Opinion
2012-07-18
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Nigel VASSER, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Steven R. Bernhard of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano and Merri Turk Lasky of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Steven R. Bernhard of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano and Merri Turk Lasky of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lasak, J.), rendered June 30, 2010, convicting him of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant had a hostile relationship with an individual who went by the name “Buddha,” who was a member of a rival gang. On the day of the shooting which gave rise to the instant charges, witnesses saw the defendant hold a gun with his arm extended, point it at Buddha, and fire several shots at him. Buddha ran and hid behind a building; after a pause, the defendant resumed shooting, striking a bystander once in the head and causing her death.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the defendant's guilt of murder in the second degree was established by legally sufficient evidence ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932). The element of intent was established by evidence that the defendant pointed a loaded firearm at Buddha and fired multiple shots ( see People v. Mei Ying Wang, 33 A.D.3d 820, 821, 826 N.Y.S.2d 285;People v. Braithwaite, 286 A.D.2d 507, 729 N.Y.S.2d 636;People v. Colon, 275 A.D.2d 797, 713 N.Y.S.2d 738). The defendant's guilt of attempted murder in the second degree was also established by legally sufficient evidence ( see People v. Nedd, 90 A.D.3d 1076, 934 N.Y.S.2d 848;People v. Hernandez, 257 A.D.2d 664, 684 N.Y.S.2d 573).
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independentreview of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15 [5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe their demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdicts of guilt of murder in the second degree and attempted murder in the second degree were not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
Recordings of telephone conversations which the defendant made while he was being held at Rikers Island, in which he discussed the shooting, were admitted into evidence at trial. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People established the foundation for the admission of those recordings through the testimony of an individual familiar with the record-keeping practices of the Department of Corrections ( see People v. Collins, 90 A.D.3d 1069, 934 N.Y.S.2d 830;People v. Williams, 55 A.D.3d 1398, 864 N.Y.S.2d 611).
The Supreme Court properly imposed consecutive sentences for the defendant's convictions of murder in the second degree and attempted murder in the second degree ( see People v. McKnight, 16 N.Y.3d 43, 917 N.Y.S.2d 594, 942 N.E.2d 1019;People v. Bonilla, 57 A.D.3d 400, 401–402, 870 N.Y.S.2d 18). Moreover, the sentences imposed for all the convictions were not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 83–86, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).