Opinion
December 12, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Frank Torres, J.).
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution ( People v Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 105), and taking into account the statutory presumption that the presence of a controlled substance in an automobile is presumptive evidence of knowing possession thereof by each person in the automobile (Penal Law § 220.25; People v Dillon, 207 A.D.2d 793, 797, lv granted 86 N.Y.2d 793), we find that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury showing that the duffel bag found on the passenger seat of a taxi between the defendants contained more than two pounds of cocaine was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that each of the defendants knowingly possessed four ounces or more of a substance containing a narcotic drug, as is required to establish the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (Penal Law § 220.21).
Moreover, a Grand Jury need not be charged with the same degree of precision as a petit jury ( People v Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36, 38; People v Calbud, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 389, 394). In this case, the charge to the Grand Jury, which tracked the statutory language describing the elements of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, was sufficient to enable the Grand Jury to determine whether there existed legally sufficient evidence to establish the material elements of the crime, and the prosecutor's failure to specifically apprise the Grand Jury that the evidence must show that each defendant knew that he possessed the requisite weight of controlled substance ( see, People v Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 22; People v Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497) was not so misleading as to impair the integrity of the Grand Jury, as is required for dismissal (CPL 210.35; People v Darby, 75 N.Y.2d 449, 455).
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Ellerin, Wallach, Asch and Tom, JJ.