Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Gary L. Paden, Judge, Super. Ct. No. VCF194534A.
Sylvia Whatley Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J., and Hill, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 22, 2008, appellant, Ivan Fernando Trujillo, was charged in an information with committing murder on November 18, 2007. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Although appellant was a minor, the prosecutor charged him as an adult. The information also alleged a special circumstance for committing the murder to further the activities of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). The information also alleged appellant committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C) & (b)(4)) and a gun enhancement for personal use of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)).
On August 18, 2009, appellant waived his constitutional rights and entered a plea of no contest to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)) and he admitted the gun use enhancement. On January 15, 2010, pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to prison for 11 years for voluntary manslaughter plus a consecutive term of 10 years for the gun use enhancement. Appellant received total custody credits of 904 days. The court imposed various fees and fines, including a $30 assessment fee pursuant to Government Code section 70373.
Because appellant’s offense was a violent felony (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(1)) and a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(1), he is not entitled to extra custody credits under the recently amended provisions of Penal Code section 4019, even if they are found to apply retroactively.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Government Code.
On appeal, appellant contends the imposition of the $30 assessment fee violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws because his offense occurred before the effective date of the statute.
Because the only issue on appeal concerns the imposition of an assessment, we do not recount the underlying facts of appellant’s offense.
PENALTY ASSESSMENT
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a $30 assessment fee pursuant to section 70373, subdivision (a)(1), because it is being applied retroactively from the time he committed his offense. Appellant committed his offense in 2007 and was convicted in August 2009 after the effective date of this statute. This court has recently held that section 70373 applies from the date of a defendant’s conviction, not the date the offense was committed. (People v. Phillips (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 475, 477-479; see also People v. Castillo (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1413-1415.) We find these cases controlling and apply their holdings here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.