Opinion
5-20-0319
05-15-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATHAN T. TURNER, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County. No. 17-CF-147 Honorable Ralph R. Bloodworth III, Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Barberis and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BOIE, PRESIDING JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Where the circuit court properly admonished defendant prior to accepting his guilty plea, defendant did not allege any valid reason to withdraw the plea, and the minimum prison sentence was not an abuse of discretion, the court properly denied defendant's motions to withdraw the plea and to reconsider the sentence. As any argument to the contrary would lack merit, we grant defendant's appointed appellate counsel leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 2 Defendant, Nathan T. Turner, appeals the circuit court's orders denying his motions to withdraw his guilty plea and reconsider his sentence. His appointed appellate counsel, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), has concluded that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the circuit court erred in denying defendant's motions. Accordingly, it has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel along with a supporting memorandum. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). OSAD has notified defendant of its motion, and this court has provided him with ample opportunity to respond. However, he has not done so. After considering the record on appeal, OSAD's memorandum, and its supporting brief, we agree that this appeal presents no reasonably meritorious issues. Thus, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The State charged defendant with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The defense requested a Rule 402 conference. After the court gave defendant appropriate admonishments (see Ill. S.Ct. R. 402(d)(1) (eff. July 1, 2012)), the State outlined its anticipated evidence. The court agreed that the evidence would likely be sufficient to convict. The court acknowledged that probation was a possible sentence but opined that it was not likely in such a case. During the conference, both the prosecutor and defense counsel observed that a conviction would require defendant to register as a sex offender for life.
¶ 5 Following a brief recess for defendant to confer with counsel, the parties announced that defendant would plead guilty to count I of the indictment, with count II being dismissed. The court explained defendant's rights and that by pleading guilty, he would be giving up certain of those rights. Defendant said that he understood.
¶ 6 The court explained the charge and possible sentences, including the requirement of lifetime sex-offender registration. The court elaborated that the registration requirement might have certain adverse consequences in day-to-day life. Defendant stated that he understood and had no questions. The court reminded defendant again that a conviction would require him to register for life as a sex offender. Defendant affirmed that he was not forced into pleading guilty.
¶ 7 As a factual basis, the prosecutor stated that L.I., who at the time of the alleged offense was four days short of her fifteenth birthday, would testify that defendant, who was at least five years older than her, placed his penis in L.I.'s hand and had her masturbate him. This occurred in her bedroom. Sheriff's deputies would testify that they collected bedding from the room and submitted it to the state crime lab, which found defendant's DNA on it. The court found the plea knowing and voluntary and scheduled a sentencing hearing.
¶ 8 At sentencing, L.I. and her mother, B.M., read their victim impact statements. B.M. then testified briefly for the State, describing an incident in which defendant, without B.M.'s permission, signed L.I. out of school as her father. The presentence investigation report (PSI) showed that defendant had previous convictions of burglary, battery, disorderly conduct, domestic battery, and driving under the influence, as well as other traffic offenses. The court sentenced defendant to three years' imprisonment.
¶ 9 Defendant moved to withdraw the plea and to reconsider the sentence. He argued that his plea was not knowing or voluntary because he did not know the extent of the sex offender registration requirements. He further alleged that there was doubt of his guilt, given that he pleaded guilty only because he "felt as if he were to blame for his girlfriend Leah Partlow being separated from her children." Defendant also wanted to withdraw his plea so that he could care for his elderly parents. In the motion to reconsider the sentence, defendant argued that the court failed to adequately consider several mitigating factors.
¶ 10 At a hearing on the motion, defendant testified when he pleaded guilty, he believed that he would only have to register as a sex offender for "probably ten years." He later realized that registration would limit his ability to travel, which would directly impact his employment. Had he known the full extent of the registration requirements, he would not have pleaded guilty. The prosecutor cross-examined defendant about the numerous times prior to the plea that he was informed of the lifetime registration requirement. Defendant testified that he did not recall any of those occasions, insisting that he remained "confused" about the extent of registration.
¶ 11 Defendant further stated that he felt that he was responsible for Partlow being separated from her children. According to defendant, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) had removed her children from her custody because he was living with her. Even though he had moved out, DCFS refused to return the children unless he was in prison.
¶ 12 Defendant insisted that he was innocent of the charges and that a jury should be allowed to weigh L.I.'s credibility. He found her "testimony" less than credible because it appeared "coached," and he was "quite certain" that she had other issues apart from incident with him. Defendant had a relationship with B.M. that did not end well, which he believed affected what L.I. testified to at the sentencing hearing. Defendant claimed that the semen found on the bed sheet was the result of contact between himself and B.M. rather than L.I.
¶ 13 The circuit court denied both motions. Defendant appeals.
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 OSAD concludes that there is no reasonably meritorious argument that the circuit court erred. It concludes that the court admonished defendant in substantial compliance with Rule 402, that defendant's testimony did not warrant allowing him to withdraw his plea, and that the sentence was not an abuse of discretion. It asserts that any contrary argument would be frivolous. We agree.
¶ 16 OSAD maintains that there is no meritorious argument that the circuit court erred in denying defendant leave to withdraw his plea. OSAD preliminarily notes that the court properly admonished defendant prior to the plea.
¶ 17 Before a trial court can accept a guilty plea, Rule 402(a) requires that the defendant be told the nature of the charge, the minimum and maximum sentences, the right to plead guilty or not guilty, and the rights that are waived by pleading guilty. People v. Sharifpour, 402 Ill.App.3d 100, 114 (2010). The purpose of the Rule 402 admonishments is to ensure that a defendant understands his or her plea, the rights he or she has waived by pleading guilty, and the consequences of this action. Id. (citing People v. Dougherty, 394 Ill.App.3d 134, 138 (2009)). However, the failure to properly admonish a defendant does not require automatic reversal. People v. Davis, 145 Ill.2d 240, 250 (1991). Substantial, not literal, compliance with Rule 402 is sufficient. Dougherty, 394 Ill.App.3d at 138. "Whether reversal is required depends on whether real justice has been denied or whether defendant has been prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment." Davis, 145 Ill.2d at 250. If the record shows that a guilty plea was voluntary and not the result of any force, threats, or promises, then any failure to strictly comply with Rule 402 is deemed harmless. Sharifpour, 402 Ill.App.3d at 114.
¶ 18 Here, the record reveals that the circuit court substantially complied with the rule. The court informed defendant of the charges, the sentencing parameters, and the rights he would be giving up by pleading guilty. The court was satisfied that defendant was not threatened. Although the court did not specifically inform defendant that he could persist in his plea of not guilty or ask him whether any promises had been made, the record as a whole reveals that the plea was voluntary. Defendant's motion did not claim prejudice from either of these omissions. See id.
¶ 19 OSAD further concludes that defendant's specific allegations and testimony do not entitle him to withdraw his plea. A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32. Rather, he or she must show a manifest injustice under the specific facts. Id. Withdrawal is appropriate where the plea was entered through a misapprehension of the facts or of the law or where there is doubt of the accused's guilt and justice would be better served by a trial. Id.
¶ 20 Defendant alleged that his plea was involuntary because he did not understand that he would have to register as a sex offender for life. However, the record shows at least five occasions on which defense counsel, the prosecutor, or the judge informed defendant of the lifetimeregistration requirement. Defendant claimed not to remember any of these instances and insisted that he remained "confused" about the registration requirement. However, he was unable to point to a single instance where anyone suggested that he would not be required to register for life.
¶ 21 In the absence of substantial objective proof showing that a defendant's mistaken impression was reasonably justified, such a subjective impression is not a sufficient reason to vacate a guilty plea. Davis, 145 Ill.2d at 244. Further, the burden is on the defendant to establish that the circumstances existing at the time of the plea, judged by objective standards, justified the mistaken impression. Id.
¶ 22 Here, there is simply no objective basis for defendant's "confusion" about the term of registration. Moreover, the court asked defendant at several points during the proceedings if he had any questions. If defendant were really confused, a question to the court prior to pleading guilty would have cleared up the confusion.
¶ 23 Defendant also contended that he pleaded guilty only because he wanted to allow Partlow to be reunited with her children. Defendant testified that, even though he had moved out of Partlow's home, DCFS would not return her children to her unless defendant went to prison. This seems doubtful, as it would likely violate Partlow's due-process rights to have the return of her children depend on an outcome over which she had no control. However, even if we accept defendant's testimony at face value, we agree with OSAD that defendant's subjective reasons for pleading guilty are irrelevant. So long as the plea is knowing and voluntary, the specific reasons behind that voluntary decision do not matter. See People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill.2d 494, 507-08 (1992) (defendant pleaded guilty to escape conditions at the Cook County jail); People v. Bryant, 2016 IL App (5th) 140334, ¶ 17 (defendant was emotionally distraught by his partner's testimony). Whatever defendant's subjective reasons for pleading guilty, they do not mean that the decision was involuntary.
¶ 24 Defendant also argued that there was "doubt" of his guilt as he believed L.I.'s testimony was "coached," and, accordingly, it would be better to have a jury decide her credibility. The short answer to this is that defendant had that right but chose to forego it. The court informed him prior to his plea that he had the right to a trial at which he could confront the witnesses against him, but he voluntarily waived that right.
¶ 25 In any event, it is unclear to what "testimony" defendant is referring, as there was of course never a trial. He apparently refers to L.I.'s "testimony" at the sentencing hearing at which she merely read into the record her victim impact statement. That reading a prepared statement would seem scripted and unnatural is hardly surprising. But describing the effects of defendant's conduct on her has nothing to do with how a hypothetical jury would view her testimony describing the incident itself. Defendant's testimony provided no basis to permit him to withdraw his plea.
¶ 26 OSAD further concludes that the court did not err in denying defendant's motion to reconsider the sentence. We agree.
¶ 27 A trial court has broad discretion when imposing sentence and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.2d 407, 448 (2005). Here, the offense was serious, as defendant took advantage of a 14-year-old girl. Moreover, despite defendant's significant, if largely nonviolent, criminal history, the court imposed a three-year sentence, the minimum prison term for a Class 2 felony. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2020). The sentence was not an abuse of discretion.
¶ 28 Finally, OSAD notes that counsel complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d). The rule requires counsel to
"file with the trial court a certificate stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings." Ill. S.Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 29 Here, counsel filed a certificate that facially complies with the rule. Moreover, the record reveals no reason to question the certificate's assertions.
¶ 30 CONCLUSION
¶ 31 As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 32 Motion granted; judgment affirmed.