Opinion
No. CR-002596-24BX
04-19-2024
The People of the State of New York, v. Carmen Torres, Defendant.
For the People: Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx County (by: ADA Juliana Rodgers). For the Defendant: The Legal Aid Society (by: Anne Culliton, Esq.).
Unpublished Opinion
For the People: Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx County (by: ADA Juliana Rodgers).
For the Defendant: The Legal Aid Society (by: Anne Culliton, Esq.).
Yadhira González-Taylor, J.
By motion filed March 11, 2024, defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") §§ 170.30 (1) (a), 170.35 (1) (a) and 100.40; and for such additional relief as the Court deems appropriate. On March 14, 2024, the People opposed defendant's motion to dismiss and consented to the hearings requested in his omnibus motion.
Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file and relevant legal authority, the Court DENIES defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30 (1) (a), 170.35 (1) (a) and 100.40; and further:
The Court finds that there are no unresolved issues which warrant a hearing pursuant to People v Allard, 28 N.Y.3d 41 [2016].
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 24, 2024, defendant Carmen Torres was arrested and charged with Penal Law ("PL") § 240.26 (1) (harassment in the second degree), a violation. Defendant was arraigned on January 25, 2025, and released on her own recognizance, and the matter was adjourned for conversion and compliance. On March 5, 2024, the prosecution advised this Court that the People's Certificate of Compliance ("CoC") and ("SoR") were filed off-calendar on February 2, 2024, and the Court deemed the CoC valid as defense counsel raised no objection. However, defense counsel requested the instant motion schedule to challenge the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Legal Standard
Facial Insufficiency Challenge
To meet the jurisdictional standard for facial sufficiency, a misdemeanor complaint "need only set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense" (see People v Smalls, 26 N.Y.3d 1064, 1066 [2015]; see also CPL § 100.40 [1] [b]; CPL § 70.10). The accusatory instrument must set forth non-hearsay facts of an evidentiary nature which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged (see People v Suber, 19 N.Y.3d 247 [2012]; People v Dumas, 68 N.Y.2d 729 [1986]). It is well-settled that "mere conclusory allegations are insufficient [ ] and a purported information which fails to meet these requirements is fatally defective" (see People v Pamulo, 48 Misc.3d 1227 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51286 [U], **2 [Crim Ct, New York County 2015] [citations omitted] citing People v Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 136 [1987]). However, "[t]he court should approach factual allegations with a fair, not overly restrictive, or technical reading" (see People v Suquilanda, 80 Misc.3d 1220 [A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51045 [U], *2 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2023] citing People v Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360 [2000]).
Additionally, "[t]he prima facie case requirement does not necessitate that the information allege facts that would prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" (see People v Washington, 46 Misc.3d 1210 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50030 [U], ***3 [ Crim Ct, New York County 2015] [internal citations omitted]. Consequently, the accusatory instrument need only set forth factual allegations which "give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense" (see Id. [internal citations omitted]).
The Accusatory Instrument
In pertinent part, the Criminal Complaint provides that on January 21, 2024, at approximately 5:15 p.m. at vicinity of Knox Place and West Mosholu Parkway North, County of the Bronx, State of New York, M. F., states that:
The complaining witness's ("CW") name has been redacted for publication in accordance with section 12.4 (f) of the Privacy Guidelines for New York Official Reports.
Deponent states that, at the above time and place, deponent observed defendant to have, on her person, in her hand one (1) knife. Deponent further states that defendant stated, in sum and substance, YOU ENVY ME. SUCK MY DICK. FUCK YOU. I'M GONNA GET YOU.
Deponent is further informed by informant that as a result of defendant's aforementioned conduct informant experienced annoyance, alarm, and fear for her physical safety.
II. The Parties' Arguments
Defendant asserts that the factual part of the Criminal Complaint alleges statements which were merely innocuous (affirmation of defendant's counsel at ¶ 9). Counsel further avers that defendant's statements did not provide reasonable cause to believe that the CW had been harassed or annoyed (Id. at 9). Additionally, counsel contends that the allegations fail to support an inference that defendant's statements constituted an immediate or genuine threat, or that defendant displayed or referenced the knife in a manner that threatened the CW (affirmation of defendant's counsel at ¶ ¶ 10-11).
The People maintain that the information has been sufficiently pled where defendant is alleged to have made statements to the CW which threatened physical contact while defendant displayed a knife which was perceived by the CW (People's affirmation in opposition). Lastly, the prosecution argues that defendant's intent to cause the deponent harassment and annoyance can be inferred by the obscene nature of defendant's utterances while she held a weapon in plain view of the CW (People's affirmation in opposition).
III. The Court's Analysis
Harassment in the Second Degree
Penal Law § 240.26 (1) provides that "[a] person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, [w]ith the intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same" (see PL § 240.26 [1]). The CJI further provides, in pertinent part, that "a person is guilty of Harassment in the Second Degree when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same" and "INTENT means conscious objective or purpose. Thus, a person acts with intent to harass, annoy or alarm a person when his or her conscious objective or purpose is to do so" (see (CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 240.26 [1], https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/2-PenalLaw/240/240-26.pdf [last accessed ]).
It is settled that "unwanted, even highly offensive, communications have failed to constitute true threats, where either no potential future injury was specified, or the injury threatened was not one covered by the statute" (see People v Orr, 47 Misc.3d 1213 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50568[U], *3 [Crim Ct, New York County 2015] [No true threat ascertained where the defendant's statements, albeit vulgar, did not evince a threat of future harm]).
Here, the information at bar demonstrates that defendant did not merely utter offensive words to the CW but rather that she told the deponent "I'M GONNA GET YOU" while holding a knife in her hand. We disagree with the proposition advanced by defense counsel that intent could not be reasonably inferred where the accusatory instrument fails to specify if defendant waived or motioned with the knife in a manner that insinuated harm.
Intent can be inferred from the defendant's conduct and/or the context in which the alleged violative conduct occurred (see, People v Ford, 53 Misc.3d 318, 322 [Crim Ct, New York County 2016] citing People v Bracey, 41 N.Y.2d 296, 301 [1977] [internal citations omitted]). Defendant's statements were not made in a kitchen or any other setting in which the CW could have reasonably expected defendant to brandish a knife, or which would support a benign explanation for why defendant held a knife in her hand while telling the CW that "YOU ENVY ME. SUCK MY DICK. FUCK YOU. I'M GONNA GET YOU." This Court finds that viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the factual allegations suffice to establish probable cause to believe that defendant acted deliberately to cause the CW annoyance, harassment, and alarm.
Accordingly, pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30 (1) (a), 170.35 (1) (a) and 100.40, based upon the four corners of the Criminal Complaint, the accusatory instrument is deemed facially sufficient.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Court DENIES defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30 (1) (a), 170.35 (1) (a) and 100.40; and further:
The Court finds that there are no unresolved issues which warrant a hearing pursuant to People v Allard, 28 N.Y.3d 41 [2016].
This constitutes the opinion, decision, and the order of the Court.