Summary
In Vasquez, the specific ruling was that where a conviction is based solely upon identification testimony by a single witness who made a brief observation of his assailant, any error which is apt to enhance the weight of such testimony may not be disregarded as being merely technical in nature.
Summary of this case from People v. EyreOpinion
May 27, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vinik, J.).
Judgment reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and new trial ordered.
The cumulative prejudicial effect of several errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial. On two occasions, the complaining witness testified that he went to the police precinct to see photographs. On each occasion, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but instead the trial court gave a curative instruction. Nevertheless, once the jury had become aware that there had been a photographic identification, the inference that the defendant had prior criminal involvement was obvious, and the inference was accentuated since the defendant failed to take the stand (see, People v Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18, 21).
It was also improper for the arresting officer to testify, over objection, that he arrested the defendant after conferring with the complaining witness and determining that the witness was certain of his identification. This testimony amounted to implicit bolstering and was error (see, People v Johnson, 57 N.Y.2d 969; see also, People v Holt, 67 N.Y.2d 819). Where, as here, a conviction is based solely upon identification testimony by a single witness who made a brief observation of his assailant, any error which is apt to enhance the weight of such testimony may not be disregarded as being merely technical in nature (see, People v Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471, 477). Moreover, the case involved only the issue of identification, yet the jury indicated it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict after six hours of deliberation. Thus, the bolstering error cannot, on these facts, be considered harmless (see, People v Johnson, supra, p 970; People v Mobley, 56 N.Y.2d 584, 585).
Additionally, the prosecutor's departure from the four corners of the evidence (see, People v Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109), vouching for the complaining witness' credibility (People v Arce, 42 N.Y.2d 179, 190), and other improprieties during summation, while standing alone might not have warranted reversal, when taken cumulatively with all the trial errors, had the effect of depriving the defendant of a fair trial (see, People v Cobb, 104 A.D.2d 656). Bracken, J.P., Brown, Weinstein and Spatt, JJ., concur.