Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 050612044
Richman, J.
Defendant Antonio Rafael Trevino timely appeals from a judgment sentencing him to 240 days in jail and three years probation pursuant to a plea agreement. In his notice of appeal, defendant indicates he is seeking review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence, which order was filed the day before defendant entered into his plea agreement. Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, identifying no potentially arguable issues. Defendant was apprised of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he has not done so. We have reviewed the entire record and agree with counsel’s assessment. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and that there is no issue warranting further briefing.
On October 24, 2006, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. Defendant sought to suppress all observations by two police officers, Concord Police Officers Kasid and Lawson, all statements made by defendant, and all seized contraband, on the ground that there was no legal justification for a warrantless search of defendant and of a backpack located in the truck defendant was driving at the time Officer Kasid initiated a traffic stop. He challenged legality of the traffic stop and of the search of both his person and of the backpack.
On November 8, 2006, a hearing was held on the suppression motion. Concord Police Officer David Kasid was the sole witness at the suppression hearing. According to Kasid’s testimony at the hearing, at about 1:37 p.m. on June 4, 2006, he was on duty in a marked patrol vehicle when he spotted a pick-up truck with an expired registration tab. After Kasid received confirmation from his patrol car computer that the truck’s registration had expired in 2004, he initiated a traffic stop.
Defendant was the truck’s driver and Raymond Trujillo was the truck’s only passenger. When Kasid told defendant about the expired registration, defendant said he was unaware it was expired and explained that he had recently purchased the truck from a friend. Kasid asked both men for identification. Neither man provided Kasid with any written identification, but they did provide their names and birth dates.
Kasid told the men to stay in the truck while he went back to the patrol car to run their names and birth dates through the computer. The check on defendant came back clear; he had “no wants or warrants.” Dispatch reported that defendant had a valid driver’s license. Kasid also asked for the physical description on defendant’s license: height, weight, eye and hair color. The information dispatch provided matched Kasid’s observations of defendant. As for Trujillo, dispatch reported that Trujillo was on probation with a search condition and there was some indication that Trujillo may have given his brother’s name instead of his own. Kasid at that point called for a back-up officer because he intended to perform a probation search of Trujillo. Kasid decided to perform the search in order to get further information regarding Trujillo’s identity and because Trujillo had been behaving as though he were under the influence of a controlled substance. Officer Lawson arrived about five minutes later, which was about seven to eight minutes after the beginning of the traffic stop.
Trujillo’s brother was also on probation.
Once Lawson arrived, Kasid returned to the truck. Kasid asked Trujillo to exit the truck. Kasid performed a probation search and found a baggy of suspected methamphetamine in Trujillo’s sock. Kasid then handcuffed Trujillo, arrested him, and placed him in the backseat of the patrol car. At this point, Trujillo told Kasid he was sorry about giving Kasid a false name (the name of Trujillo’s brother).
Meanwhile, defendant had been sitting in the truck’s driver’s seat for about 10 to 12 minutes since the beginning of the traffic stop. After putting Trujillo in the patrol car, Kasid asked defendant if he had any documentary identification on him, and defendant said he did not. Kasid had spotted two backpacks in the truck bed. He asked defendant if there was any identification in the backpacks. Defendant replied, “Well yeah. There is something in there. Some ID.” Kasid asked if he could look in the backpacks, but defendant said no. Kasid did not ask defendant which backpack belonged to defendant and defendant did not volunteer this information.
Kasid asked defendant to step out of the truck. Kasid handcuffed defendant and arrested him for failure to present identification. Kasid then searched defendant. Kasid found a glass pipe with white powder residue in the bowl and a plastic syringe in the pocket of defendant’s shorts. Kasid placed defendant in a second patrol car.
Kasid then walked back to the truck and searched the two backpacks in order to find defendant’s identification. In a zippered pouch in one of the backpacks, Kasid found two driver’s licenses in the name of Michael Garcia. The licenses had different numbers, but defendant’s photo was on both of them. Kasid also found in that same backpack pouch a checkbook in Michael Garcia’s name with two checks missing.
“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) We conclude that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress based on Kasid’s undisputed testimony.
Kasid had adequate grounds to stop the truck when he saw its registration had expired, a violation of the Vehicle Code. (Veh. Code, § 4601, subd. (a) [vehicle registration must be renewed prior to the expiration of the registration year]; People v. Castellon (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373 (Castellon) [stop of vehicle upon probable cause of violation of Veh. Code, § 4601 was proper].) Defendant’s detention was also justified by the fact that defendant had been driving without carrying with him a valid driver’s license, another Vehicle Code violation. (Veh. Code, § 12951 [licensee must have valid driver’s license in his immediate possession at all times when driving and must present his license for examination upon demand of a police officer enforcing the provisions of the Vehicle Code]; Castellon, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.) In turn, each of these two Vehicle Code violations justified a custodial arrest and search of defendant’s person incident to that arrest. (People v. Monroe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1177-1178, 1195 [a custodial arrest for failure to provide a driver’s license or other satisfactory evidence of the defendant’s identity, in violation of the Vehicle Code, supported a search of the defendant’s person]; People v. McKay (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 605, 618 [custodial arrest for fine-only violation of the Vehicle Code does not violate the Fourth Amendment].)
Kasid testified that he discovered during the traffic stop that Trujillo was on probation with a search clause. Based on this testimony, the trial court properly found that the brief delay caused (1) by waiting for the cover officer to arrive on the scene and (2) by completing the search and resulting arrest of Trujillo was not unduly prolonged. (People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 674-675 [whether a detention is unduly prolonged is to be decided on the facts of each case, looking to the “ ‘duration, scope and purpose’ ” of the stop].)
Regarding the search of the backpacks, as the trial court noted, defendant did not provide any written identification; even with height, weight, hair and eye color, Kasid did not have enough information to confirm that defendant was who he said he was. Defendant told the officer there was identification in the backpacks. The trial court properly concluded that Kasid was authorized to look for it there. (In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60, 86-87 [where the defendant was unable to produce the required license documents upon demand after a Vehicle Code violation, it was lawful for the police officer to search the car in the areas where such documents reasonably could be expected to be found].) In addition, the trial court properly concluded that Kasid’s search of the backpacks was also lawful under the automobile exception based on Trujillo’s possession of contraband. (People v. Nicholson (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 707, 711 [when acting with probable cause, the police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle for suspected contraband, including a search of all of the vehicle’s contents and containers that might conceal the suspected contraband].)
We also note that there was no error in entry of defendant’s plea or in his sentencing. On November 9, 2006, in exchange for an agreement that he would be placed on probation with jail time, defendant pleaded no contest to all of the charges in the information: making, passing, or possessing a fictitious check (Pen. Code, § 476); possession of a blank check with the intent to defraud (Pen. Code, § 475, subd. (b)); possession of a forged driver’s license (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (b)); possession of a smoking device (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364); and unauthorized possession of a syringe (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 4140). Defendant also admitted one prior prison term which was also alleged in the information (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant received credit for 159 actual days served. The trial court imposed a restitution fine of $200, a probation fine of $200 to become effective if defendant’s probation is revoked, and a court security fee of $100.
Before defendant entered his plea, the trial court confirmed that he had filled out the plea form freely and voluntarily, and that he had discussed the form with his counsel. The plea form detailed defendant’s constitutional rights and explained the direct consequences of the plea. Defense counsel stipulated to a factual basis for the plea. The sentence imposed by the trial court was the disposition anticipated in the plea form.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Kline, P.J., Haerle, J.