Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Los Angeles Superior Court. Beverly O’Connell, Judge. No. VA098880
Kathleen M. Redmond, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
RUBIN, J.
Following denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Miguel Angel Vallejo pleaded no contest to one count of transporting a controlled substance. A prison sentence was imposed, and Vallejo was ordered to pay fees and restitution. On appeal Vallejo contends physical evidence seized from the trunk of his car after he was arrested should have been suppressed because it was obtained as a result of an illegal pretextual search. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 3, 2007, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Jose Ambriz and his partner were on patrol. After conducting a random vehicle license check, the deputies pulled over the car driven by Vallejo, and arrested him for an outstanding warrant. Vallejo was driving with a suspended license.
After arresting Vallejo, the deputies searched his car. They searched the interior and the trunk. Inside the trunk, they found several wrapped presents and an unlocked toolbox containing several suspicious items, including a shaving cream can. Ambriz noticed the bottom of the can was not properly sealed. He twisted the can. It opened to reveal a glass pipe and a plastic bag containing a substance resembling methamphetamine. The items in the toolbox were seized.
Vallejo was charged with two felonies -- possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) -- and a misdemeanor of possessing a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a).) As to the two felonies, it was also alleged Vallejo had suffered three prior felony convictions under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
Initially, the information alleged Vallejo had suffered two strikes pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(d), and section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i). Eventually, both strikes were stricken.
Vallejo moved to suppress the evidence found in his trunk. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) A hearing was conducted on the motion. Ambriz testified he and his partner intended to have the car impounded after they had arrested Vallejo. (Veh. Code, § 14602.6, subd. (a) [authorizing impound when driver is arrested for driving with a suspended license].) To that end, they conducted an inventory search that yielded the evidence in the toolbox (a digital scale, a box of plastic sandwich bags, a propane torch and the shaving cream can). Ambriz testified the policy of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department requires officers to open all boxes when inventorying a car’s contents. Apart from identifying the contraband, no inventory report was prepared of the items found in Vallejo’s car. Ambriz could not recall if the toolbox had also contained tools. He did not remember what was in the presents the deputies unwrapped, but believed it was clothes. He recalled finding two cell phones on the front seat (which, his training and experience in the area of narcotics had taught him, was a common method used in drug dealer contacts), and unspecified papers in the glove box. Ambriz did not remember if jewelry had been found in the car. Ambriz photographed the contents of the trunk.
Vallejo argued the evidence found in the trunk should be suppressed because the officers did not conduct a valid inventory search for the purpose of safeguarding and recording the contents found in the car. Rather, he asserted the search was a ruse to permit the deputies to engage in “general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” The trial court disagreed, and denied the motion.
A plea agreement was reached. Vallejo pled guilty to transporting a controlled substance. He was sentenced to the midterm of three years, given credit for time served and good time/work credits, ordered to register as a narcotics offender and to provide a DNA sample. He was ordered to pay restitution and various fees. The remaining counts and allegations were dismissed.
DISCUSSION
The standard of review from denial of a motion to suppress is well settled. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review. (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1133-1134.)
The United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld warrantless inventory searches of lawfully impounded vehicles in cases in which the purpose of the intrusion is to protect the car and its contents. (See Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4-5; Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371; South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 376.) An inventory search may include closed areas, such as trunks (Colorado v. Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. at pp. 374-375), and may extend to closed containers found in the car. (Id. at pp. 372-373.) California law is in accord. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 126 [inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement].) Inventory searches are considered standard procedure once an automobile is impounded. (South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. at pp. 372-375; People v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 373; People v. Steeley (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 887, 892.)
Vallejo does not claim his car was unlawfully impounded.
Nevertheless, as observed in People v. Needham (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 260, “Inventory searches must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. [Citation.] The police may exercise discretion in opening containers during inventory searches provided that discretion is exercised according to ‘standardized criteria’ [citation] or ‘established routine’ [citation] based on some standard other than suspected criminal activity. [Citations.] ‘A police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and the characteristics of the container itself.’ [Citation.] For instance, an inventory policy permitting police officers to open closed containers when unable to ascertain the contents by examining the container’s exterior would not violate the Fourth Amendment. [Citation.] [¶] The standardized procedure or established routine authorizing the inventory search need not be written. [Citation.] However, ‘an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 266.)
Vallejo complains the inventory search was invalid and used as a ruse to rummage for incriminating evidence because the deputies produced no written inventory of the contents of his car and Ambriz could not even recall what much of what was found outside the toolbox. We disagree.
Ambriz testified he and his partner intended to and did conduct an inventory search of Vallejo’s car before having the vehicle impounded. He testified departmental policy for inventory searches of impounded vehicles is to open all boxes, and fill out the “CHP-180” form. The deputy’s testimony alone is ample evidence of the existence of a standardized policy, and that the policy was followed in this case. (See, e.g., People v. Green, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 [even though officer did not use “the magic words ‘standard procedure,’ her matter-of-fact response” indicated post-impound inventory searches were standard department procedure]; People v. Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 127 [if search procedure is routine or standardized, policy need not be written]; People v. Needham, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 266-267 [same].)
At the outset, we note our disagreement with Vallejo’s contention that the CHP-180 form does not indicate any inventory found in the vehicle. The form reflects the officers found two radios and a spare tire, but no tape deck. It also indicates the car was examined for damage before being towed.
Moreover, the record contains ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding that a valid inventory search was undertaken: Ambriz testified that, after searching the inside of the car, the deputies opened the trunk. They found and unwrapped several wrapped gifts and the tool box, where they unexpectedly found, among other things, a shaving cream can with an unsealed bottom. Based on this evidence, the fact the toolbox also contained a working scale, propane torch and a box of baggies, and that two cell phones were recovered from the front seat, coupled with his experience and training, Ambriz’s suspicions were reasonably aroused to allow him to remove the false bottom of the can to see what might be concealed inside, inasmuch as he could reasonably assume it would not be shaving cream. The inventory search halted once contraband was discovered.
The trial court considered this evidence. It found Ambriz’s testimony credible. It noted the evidence supported Ambriz’s attestation that the sheriff’s department has a policy to search closed containers during routine inventory searches, and Vallejo had not objected to the evidence of such a policy. It also found Ambriz’s testimony credible that Vallejo was not detained under false pretenses but was pulled over because of an outstanding warrant – another point Vallejo did not contest. The CHP-180 form was used to inventory the contents and condition of the car, and had been filled out, even if it did not list a complete inventory of the contents of the car. In determining whether this search was or was not a pretext for a more generalized search, the trial court was free to consider the fact that a complete inventory was not prepared. Apparently the trial court did not give much weight to this fact, and found the inventory search was valid, conducted pursuant to a routine policy, and not a ruse. These findings were supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: COOPER, P. J., FLIER, J.