Opinion
2021-04037 Ind. 767/18 771/18
06-23-2021
The People of the State of New York, respondent, v. Jamel Turner, appellant.
Richard L. Herzfeld, New York, NY, for appellant. Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.
Richard L. Herzfeld, New York, NY, for appellant.
Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX, ROBERT J. MILLER, PAUL WOOTEN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Suffolk County (Fernando Camacho, J.), both rendered August 6, 2019, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree under Indictment No. 767/18, and assault in the first degree (six counts), aggravated vehicular homicide with a suspended license (five counts), and operating a motor vehicle impaired by drugs in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(4) under Indictment No. 771/18, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.
ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant contends that his pleas were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he was not advised until after his allocution that his sentences would include a period of postrelease supervision. The defendant's contention is unpreserved for appellate review because the defendant failed to move to withdraw his pleas on that ground or otherwise raise this issue prior to the imposition of the sentences (see People v Murray, 15 N.Y.3d 725, 726-727; People v Bush, 185 A.D.3d 1048). In any event, the defendant's assertion that he was not advised until after his allocution that his sentences would include a period of postrelease supervision is belied by the record, and therefore, his contention is without merit.
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its determination generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion (see CPL 220.60[3]; People v Stephensbush, 172 A.D.3d 1108, 1108). When a defendant moves to withdraw a plea of guilty, the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry rests largely in the discretion of the court, and a hearing will be granted only in rare instances (see People v Manor, 27 N.Y.3d 1012, 1013-1014; People v Caputo, 163 A.D.3d 983, 984). When a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty "is patently insufficient on its face, a court may simply deny the motion without making any inquiry" (People v Mitchell, 21 N.Y.3d 964, 967).
Here, the record supports the County Court's determination that the defendant's pleas of guilty were entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently (see People v Stephensbush, 172 A.D.3d at 1109). The defendant's postplea assertion that his pleas were involuntary because his attorney failed to adequately consult with him is belied by the record and contradicted the statements he made under oath during his plea allocution. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas of guilty was properly denied without further inquiry (see People v Balbuenatorres, 179 A.D.3d 828, 829; People v Massey, 70 A.D.3d 722, 723).
RIVERA, J.P., HINDS-RADIX, MILLER and WOOTEN, JJ., concur.