because we conclude that the impound was not objectively proper as part of a community caretaking function, we do not address the officer's subjective intent, which in some instances might render a decision to impound and the subsequent inventory search unlawful under the Fourth Amendment "even when some objectively reasonable basis exists for the impounding." (Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 788; Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 867.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions for the court to vacate its order denying the motion to set aside the information and issue a new order granting the motion.
WE CONCUR: DATO, Acting P. J., RUBIN, J.