Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. KA074614. Tia Fisher, Judge.
Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Angelo Jacob Vasquez.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Salvador Villanueva.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Chung L. Mar, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
RUBIN, ACTING P. J.
Angelo Jacob Vasquez and Salvador Villanueva appeal from the judgment entered after a jury convicted them of aiding and abetting two murders and one attempted murder. They both contend the court erred by giving incomplete self-defense instructions, that there was insufficient evidence to support a gun use allegation, that the pattern jury instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine was defective, and that improper instructions on the gun use allegation were given. Vasquez contends there was insufficient evidence he aided and abetted the crimes or that the crimes were the natural and probable consequences of their intended conduct. He also attacks the constitutionality of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and contends his life sentence was unconstitutional. We reject their contentions and affirm the judgment.
Villanueva joins in Vasquez’s contention that the natural and probable consequences doctrine is unconstitutional.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the afternoon of April 3, 2006, Christopher Murray shot and killed Christopher Trevizo and Demetries Flores, and shot at but missed Damon Flores, the brother of Demetries Flores. Accompanying Murray were Angelo Vasquez and Salvador Villanueva, who pointed guns at each of the Flores brothers, but fired no shots. Murray pleaded no contest to murdering Trevizo and Demetries Flores, and to the attempted murder of Damon Flores. Vasquez and Villanueva were convicted as aiders and abettors of the murders of Trevizo and Demetries Flores, and of the attempted murder of Damon Flores.
For ease of reference we will refer to the Flores brothers by their first names.
Murray contended he was insane at the time of the crimes, but a jury found he was sane. We affirmed the sanity verdict on appeal, but reversed and remanded for resentencing. (People v. Murray (May 11, 2009, B203444) [nonpub. opn.].)
Villanueva was convicted of first degree murder as to Trevizo and second degree murder as to Demetries. Vasquez was convicted of second degree murder as to both those victims.
The evidence showed that Murray was a marijuana dealer, and that in February or March of 2006 Trevizo and two other men stole marijuana from Murray at gunpoint. Mallory Parker, who was Murray’s girlfriend, said Murray was angry about that incident. Villanueva and Vasquez were Murray’s good friends. She heard Villanueva tell Murray that he “need[ed] to handle his shit, ” and said he could get a gun. Villanueva admitted at trial that he stole the murder weapon – a.357 magnum handgun – from a car and gave it to Murray. Vasquez told Murray he needed to stick up for himself.
According to Damon, Trevizo and Murray spoke to each other by phone the morning of April 3, 2006. Trevizo did not sound angry during their conversation. That afternoon, Damon, Trevizo, and Demetries were headed to a nearby wash in their Hacienda Heights neighborhood in order to smoke marijuana. As they neared the wash, they saw Murray, Vasquez, and Villanueva walking toward them. The Trevizo trio hopped a fence in order to enter the wash area. The Murray trio followed them, with Villanueva and then Vasquez going first, and Murray going last. As soon as the Murray trio cleared the fence, Damon saw that Villanueva and Vasquez had guns in their hands. Villanueva pointed his gun at Damon, and Vasquez pointed his gun at Demetries. The Trevizo trio was unarmed.
For ease of reference, we will sometimes refer to Murray, Vasquez, and Villanueva collectively as the Murray trio, and to Trevizo, Damon, and Demetries collectively as the Trevizo trio.
Damon heard Trevizo and Murray talking, but could not hear what they were saying. Eventually, however, Damon concluded Trevizo and Murray were going to fight. Damon walked toward them to see if he could do anything, but Villanueva, whose gun was still pointed at Damon, pressed the barrel against Damon’s abdomen and told Damon to stop. Damon complied. According to Damon, Villanueva and Vasquez appeared “threatening and controlling.” Murray then walked toward Trevizo “like he was going to sock him, ” but then turned his back to Trevizo, pulled out a gun, and shot Trevizo in the head. Villanueva and Vasquez stood there for a second, then ran off. Even though Trevizo was on the ground, Murray shot him again. Demetries told Damon to run, and Damon took off. When Demetries tried to flee, Murray asked him where he was going. Demetries answered “nowhere, ” and Murray shot him. Murray then fired several shots at Damon as Damon fled.
The Murray trio ended up at Vasquez’s house after the shootings. According to Parker, who arrived there later, all three appeared to have showered. Villanueva confirmed this, testifying that all three showered and put their clothes in a trash bag. Mike Shokuri, who was friends with the Murray trio, testified that when he went to Villanueva’s house later that day, Murray put the trash bag and a backpack in Shokuri’s car. Shokuri threw the bag away, and left the backpack at a friend’s house. Shokuri went to the sheriff’s department that night to report what happened, then led deputies to the backpack. Inside was the.357 Magnum Murray had used.
Villanueva testified that he, Vasquez, and Murray, had been smoking marijuana the morning of April 3, 2006. The trio then decided to go to a liquor store and buy some food. Before they left, Murray pulled out three handguns and nagged Villanueva and Vasquez into carrying one so they could be “the three amigos.” Villanueva’s and Vasquez’s guns were not loaded. On their way to the liquor store, Murray spotted the Trevizo trio and said he wanted to talk to Trevizo. They hopped the fence leading to the wash area and approached the Trevizo trio. Villanueva said that when they followed the Trevizo trio over the fence, he believed Murray and Trevizo were going to “smooth things out. Maybe escalate to a fight maybe” but nothing beyond that.
Murray and Trevizo began arguing and Trevizo said “let’s do this one-on-one.” Murray said “Fuck that.” At that point, according to Villanueva, Damon came towards him and tried to circle around behind him. Villlanueva pulled out his gun for the first and only time, and asked, “What the hell are you doing?” Damon answered “nothing” and backed off. Villanueva put the gun away, and assumed that Trevizo and Murray were simply going to fight. Instead, Murray shot Trevizo. When he and Vasquez heard the first shot, they were scared and took off running. He was repelled and shocked by what Murray had done, and had no idea Murray was thinking of shooting anyone. Murray caught up with him soon after. Although Villanueva was angry at Murray, he accepted a ride to Vasquez’s house from Murray because he believed it was the fastest way to get out of the situation and away from Murray.
Villanueva was so upset by what happened that he spent part of that night vomiting. The next day, he went to the sheriff’s department to tell them what had happened. He told detectives that he did not know how to obtain a gun, and that Murray got the murder weapon from someone else.
Villanueva and Vasquez were tried on the theory that they either aided and abetted the shootings, or that they aided and abetted a planned assault with a firearm, and the shootings were the natural and probable consequences of the planned offense. Villanueva asked that the jury be instructed on self-defense and imperfect self-defense. The trial court granted that request in part, and instructed the jury that if it believed Villanueva pulled his gun on Damon in self-defense, that it could not consider that act in determining whether Villanueva aided and abetted Murray.
Although the jury was instructed on reasonable self-defense as to Villanueva’s conduct in pointing a gun at Damon, Villanueva contends he was entitled to complete instructions on perfect and imperfect self-defense, both as to himself, and, derivatively, as to Murray. He also contends that: the CALJIC No. 3.02 instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine was erroneous because it did not inform the jury he could be guilty of a lesser offense than Murray, and because it improperly shifted the burden of proof on malice as an element of homicide; there was insufficient evidence to support a gun use allegation; and the trial court erred by not defining what it meant to use a gun in the commission of certain offenses. Vasquez joins in these arguments. Vasquez contends: there was insufficient evidence he intended to aid and abet the shootings, or that they were the natural and probable consequences of the intended offense; the natural and probable consequences doctrine is unconstitutional; and his sentence of 25 years to life was constitutionally cruel and unusual.
DISCUSSION
1. Self-Defense Instructions
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on defenses and lesser included offenses when there is substantial supporting evidence. (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 553 (Moye).) So-called “perfect” self-defense is a complete defense to a murder charge. It requires evidence that the defendant reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. “Imperfect” self-defense negates malice and reduces homicide to voluntary manslaughter. It exists when the defendant subjectively, but unreasonably, believed in the need for self-defense. (Id. at p. 550.) Villanueva contends both instructions were warranted for two reasons. First, because his liability was derivative of Murray’s, evidence that Murray acted in perfect or imperfect self-defense called for the instruction. Second, evidence that he pulled his gun on Damon only in response to a perceived attack by Damon called for the instructions.
As to the first, there is no evidence that Murray entertained even an unreasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury when he shot Trevizo and Demetries, or when he fired at Damon. The undisputed evidence shows that Murray, armed with a handgun and accompanied by two companions carrying handguns, followed the Trevizo trio into the wash area. Murray and Trevizo began arguing and, according to Damon, Murray moved as if he intended to hit Trevizo, then turned his back on him, pulled out a gun and fired. Murray then shot and killed Demetries as he began to flee, and fired at Damon as he ran away. Even according to Villanueva, it looked like nothing more than a fist fight was about to happen. On this record, there was no evidence that Murray subjectively or reasonably believed his life was in jeopardy.
Second, even if the self-defense instructions were warranted as to Villanueva’s state of mind, we will reverse only if a different outcome was reasonably probable had the instructions been given. (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 555-556.) Assuming for the sake of argument that they were, we conclude the error was harmless.
Villanueva’s liability was based on the theory that he aided and abetted Murray in, at a minimum, an assault with a firearm on Trevizo, with the murder of Demetries and the attempted murder of Damon, flowing as the natural and probable consequences of that assault. In order to establish Villanueva’s guilt, the prosecution had to show that he shared the same specific intent as Trevizo did, and aided or encouraged Trevizo with the intent of helping him commit that crime. (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259.) Villanueva argued that he lacked the intent to aid or abet any assault by Trevizo based on the same evidence that he contends supports his requested self-defense instructions – that he was not aware of any plan to shoot anyone, did not intend to shoot anyone, and pulled his gun on Damon briefly only when Damon came toward him. By finding that Villanueva aided and abetted Murray, the jury obviously rejected that evidence. Therefore, even had the jury been instructed as Villanueva wished on perfect and imperfect self-defense, it is not reasonably probable the jury would have disbelieved Villanueva’s evidence in connection with his intent to aid and abet, then turned around and believed the same evidence in order to acquit him based on perfect self-defense, or convict him of the lesser included offense of manslaughter.
Moreover, Villanueva does not contend on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the aiding and abetting component of his crimes.
2. No Error By Giving CALJIC No. 3.02
A person who knowingly aids and abets a crime is guilty of not just the intended crime, but of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. The issue is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable. (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920 (Medina).)
The jury was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine with CALJIC No. 3.02, which read in part: “One who aids and abets the commission of a crime is not only guilty of that crime but is also guilty of any other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and probable consequence of the crime originally aided and abetted.” Villanueva contends this improperly directed the jury to believe it had to convict him of the same crime Murray committed, even if Villanueva had a different mental state and intent and was therefore guilty of some lesser offense.
This argument fails because it assumes CALJIC No. 3.02 has the same meaning as CALCRIM No. 400, which states that “[a] person is equally guilty of the crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed it.” That instruction has been criticized as potentially misleading because, depending on the case, the aider and abettor’s mental state might make him guilty of a lesser offense. (See People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1164-1165.) Unlike CALCRIM No. 400, CALJIC No. 3.02 does not state that an aider and abettor is “equally guilty” with the direct perpetrator.
However, the jury was also instructed with CALJIC No. 3.00, which, like CALCRIM No. 400, does state that persons who commit crimes are principals, that principals may be those who directly take part in a crime or can be aiders and abettors, and that each principal, regardless of the extent of his participation, is equally guilty. At oral argument, Villanueva cited People v. Nero (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 504, which held that the use of CALJIC No. 3.00 was error under the circumstances of that case.
Both Nero and Samaniego differ from this case in a few key respects. First, in neither case does the appellate court state that the juries were instructed with the version of CALJIC No. 3.02 that was given here. The jury in this case was instructed with CALJIC No. 3.02 that in order to find Villanueva guilty of the murders and the attempted murder, “or the lesser crimes thereto under this theory of liability, you must be satisfied” that an assault with a firearm was committed, that Villanueva aided and abetted that crime, that a co-principal committed murder and attempted murder, and that the “crimes of First Degree Murder or Second Degree Murder or Voluntary Manslaughter or Attempted Murder or Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter were a natural and probable consequence of the” weapon assault crime. The jury was also instructed on the lesser included offenses of voluntary and attempted voluntary manslaughter and was told it could find Villanueva guilty of those offenses. Thus, viewing the instructions as a whole (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 252), the jury was told that Villanueva could be guilty of lesser crimes than murder or attempted murder.
Second, the jury in Nero, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 504, asked whether it could find an aider and abettor defendant guilty of a lesser crime than the direct perpetrator, and the court instructed the jury it could not do so. Further, the evidence was very much in dispute. Those factors led the Nero court to hold that the error was prejudicial. (Id. at p. 519.) In this case, the jury did not ask that question and, in fact, found different levels of criminal liability existed between Villanueva and Vasquez, concluding that Villanueva committed first degree murder as to Trevizo and second degree murder as to Demetries, while finding Vasquez guilty of second degree murder as to both. If the jury believed it had to find appellants equally guilty with Murray, then it would have concluded Murray committed the first degree murder of Trevizo when it found Villanueva guilty of that offense. The jury would then have found Vasquez equally guilty, but did not. In short, on this record, we hold that any error in giving CALJIC No. 3.00 was harmless.
Villanueva also contends CALJIC No. 3.02 impermissibly shifted to him the burden of proof on malice because, in determining whether the shootings were the natural and probable consequences of an assault with a firearm by Murray, it told the jury to apply “an objective test, based not on what the defendant actually intended, but on what a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to occur.” This contention has been rejected by our Supreme Court (see People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1021-1022; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 777-778) and we must abide by those decisions.
3. Substantial Evidence Supports Vasquez’s Convictions
Vasquez contends there was insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted Murray in a plan to kill the victims, that he aided and abetted Murray in a planned assault with a firearm, or that the murder of Demetries and attempted murder of Damon were the natural and probable consequences of Murray’s intended actions. He bases this on the following evidence: Villanueva’s statement that the guns were not loaded; there was no evidence the Murray trio discussed using the guns right before the incident; Vasquez knew the Trevizo trio and had no animosity towards them; it was assumed by all that only a fist fight might ensue; Vasquez kept his gun pointed toward the ground and said nothing to encourage Murray; and he fled right after the first shot was fired and was no longer there while Murray shot Trevizo again, then shot at Demetries and Damon.
We review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175.) Our inquiry is directed to whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, because that is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. Unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction. (Id. at pp. 1180-1181.) These rules apply to circumstantial evidence, and we must also accept logical inferences that a jury might have drawn from such evidence. (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
Our review of the record discloses the following conflicting evidence. Murray was angry at Trevizo because Trevizo and two other companions stole marijuana from him at gunpoint. Villanueva told Murray he had to “handle his shit” and that he could get him a gun. Vasquez told Murray he needed to stick up for himself. According to Villanueva, Vasquez was with him when he stole the eventual murder weapon that he later gave to Murray. Murray, Vasquez, and Villanueva were all carrying guns as they spotted the Trevizo trio and then followed them into the wash area. In his statement to the police, Villanueva said that when they saw the Trevizo trio, Murray said “Let’s go handle him.” Although Villanueva claimed the guns were not loaded, the jury was not required to accept that evidence. Damon testified that Vasquez pointed the gun at Demetries, and that both Villanueva and Vasquez appeared threatening and controlling. Even though Vasquez ran after the first shot was fired, he joined up with Murray and Villanueva soon after. The three then showered and disposed of their clothes and weapons.
Based on this, the jury could reasonably deduce that Vasquez and Villanueva were encouraging Murray to take revenge on Trevizo for stealing Murray’s marijuana. To accomplish this, Villanueva said he could get a gun for Murray, then stole what turned out to be the murder weapon while in the company of Vasquez. Obtaining a gun so Murray could take revenge on Trevizo is inconsistent with the notion that only a fist fight was expected. The Murray trio, all armed with handguns (even though not all loaded), then spotted and followed the Trevizo trio into the wash area after Murray said, “Let’s handle him.” Vasquez pointed his gun at Demetries and Villanueva pointed his at Damon while Murray confronted Trevizo. Once Murray fired the first shot, Vasquez and Villanueva ran. The jury could conclude from this that Vasquez and Villanueva stayed to assist Murray until he shot Trevizo. That they were acting in concert throughout is also a logical inference from the fact that despite running after the first shot, Vasquez rejoined Villanueva and Murray later on and took steps to conceal or dispose of the evidence. Pieced together, this evidence supports, at a minimum, the conclusion that Vasquez knew Murray was going to shoot Trevizo, and took steps to help plan, carry out, and cover-up, their participation.
A rational trier of fact could also deduce from this chain of events that the murder of Demetries and the attempted murder of Damon were the natural and probable consequences of Murray’s plan to shoot Trevizo. As discussed earlier, someone who aids and abets one crime is guilty of any other committed by the actual perpetrator so long as the additional crime was a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. (Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920.) A natural and probable consequence is one that is reasonably foreseeable. The consequence need not have been a strong probability, and a possible consequence that might reasonably have been contemplated is enough. This question is evaluated under all the factual circumstances of the individual case, and is a factual issue to be resolved by the trier of fact. (Ibid.)
The jury could have concluded that Murray shot at Demetries and Damon because he wanted to eliminate them as witnesses to his just-completed murder of Trevizo. Such conduct is a natural and probable consequence of the act of shooting Trevizo. (People v. Woods (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1594-1595.) We therefore hold there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determinations.
4. The Gun Use Enhancement Was Supported By Sufficient Evidence
The jury found true allegations that Villanueva and Vasquez personally used a firearm in the commission of all three shootings. (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (b).) They contend there was insufficient evidence to support those findings, especially in regard to the shootings of Demetries and Damon, which they claim occurred after they fled the scene. In particular, they contend, personal use cannot be based on derivative aider and abettor liability. We disagree.
Personal firearm use for these purposes means, among other things, to make instrumental to an end or process and to apply to advantage. The term “use” must be broadly construed to further the Legislature’s intent to deter firearm use. (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 806.) The firearm use does not have to be strictly contemporaneous with the base felony. In making this determination, the trier of fact “ ‘may consider a “video” of the entire encounter; it is not limited to a “snapshot” of the moments immediately preceding [the primary offense]. Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that although defendant’s presence with the victims was sporadic, the control and fear created by his initial firearm display continued throughout the encounter.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 806-807.) A gun use occurs in the commission of a crime if it objectively facilitates the commission of the offense. The issue is not one of the gun user’s subjective mental state, but of the objective role the gun use played in the commission of the crime. (People v. Wardell (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1495.)
Personal gun use occurs even if the defendant points the gun at the victim’s companions in order to neutralize those who might interfere with successful completion of the crime. (People v. Granado (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 317, 329-330.) Because the jury could conclude from the evidence that Vasquez and Villanueva did just that, there is sufficient evidence that they used their firearms in connection with the shooting of Trevizo.
The same is true as to Damon and Demetries. Although People v. Walker (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 240-242 (Walker), seemingly held that personal use cannot be based on aider and abettor liability, as explained in People v. Berry (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 332 (Berry), this is not the case. Walker involved a case where there was no evidence that the aider and abettor defendant actually handled a firearm at all while the perpetrator shot someone. As the Berry court explained, “Walker left intact [a prior holding] that a defendant who personally uses a firearm in a series of joint offenses may be found to have personally used a firearm in a shooting even though he did not fire the actual shot.” (Berry, at pp. 336-337.) According to the Berry court, personal firearm use “encompasses a situation where the defendant is armed and uses his firearm in furtherance of a series of related offenses that culminates in a fatal or near fatal shooting even though the defendant does not personally fire the actual shot.” (Id. at p. 335.)
Looking at the entire video, as opposed to one or two discrete frames (People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 806), the jury could have found that Vasquez and Villanueva facilitated Murray’s murder of Demetries and attempted murder of Damon by pinning them to the spot while Murray shot Trevizo, thus preventing them from either interfering with Murray or escaping before the other shots were fired. We therefore hold there was sufficient evidence to support all three gun use allegations.
5. The Gun Use Instruction Was Correct
The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 17.19 that it had to determine whether Vasquez and Villanueva personally used a firearm “in the commission of” the crimes charged, or their lesser related offenses. This precisely tracks the language of the statute, and is a commonly understood, non-technical phrase. Because there was no objection to the instruction, or a request to clarify it, the issue is waived. (People v. Rodriguez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 543, 546-547.)
6. The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine Is Constitutional
Vasquez and Villanueva contend the natural and probable consequences doctrine is unconstitutional and violates the separation of powers doctrine because it is a judicially-created basis of criminal liability that allows for murder convictions without proof of malice. The constitutionality of this doctrine has been recognized by our courts, and we therefore reject the contention. (See People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1022-1023, and cases cited therein.)
7. Vasquez’s Sentence Was Not Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Vasquez contends his sentence of 25 years to life violated the United States and California constitutions because it was cruel and unusual punishment. He bases this on the fact that he was 16 at the time, he succumbed to peer pressure, did not intend to kill anyone, and was relatively unsophisticated.
We initially hold the issue was waived because it is fact specific and was not raised below. (People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229.) We alternatively hold on the merits that the sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment. Vasquez already had two sustained juvenile petitions for burglary and grand theft. The evidence shows that he encouraged the crime by telling Murray to stick up for himself, and was present when the murder weapon was procured by Villanueva. He used a gun to help carry out the crimes, then joined up with Murray and Villanueva to destroy the evidence by showering and disposing of their guns and clothes. Finally, the crimes were heinous and involved multiple unarmed victims. On this record we cannot say the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20-24), or that, given the facts surrounding the crime and the offender, the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 423-424.)
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: FLIER, J., LICHTMAN, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.