Opinion
A101464.
11-7-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GEORGE VERNON TOWNSEND, Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant George Vernon Townsend challenges the legality of detentions that occurred on two different occasions in the City of Vallejo. Both times illegal drugs were found. Appellant did not succeed in suppressing the evidence and ultimately pleaded no contest to transportation of heroin and possession of heroin for sale, as set forth in a consolidated information. In return the court granted probation and admission to a drug treatment program when available and sentenced appellant accordingly. We conclude that the trial court properly denied appellants motion to suppress evidence and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. February 25, 2001 Incident
1. Facts: Around 10:00 p.m. on February 25, 2001, Vallejo Police Officer Crutcher was patrolling in a marked patrol car near a gas station on the corner of Sonoma and Marine World Parkway. He noticed a green compact car driving "faster than prudent" through the parking lot of the gas station. Officer Crutcher activated the red lights because he observed that the registration tab was expired. Appellant, the driver, identified himself verbally but did not have a drivers license. Running a Department of Motor Vehicles check, it turned out appellant was not a licensed driver.
Officer Crutcher arrested appellant for driving without a license, searched him, and found two containers with 18 wrapped chunks of black tar heroin.
Appellant admitted that Officer Crutcher asked for his license and he did not have one. He also testified that when the officer mentioned lack of registration, appellant told him the tab was on the rear window.
2. Ruling: Denying the motion, the trial court found that even if the car were legally registered, "the officer did have the right to stop and investigate seeing the expired tag. Even if there was a conversation where he said, `Look at the red tag, its registered, I think he has the right to investigate that. And during that investigation he asks for identification and drivers license. During that period of time he had no drivers license, which led to the arrest."
B. July 7, 2001 Incident
1. Facts: Officer Wheat of the Vallejo Police Department was on patrol in a marked police car near the corner of Echo Summit and Mini Drive around 5:00 p.m. on July 7, 2001. He had made a few drug-type contacts on that corner in the past, and although the narcotics traffic was "[n]ot as high" as other areas, there definitely was activity in that vicinity.
Officer Wheat observed what appeared to be a hand-to-hand transaction between appellant and another man. Two men standing at the corner behind a vehicle appeared to be passing a small object between them. Officer Wheat drove closer. The subjects looked up at him and appeared very nervous. Mr. Larren, the one who received the small item, quickly placed it in his pants pocket.
Officer Wheat asked Larren if he had any controlled substances and whether he could search him. Larren said no. When Wheat told Larren he had seen what looked like a drug deal, Larren admitted he had a small bag of marijuana which Officer Wheat retrieved.
Officer Wheat also asked if the man sitting in the parked vehicle—Mr. Roden—were involved. Larren said he was. Wheat had the driver step out and sit on the curb. Wheat retrieved a small bottle of brown tar heroin from Roden after he consented to a search.
Meanwhile appellant was straddling a bicycle. Officer Wheat asked appellant to step off the bicycle and sit down. Wheat asked appellant if he could search him. Appellant put his hands behind his back and said something like, "`Go ahead." Wheat found a small bottle with black tar heroin.
Appellant testified that Officer Wheat told him to sit on the curb before he searched Larren. Appellant also stated he did not consent to a search.
2. Ruling: The trial court ruled that Officer Wheat was justified in effecting the stop and further investigation because he could validly infer, from his experience and upon observing the activities of the three men, that a possible drug transaction was taking place. Concern for officer safety upon encountering the three individuals in turn justified having appellant sit on the curb to "effectuate his turn." Finally, the earlier searches established probable cause to search appellant.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review; Reasonableness Standard
On appeal from a judgment of conviction entered after the trial court has denied a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, we engage in a two-step process of review. We uphold the trial courts factual findings as to how the challenged detention occurred if supported by substantial evidence. However, we independently assess the facts in determining whether the detention meets the constitutional standard of reasonableness. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597; People v. Daugherty (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 275, 281.)
"The Fourth Amendment prohibits `unreasonable searches and seizures by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest. [Citations.] Because the `balance between the public interest and the individuals right to personal security, [citation], tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in such cases, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officers action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity `"may be afoot". . . ." (United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273.) Reviewing courts thus look to the totality of the circumstances of each case to establish whether the officer had a "`particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. [Citation.] This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that `might well elude an untrained person. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
Our own high court has similarly stated that "circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may justify a police officer stopping and briefly detaining a person for questioning or other limited investigation. [Citations.] . . . [Citations.] The guiding principle, as in all issues arising under the Fourth Amendment and under the California Constitution [citations], is `the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizens personal security. [Citation.]" (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 892, fn. omitted.) "[T]o justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity." (Id. at p. 893.)
B. The February 25, 2001 Stop Was Proper
Appellant complains that since his car was currently registered at the time of the incident, Officer Crutcher did not have an objectively reasonable basis for effecting the stop on February 25, 2001. We disagree.
Officer Crutcher stopped the vehicle after observing that the registration tabs on the license plate of the vehicle had expired. Pursuant to Vehicle Code section 5204, subdivision (a), current registration tabs "shall be attached to the rear license plate . . . ." Further: "Vehicles that fail to display current month and year tabs or display expired tabs are in violation of this section." (Ibid.) As a matter of course Officer Crutcher asked to see appellants drivers license. It is the law in this state that a driver "shall present his or her license for examination upon demand of a peace officer enforcing the provisions of this code." (Veh. Code, § 12951, subd. (b).) Officer Crutcher arrested appellant for lack of a license. The subsequent search was proper as pursuant to a lawful arrest. (United States v. Robinson (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224, 236.)
So far, so good. Appellant stresses that he had a temporary permit to operate the vehicle, which gave him current registration as shown on the rear window. From this he argues that the stop was unreasonable because Officer Crutcher failed to consider the possibility that appellant was driving legally, albeit without a current license plate sticker. Appellant points out that Vehicle Code section 4156 allows a person to obtain a temporary permit to operate a vehicle. Such permits may be issued in the discretion of the Department of Motor Vehicles, and are subject "to such terms and conditions and shall be valid for such period of time as the department shall deem appropriate under the circumstances." (Ibid.)
We concur with the trial court that the limited traffic stop was reasonable even if we assume the temporary permit was valid. Appellant assumes that Officer Crutcher proceeded under a mistaken, limited understanding of the rules of vehicle registration. We disagree. The issue is whether he acted pursuant to a reasonable suspicion that the registration had expired. Normally, current registration is ascertained by checking the license plate tab. Officer Crutcher did that and verified it had expired. Most cars are not operating pursuant to temporary permits. Such permits are just that—temporary, subject to discretionary terms and conditions that could require further scrutiny and verification. That Officer Crutcher did not check all alternate ways of registering vehicles before he stopped appellant, and that his suspicion of illegality turned out to be incorrect, do not invalidate the stop. A reasonable suspicion was shown here.
This case does not bear resemblance to Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648 cited by appellant. There, the police stopped the defendant pursuant to a random roadblock-type check for drivers licenses and vehicle registration papers. The detention was declared illegal. Unlike the present case, there was no reasonable suspicion that the car was being driven contrary to the applicable laws governing operation of motor vehicles. (Id. at p. 663.)
C. The July 7, 2001 Detention Was Proper
Appellant also assails the July 7, 2001 detention as supported by a mere hunch, not reasonable suspicion. It was appropriate.
Officer Wheat observed a hand-to-hand transaction. While the area was not the hottest drug spot, drug deals had transpired there. As Officer Wheat approached, the men appeared very nervous and Larren quickly placed the object in his pants pocket. Larren consented to a search after Officer Wheat told him what he had observed. That search revealed marijuana. Larren also implicated the driver. Wheat had him exit the car and found heroin on him pursuant to a consensual search. After the Larren search, appellant was told to get off his bicycle and he was subsequently searched pursuant to his consent.
The above encounters were reasonable and each unfolding element passes the reasonable suspicion test necessary to validate an investigative stop. Appellant calls our attention to People v. Jones (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 519, 524, which held that the mere fact that the defendant received money from another on the street in an area known for drug activity will not justify a detention. Here we have more than that. A small object is passed off, appellant and his companions become very nervous as the officer drove closer to them, and one of the subjects quickly puts the object in his pants pocket.
Appellant also refers to Cunha v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 352. There, two police officers observed the defendant and another man exchange what appeared to be an object for money. The officers approached the suspects and asked if they were dealing. When they gave a negative reply, the officers returned them to the site of the suspected transaction and placed them under arrest. (Id. at p. 355.) Observing in dicta that the court had some doubts as to whether the suspects activities were sufficient to justify a detention, the Supreme Court found the arrest invalid. (Id. at pp. 356-357.) Again, here we have more—the very nervous demeanor of the suspects upon being spotted, and the quick removal of the object from sight. Officer Wheat acted pursuant to a reasonable suspicion justifying appellants detention. Appellants consent to the search revealing the contraband was not, therefore, the product of an unlawful detention as contended by appellant.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Kay, P.J. and Rivera, J. --------------- Notes: Apparently a red registration tab, issued pursuant to a temporary operating permit valid through April 2001, was displayed in the rear window.