Opinion
Docket No. CR-029116-21SU
01-26-2023
PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Meredith VENTURA, Defendant
Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney of Suffolk County, Brandon Wong / Of Counsel, District Court Bureau, 400 Carleton Avenue, Central Islip, NY 11722, for the People. Michael J. Brown, Esq., 320 Carleton Avenue, Suite 2000, Central Islip, NY 11722, for defendant.
Raymond A. Tierney, District Attorney of Suffolk County, Brandon Wong / Of Counsel, District Court Bureau, 400 Carleton Avenue, Central Islip, NY 11722, for the People.
Michael J. Brown, Esq., 320 Carleton Avenue, Suite 2000, Central Islip, NY 11722, for defendant.
Eric Sachs, J.
ORDERED that this motion by the defendant is decided as follows: The defendant's motion to strike the CoC/SoR is DENIED. The defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instruments based upon an alleged violation of her statutory speedy trial rights is DENIED.
On November 6, 2021, the defendant was arrested and charged under Docket No. CR-029116-21SU with one count of Driving While Intoxicated in violation of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") § 1192.3, an unclassified misdemeanor, and Reckless Driving in violation of VTL § 1212, an unclassified misdemeanor, along with seven traffic infractions. She was arraigned on November 7, 2021.
On December 24, 2021, the defendant was separately arrested and charged under Docket # CR-032972-21SU with one count of Driving While Intoxicated in violation of VTL § 1192.3. The instant motion, filed under Docket # CR-029116-21SU, does not appear to be addressed to that charge.
A. Prior Motion History
By motion dated March 23, 2022, the defendant moved this Court for an order (1) dismissing three informations charging traffic infractions as legally insufficient; (2) striking the CoC/SoR as invalid; and (3) dismissing all accusatory instruments based upon an alleged violation of her statutory speedy trial rights.
In an order dated July 27, 2022, this Court (1) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the three informations charging traffic infractions, (2) denied the defendant's motion to strike the CoC/SoR, and (3) denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instruments based upon the alleged violation of her speedy trial rights. With respect to the defendant's prior motion to strike the CoC/SoR, the defendant argued that where a defendant is charged in multiple accusatory instruments, and the People have certified in a single CoC/SoR as to the legal sufficiency of all accusatory instruments, and some of those accusatory instruments are later deemed facially insufficient, the entire CoC/SoR is invalid. In its prior order, this Court rejected that argument, and held that the People's initial CoC/SoR was valid despite the fact that three accusatory instruments were legally insufficient. This Court reasoned:
"It is the opinion of this Court that where the People certified as to the legal sufficiency of all accusatory instruments, and some accusatory instruments are later deemed facially insufficient, the initial CoC/SoR is nevertheless still valid as to the remaining accusatory instruments.
Therefore, the fact that three accusatory instruments are deemed by this Court to be facially insufficient does not render the CoC/SoR filed on December 14, 2021 invalid with respect to the remaining charges. See , e.g. , People v Ward , 73 Misc 3d 1221(A), 155 N.Y.S.3d 287 [City Ct, City of Poughkeepsie 2021] [CoC/SoR containing facially insufficient traffic infractions was not invalid on ground that it included such infractions, where defendant was also charged with other offenses; nevertheless, the People were required to file supplemental CoC/SoR after Court dismissed facially insufficient traffic infractions, and initial CoC/SoR was rendered illusory when People failed to do so]. Accord , People v Ausby , 46 Misc 3d 126(A), 7 N.Y.S.3d 244 [App. Term 1st Dep't 2014] [statement of readiness as to converted charge effectively stopped speedy trial clock as to that charge, even where the
accusatory instrument contained a subsequently dismissed charge]. Thus, the defendant's motion to strike the December 14, 2021 CoC/SoR is denied.
7/27/22 Order at p. 5.
Since this Court determined that the initial CoC/SoR was valid as to the counts deemed legally sufficient, the Court determined that the People had not exceeded their statutory speedy trial time. Accordingly, this Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss based on an alleged speedy trial violation.
B. Instant Motion
On October 14, 2022, the defendant filed a second motion to (1) strike the CoC/SoR as invalid and (2) dismiss based upon an alleged violation of the defendant's speedy trial rights. (See generally Def.’s Aff. (10/14/2022)).
This Court addresses both motions, below.
1. Motion to Strike the CoC/SoR
The defendant argues that the People's initial CoC/SoR is invalid because the People were required, and failed, to file a Supplemental CoC/SoR following this Court's July 27, 2022 Order dismissing three of the accusatory instruments. (See Def.’s Aff. (10/14/2022) at ¶¶ 4-5. The defendant contends that this Court's Order (citing the Ward decision), and the Ward decision itself, require a Supplemental CoC/SoR be filed where an initial CoC/SoR certified as to counts later dismissed. Therefore, the defendant asserts that the time from the date of this Court's order on July 27, 2022 until the filing of the instant motion on October 14, 2022 (79 days), are chargeable to the People (in addition to the 37 days previously found by the Court to be chargeable to the People); consequently, the People have used a total of 116 days on the speedy trial clock. (Id. at ¶ 5). The People contend that no such Supplemental CoC/SoR is required.
In support of its argument, the defendant notes that, in their original CoC/SoR, the People certified that "all counts charged in the accusatory instruments(s) meet the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this Criminal Procedure Law and any counts not meeting the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 have been dismissed." (12/14/2021 CoC/SoR). The defendant argues that the CoC/SoR was not accurate when filed inasmuch as "counts not meeting the [statutory requirements]" were not dismissed prior to the filing of the CoC/SoR, but after ; hence a Supplemental CoC/SoR is required.
It is the opinion of this Court that no Supplemental CoC/SoR is required. Pursuant to CPL § 30.30(5-a), "a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts charges in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements of section 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter and those counts not meeting the requirements of section 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter have been dismissed."
The purpose of a CoC is for the People to certify compliance with discovery obligations pursuant to CPL § 245.20. See CPL § 245.50(1) and People v. Ramirez , 73 Misc. 3d 664, 155 N.Y.S.3d 537 [Crim. Ct., N.Y. Cnty 2021]. Here, the People initially certified that they had complied with their discovery obligations as to all counts in their their CoC/SoR. While the initial certification was incorrect as to some counts, it was correct as to others.
In sum, this Court does not believe there is a statutory basis for requiring the People to re-certify as to counts previously properly certified. Moreover, to the extent the Ward case required the People to file a Supplemental CoC/SoR and struck the initial CoC/SoR and dismissed the accusatory instrument in that case, the Ward case is an out-of-district case and is not controlling. Finally, this Court disagrees that its prior Order mandated that the People file a Supplemental CoC/SoR.
In the absence of any statutory basis or appellate-level authority requiring a Supplemental CoC/SoR in the factual situation presented in this case, this Court declines to impose such a requirement. As stated in its 7/27/2022 Order, it is the opinion of this Court that where the People certified as to the legal sufficiency of all accusatory instruments, and some accusatory instruments are later deemed facially insufficient, the initial CoC/SoR is nevertheless still valid as to the remaining accusatory instruments.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to strike the initial CoC/SoR is DENIED.
2. Motion to Dismiss Based on an Alleged Speedy Trial Violation
As noted above, the defendant has also moved to dismiss based upon an alleged violation of the defendant's speedy trial rights. (See Def.’s Aff. (10/14/2022) at ¶ 5).
The defendant's motion to dismiss is based on the contention that the People's December 14, 2021 is invalid. For the reasons discussed above, this Court finds that the defendant's December 14, 2021 CoC/SoR is valid as to the surviving charges (i.e. , two misdemeanors, and four traffic infractions).
Thus, the defendant's motion to dismiss the surviving charges based on an alleged speedy trial violation is DENIED.
By reason of the foregoing, the defendant's motion to strike the CoC/SoR is DENIED. The defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instruments based upon an alleged violation of her statutory speedy trial rights is DENIED.