Opinion
4-24-0318
05-16-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES RUSSELL VALENTINE, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County No. 24CF163 Honorable J. Jason Chambers, Judge Presiding.
DeARMOND JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
DeARMOND JUSTICE.
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.
¶ 2 Defendant, James Russell Valentine, appeals the circuit court's order denying him pretrial release under article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), hereinafter as amended by Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). Defendant argues this court should overturn the circuit court's decision because the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) he committed detention-eligible offenses, (2) he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community. Defendant further argues the court abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain why less restrictive conditions would not avoid defendant's threat. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On February 14, 2024, defendant was charged, by indictment, with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012); 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2020)). The next day, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release under section 110-6.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)). The State alleged defendant was charged with qualifying offenses and defendant's pretrial release posed a real and present threat to the safety of persons or the community (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)). At the detention hearing, the State, relying on a probable cause statement, proffered the following in support of its petition.
¶ 5 According to the State, on June 22, 2023, police responded to a residence located at 871 8th Street in Normal, Illinois, after receiving a report of criminal sexual assault. Upon arrival, officers met with Ashley Nolan, who indicated that she and defendant were previously married but had since separated. The relationship produced two children, M.V. (born in June 2010) and a son (born in February 2015). Nolan's older daughter, M.T. (born in November 2006), resided with the family as well. Nolan told police she overheard M.T. and M.V. arguing earlier that morning about moving in with Nolan's current boyfriend. After Nolan intervened, the children told her defendant had been sexually assaulting them for years.
¶ 6 Forensic interviewers from the Children's Advocacy Center subsequently interviewed the minors. M.T. described defendant as a "monster" and indicated he had abused her for 10 years. M.T. recalled defendant first abused her in the bathroom of their home when she was six years old. After defendant brushed M.T.'s hair, he told her he wanted to play a game. Defendant turned off the light, sat on the toilet, placed a hot dog between his legs, and had M.T. bite it. When defendant turned the light back on, his penis was exposed, and he made M.T. suck it. M.T. said, later that same day, defendant made her watch a pornographic movie with him.
¶ 7 Defendant sexually assaulted M.T. almost daily by the time she was 10 years old. She had difficulty providing specific details because the assaults were so numerous; they "kind of just meshed together." M.T. said defendant offered her cannabis in exchange for sex and she would often "get high" beforehand because it "allowed her to escape mentally." According to M.T., defendant told her "his actions were a need" that he could not control.
¶ 8 Between the ages of 8 and 13, M.V. estimated defendant digitally penetrated her 75 times, vaginally penetrated her 120 times, penetrated her anus 15 times, and "made her perform oral sex on him 160 to 180 times." M.V. indicated defendant first assaulted her when she was approximately 8 or 9 years old while having an "all-nighter" with her younger brother. M.V. slept on the couch while her brother slept on the floor of the family's living room. At some point, defendant awakened M.V. and told her to come to his bedroom, where he offered her money if she smoked cannabis with him. M.V. agreed but "did not understand at that time what smoking would do to her." M.V. stated that once they finished smoking, defendant "began playing with her clothing" and "manipulating his crotch both inside and outside of his clothing" before digitally penetrating her vagina.
¶ 9 The next instance of assault described by M.V. occurred when she was 10 years old, after she walked in on defendant "sitting down" in the bathroom. According to M.V., defendant stood up and told her to "knock next time." However, he told her to stay as she was leaving. M.V. stated defendant then penetrated her vaginally with his penis. M.V. "described the experience as painful, and [it] felt like it lasted for 20 minutes." She also remembered bleeding after defendant penetrated her anus for the first time. M.V. described that experience as being "very painful" and recalled "feeling the veins on [defendant's] penis touching the wall inside her buttock." According to M.V., the last time defendant sexually assaulted her "was two to three weeks before her interview."
¶ 10 During their respective interviews, M.T. and M.V. separately described an incident where defendant sexually assaulted them together in his bedroom. Regarding that incident, the minors stated that after Nolan left for the store, defendant offered money to whomever performed the best oral sex on him. After making the children do so, defendant proceeded to digitally penetrate M.V.'s vagina as he penetrated M.T.'s anus. He then took "his penis out of M.T.'s anus and penetrat[ed] M.V. vaginally."
¶ 11 Forensic interviewers also interviewed defendant. Defendant disclosed that he and Nolan were addicted to cannabis, cocaine, and "ecstasy" during their relationship, and he acknowledged physically and mentally abusing her. Although he admitted he taught the children to not talk to the police about anything going on at home, he questioned why the abuse would have gone on for so long without it being reported to the police. Defendant also admitted he allowed the children to "run around with no parents," steal, and consume drugs. He denied sexually abusing M.T. and M.V., and he believed the children were being manipulated by Nolan.
¶ 12 The State argued that pretrial detention was necessary because defendant posed a threat to the two victims and the community at large. Specifically, it emphasized the detailed accounts given by the minors and the length of time defendant engaged in the inappropriate conduct with each victim. The State argued, given the nature of the offenses and the position of trust defendant held in the victims' lives, there were no conditions the circuit court could impose that would mitigate the risk he posed to the victims or to other children in the community. Further, the State noted defendant had previous convictions for domestic battery in 2008 and 2022.
¶ 13 In contrast, defense counsel noted defendant was 36 years old, previously employed as a carpenter, and had a stable presence in the local community for at least three years. Counsel also proffered the statement given to police by defendant's mother, Jody Wallace. Wallace told police defendant's family lived with her 80% to 90% of the time, and defendant had remained sober since late 2021. According to Wallace, defendant's family became his primary focus after his newfound sobriety. Wallace stated she overheard defendant tell Nolan that he intended to seek custody of the children because he felt it was unsafe for them to be around Nolan while she actively used drugs, which, Wallace claimed, precipitated the instant allegations.
¶ 14 Defense counsel further highlighted Nolan's accusations that police would find incriminating text messages on M.T.'s phone and defendant's social media accounts. However, police found nothing of evidentiary value on either. Additionally, counsel pointed to the lack of physical trauma after the victims' medical examinations. If released, counsel asserted defendant would reside with his mother and he agreed "to follow any directives of the court."
¶ 15 Ultimately, the circuit court denied defendant pretrial release and found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence defendant posed a real and present threat to persons or the community and no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably avoid this threat. The court further found the proof was evident or the presumption great defendant committed the offenses charged. Before doing so, the court stated it considered the nature of the charges, the pretrial detention report, the applicable statutes, and the evidence and arguments of the parties. The court then considered whether conditions were appropriate and what conditions to impose, noting the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged, defendant's convictions for domestic battery, for which "he was on a continuing order *** which had a condition that he not commit new offenses," and the available resources in the local community for pretrial release, which the court found "would not be sufficient."
¶ 16 The circuit court issued a written order on the State's verified petition for detention, doing so by checking boxes on a preprinted form. In its order, the court indicated the following reasons for concluding less restrictive conditions would be ineffective: "Community/individual safety cannot be meaningfully achieved with available conditions of pretrial release," "There is a high likelihood that Defendant will commit new criminal offenses if granted pretrial release," "Defendant has a history of *** thwarting/frustrating release/supervision conditions," and the "allegations of ongoing sexual abuse/assault of minors by 2 individuals making similar reports."
¶ 17 This appeal followed.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 Defendant's notice of appeal indicates the following relevant bases for vacating the circuit court's detention order: the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) he committed detention-eligible offenses, (2) he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community, and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate defendant's real and present threat to the safety of the community. Defendant further argues the court failed to adequately explain why less restrictive conditions would not avoid the threat. The Office of the State Appellate Defender, defendant's appointed counsel on appeal, filed an accompanying memorandum laying out the reasons for reversing the court's decision.
¶ 20 The determination of whether pretrial release should be granted or denied is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. People v. Morgan, 2024 IL App (4th) 240103, ¶ 35. "A court abuses its discretion by issuing a decision that is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable-a decision with which no reasonable person would agree." People v. Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 12. Under this standard, a reviewing court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the circuit court simply because it would have analyzed the proper factors differently. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 11. Likewise, "we will not substitute our own judgment for the trier of fact on issues regarding the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses." People v. Vega, 2018 IL App (1st) 160619, ¶ 44, 123 N.E.3d 393.
¶ 21 Defendant first argues the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the proof is evident or the presumption great he committed the offenses charged. In support, defendant emphasizes there was no physical evidence, no evidence of trauma, and no independent corroboration of the underlying allegations.
¶ 22 Under the Code, all criminal defendants are presumed eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). Before the State may overcome that presumption and secure pretrial detention of a criminal defendant under section 110-6.1(a) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2022)), the State must prove several things. One is to prove by clear and convincing evidence "the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed" an offense described in section 110-6.1(a) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1) (West 2022)).
¶ 23 Here, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding the proof was evident defendant committed an offense listed in section 110-6.1(a). Defendant was charged with multiple counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012); 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2020)), an offense listed in section 110-6.1(a)(1.5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5) (West 2022)). Moreover, the lack of physical evidence or independent corroboration does not mean the accounts of the two minor victims are unreliable. Those are matters both defendant and the State are free to develop further at trial. Defendant is alleged to have committed these offenses when he was alone with the minors, and the abuse began when the victims were approximately 6 and 8 years old. The lack of independent corroboration is unsurprising given the nature of these offenses, while the separate statements made by the minor victims serve to corroborate each other. The record also supports the court's findings. At the detention hearing, the court was persuaded by the State's proffer, which included the victims' statements detailing the incidents of abuse and describing at least one instance where defendant sexually assaulted them together. The proffer was adequate to satisfy the State's burden to show defendant likely committed detainable offenses, and it was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful for the court to have found this prerequisite satisfied by clear and convincing evidence. See Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 12.
¶ 24 Defendant next argues the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence he poses a real and present threat to the safety of any persons or persons or the community. In support, defendant asserts "the State relied mostly on the charges *** to argue that [he] posed a threat to the community as [he] did not have any prior felony convictions in his background and had never been incarcerated."
¶ 25 To deny a defendant pretrial release under section 110-6.1(e)(2) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West 2022)), the State must also prove by clear and convincing evidence "the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case." The Code gives the circuit court broad discretion in choosing what factors to consider in making this determination. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022) (setting forth factors a court may consider when considering dangerousness).
¶ 26 Here, we find the circuit court's dangerousness finding was not fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable. In issuing its ruling, the court stated it considered the nature of the charges, the pretrial detention report, the applicable statutes, and the evidence and arguments of the parties. The evidence shows defendant had multiple convictions for domestic battery. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(2)(A) (West 2022). He allegedly began sexually abusing the victims when they were between the ages of 6 and 8 years old, abused M.T. for at least 10 years, and continued abusing M.V. until as recently as "two to three weeks before her interview." See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1), (3), (6) (West 2022). The minors stated defendant offered them cannabis in exchange for sex, and defendant admitted he allowed the children to "run around with no parents," steal, and consume drugs. He also acknowledged teaching the children not to talk to the police about anything going on at home. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(4) (West 2022). Considering the alleged misconduct reflects a long-standing pattern of sexual abuse and defendant's statements to M.T. that "his actions were a need" that he could not control, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding defendant's release poses a real and present threat to the victims or the community. See Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 12.
¶ 27 Third, defendant argues the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of the community. He likewise argues the circuit court failed to adequately explain why lesser conditions could not mitigate the risk.
¶ 28 To secure an accused's pretrial detention under the dangerousness standard, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat defendant's release poses to the safety of any person or persons or the community. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3)(i) (West 2022). If the circuit court determines the defendant should be denied pretrial release, the court must make written findings summarizing the reasons for denying pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid the danger posed by defendant to any person or the community. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022). In determining compliance with the directives of the statute, the court's oral findings may be considered in conjunction with the written order. See People v. Hodge, 2024 IL App (3d) 230543, ¶ 11 (holding that, considering both the transcript of the hearing and the court's written order, the court's reasons for its detention findings were adequately stated to allow the appellate court to fully consider its decision); see also In re Madison H., 215 Ill.2d 364, 374-75, 830 N.E.2d 498, 505 (2005) (holding that an oral finding on the record may satisfy the statutory requirement that court put the factual basis for its finding of dispositional unfitness in writing if the oral finding is explicit and advises the parties of the basis for the court's decision).
¶ 29 Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's conclusion no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate defendant's threat. The State presented sufficient evidence to support the court's conclusion. At the detention hearing, the State argued, given the nature of the offenses, defendant's conduct put the victims, as well as other children in the community, at risk. The State further emphasized the position of trust defendant held in the victims' lives, the detailed accounts given by the minors, and the length of time defendant engaged in the inappropriate conduct with each victim. The court then considered whether any conditions were appropriate and what conditions to impose, noting the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged, defendant's convictions for domestic battery, for which "he was on a continuing order *** which had a condition that he not commit new offenses," and the available resources in the local community for pretrial release, which the court found "would not be sufficient." The court's written findings directed toward the conditions element reflected these considerations.
¶ 30 Given the seriousness of the offenses, the tender age of defendant's victims when he allegedly began sexually abusing them, and the prolonged period during which defendant was able to conceal the ongoing abuse, it was not unreasonable for the circuit court to conclude that the victims' safety could not be ensured if defendant was released while he awaits trial. Further, the fact the court selected specific boxes to check, boxes with reasons supported by the record, and not others, shows the court used its discretion in weighing the evidence and in providing the reasons for its findings. Thus, there are no errors on these grounds. See Atterberry, 2023 IL App (4th) 231028, ¶ 12.
¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 32 For all these reasons, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 33 Affirmed.