Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 93F06111
HULL, J.Defendant Edelmira Valencia appeals from the denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate her 1994 convictions for transporting cocaine and methamphetamine. We affirm.
Facts and Proceedings
Defendant and her husband were arrested in 1993 when police stopped their vehicle and found drugs in defendant’s purse. In 1994, defendant entered negotiated pleas of no contest to one count of transporting methamphetamine and one count of transporting cocaine, and the trial court placed her on probation. Defendant did not appeal or otherwise challenge her convictions.
Thirteen years later, in December 2007, defendant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis to vacate her convictions. Defendant’s petition alleged that her husband, Inocencio Sanchez, was physically abusive and that she had been subject to coercion and manipulation by Sanchez when she entered her plea. Sanchez had acted as a translator during defendant’s conversations with her attorney and had controlled the information she received. Defendant asserted that she had not understood that her plea agreement was part of a package deal that also affected Sanchez.
Defendant’s petition alleged that she has since moved to Indiana and become a successful businesswoman. The efforts to vacate her convictions are apparently prompted by immigration concerns.
According to defendant, she did not discover the grounds for her petition until July 2005 when her attorney obtained a declaration from Sanchez in which he admitted that defendant had not known about the drugs that he had placed in her purse. She asserted that this was also the first time she learned that her plea was tied to the deal offered to Sanchez.
Upon obtaining Sanchez’s statement, defense counsel approached the district attorney’s office about vacating defendant’s convictions. The parties agreed that an investigation into defendant’s life in Indiana would be appropriate, and defendant gave authorities the requested background information. In April 2006, the deputy district attorney reported that the investigation was favorable and in June 2006, defense counsel presented a proposed motion to vacate her convictions. In December 2006, the deputy district attorney responded that his office would not agree to that relief. Defendant filed her petition for writ of error coram nobis in December 2007.
The trial court denied the petition for a number of reasons. The court concluded that because defendant would have been aware of any coercive actions by defendant at the time she entered her plea, she could have raised that claim then or any time over the ensuing years. The court also concluded that defendant did not exercise due diligence for any of her claims: she obtained Sanchez’s declaration in July 2005 but did not file her petition until December 2007. The court noted that regardless of any coercion from Sanchez, the record also demonstrated that defendant entered into the plea agreement at the advice of her attorney, and that she knew before she entered her plea that Sanchez had admitted that defendant did not know that the drugs were in her purse. Finally, the court concluded that an interpreter was present at the hearing in which defendant entered her plea and there was no evidence that defendant did not understand the consequences of that plea.
For all of these reasons, the court denied defendant’s writ petition.
This appeal followed.
Discussion
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition for writ of error coram nobis. We disagree.
The California Supreme Court recently outlined the requirements for the extraordinary writ of error coram nobis as follows: “The grounds on which a litigant may obtain relief via a writ of error coram nobis are narrower than on habeas corpus [citation]; the writ’s purpose ‘is to secure relief, where no other remedy exists, from a judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would have prevented its rendition if the trial court had known it and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not then known to the court’ [citation].” (People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1091.)
Because this remedy is of such a limited nature, it is not available when a litigant has another remedy at law, such as an appeal or motion for new trial. (People v. Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1092.) The writ “‘is not a catch-all by which those convicted may litigate and relitigate the propriety of their convictions ad infinitum. In the vast majority of cases a trial followed by a motion for a new trial and an appeal affords adequate protection to those accused of crime. The writ of error coram nobis serves a limited and useful purpose. It will be used to correct errors of fact which could not be corrected in any other manner. But it is well-settled law in this and in other states that where other and adequate remedies exist the writ is not available.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at. p. 1094.)
A writ of error coram nobis can be granted only if three requirements are met: “‘(1) Petitioner must “show that some fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the rendition of the judgment.” [Citations.] (2) Petitioner must also show that the “newly discovered evidence... [does not go] to the merits of issues tried; issues of fact, once adjudicated, even though incorrectly, cannot be reopened except on motion for new trial.” [Citations.]... (3) Petitioner “must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ....”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1093.)
This third requirement is dispositive in this case. Even if we assume for purposes of argument that defendant did not know that her husband’s selective translation limited her understanding of her plea and its ramifications, that she did not know that her plea was part of a package deal, and that she was unaware of the coercive pressure by her husband, defendant did not file her petition with due diligence.
Defendant asserted that she did not discover the “full grounds for this petition until July, 2005 when her attorney successfully contacted... Sanchez who agreed to tell the truth about the circumstances of her arrest. At that time, [defendant] learned of the package deal nature of her plea. Additionally,... Sanchez admitted that [defendant] had not known about the existence of the drugs that he placed in her purse. That information gave petitioner the evidence needed to prove coercion and prejudice as required under California law.” Defendant asserted in her petition, and reiterates again on appeal, that the due diligence period “should begin to run from the time of... Sanchez’s crucial admission.” However, the subsequent timeline does not reflect due diligence.
After receiving Sanchez’s declaration, defendant’s attorney met with a deputy district attorney on July 18, 2005, to discuss possible disposition of the case. They agreed that further investigation into defendant’s current life in Indiana was appropriate, and defendant provided the requested information in September 2005.
In April 2006, the deputy district attorney reported that the investigation was favorable to defendant.
In June 2006, defendant submitted a proposed motion to vacate the convictions to the district attorney.
On December 20, 2006, the deputy district attorney “advised” that “his office would not be able to assist [defendant] with the relief requested.”
Not until December 4, 2007, nearly one year later, did defendant file her petition for writ of error coram nobis.
Even if we assume defendant acted with due diligence while negotiating with the district attorney’s office from July 2005 to June 2006, defendant offers no explanation for her failure to act during the six months that her proposed motion to vacate sat at the district attorney’s office, or why after learning in December 2006 that the district attorney would not support her efforts, it took another year, until December 2007, to file her writ petition.
“The due diligence requirement is not some abstract technical obstacle placed randomly before litigants seeking relief, but instead reflects the balance between the state’s interest in the finality of decided cases and its interest in providing a reasonable avenue of relief for those whose rights have allegedly been violated.... [A]lthough coram nobis exists as a possible remedy in cases where this system breaks down, the availability of that extraordinary remedy, like habeas corpus, ‘properly must be tempered by the necessity of giving due consideration to the interest of the public in the orderly and reasonably prompt implementation of its laws and to the important public interest in the finality of judgments. [Citation.] Nor is the diligence requirement for coram nobis unique, for in addition to habeas corpus petitions, we require diligence of other types of collateral attacks on the validity of a plea.” (People v. Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1097.)
Defendant asserts she learned of the basis for her claim in July 2005, but she did not file her petition for nearly two and one-half years. She knew by December 2006 that the district attorney would not agree to vacate her plea, but she waited nearly one more year before filing her petition. Given this chronology, the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining that plaintiff did not exercise due diligence. (See People v. Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1095.)
The failure to exercise due diligence precludes the requested relief, and the trial court properly denied defendant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis. There was no error.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
I concur: RAYE, J.
SCOTLAND, P.J.
Defendant’s petition for writ of error coram nobis was untimely, as explained by my colleagues, which alone is a basis to affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the petition. But there is more. The petition has a fundamental defect. The facts alleged do not support relief.
After cocaine and methamphetamine were found in defendant’s purse during a traffic stop, she pled no contest to transporting the drugs and was placed on probation. Thirteen years later, she filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that she “entered her guilty plea involuntarily, subject to manipulation, duress and coercion imposed by her husband,... who was also her co[]defendant.” Specifically, the petition alleges the following: Because she was “unable to understand much English,” her husband “acted as translator between her and her lawyer,” thus “controlling the information she received from [her lawyer].” Consequently, she did not know that the plea agreement proposed by the prosecutor was for “a package deal” that would reduce her husband’s sentence from six years to three years and “was dependent upon [her] agreeing to plead also.” Her husband, acting as translator for her attorney, “used the implicit threat of violence to coerce her to accept the plea [agreement],” even though she “insisted that she was innocent and wished to go to trial.” As to the drugs in her purse, the petition alleges her husband put them there, without her knowledge. However, the petition acknowledges that, at the preliminary hearing prior to entry of the plea, an officer testified that defendant “was evasive in revealing the contents of her purse.” Although her husband had told officers that defendant “knew the drugs were being transported in the car,” he now admitted she “had not known about the existence of the drugs that he had placed in her purse.”
The alleged new facts are not grounds for relief on coram nobis. (See People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1103.) “To qualify as the basis for relief on coram nobis, newly discovered facts must establish a basic flaw that would have prevented rendition of the judgment.” (Ibid.) Such facts, for example, would be that defendant was insane at the time of trial and this fact was not known to the court and counsel; defendant was an infant and appeared by attorney without appointment of a guardian or guardian ad litem; defendant was dead at the time judgment was rendered; a default was entered against defendant, who had not been served with summons and had no notice of the proceeding; defendant’s plea of guilty was procured by extrinsic fraud; or defendant’s plea of guilty was extorted through fear of mob violence. (Id. at p. 1102.) In contrast, that trial counsel improperly induced defendant to plead guilty, or defendant discovered new facts that would have bolstered a defense and encouraged her to make a different strategic choice (id. at p. 1095) do not support coram nobis because they simply would have affected the willingness of defendant to enter the plea; they would not have prevented the rendition of the judgment. (Id. at p. 1103.)
“‘Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to present [her] claim or defense to the court; where [she] was kept ignorant or, other than from [her] own negligence, fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding.... The essence of extrinsic fraud is one party’s preventing the other from having [her] day in court.’ [Citation.]” (Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 834, 844.)
Here, although defendant was evasive in revealing the contents of her purse, she alleges that she was unaware that the drugs were in her purse. This she necessarily knew at the time of her plea. That she allegedly was unaware the plea agreement was a package deal from which her abusive husband benefitted is not extrinsic fraud preventing her from fully participating in the proceeding. That her husband later allegedly admitted that defendant did not know about the drugs in her purse did not prevent the rendition of judgment against her; it simply would have affected her willingness to enter the plea. And the claim that her husband “implicitly” coerced her into entering the plea is not a newly discovered fact entitling her to coram nobis relief.
Because the facts alleged do not support coram nobis, the trial court correctly denied the petition on this basis, as well as because the petition was untimely. Thus, I concur in my colleagues’ decision to affirm the trial court’s judgment.