Opinion
C088814
04-01-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LUCAS WAYNE THOMAS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16CF04176)
Defendant Lucas Wayne Thomas pleaded no contest to manufacturing concentrated cannabis, maintaining a place for selling or using concentrated cannabis, and possession of marijuana for sale. He now contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered through an initial warrantless search of the outbuilding and barn on his property. We agree and reverse the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The evidence supporting defendant's conviction on drug charges was ultimately seized during service of a search warrant. However, the only evidence supporting the warrant was found in a warrantless search that occurred while a law enforcement officer was walking around defendant's property looking for a missing baby and its father, who was also the suspect in its disappearance.
The officer entered a workshop on the property through an unlocked door and took photographs of the drug evidence he found there before continuing to canvas the area. He later forwarded these photographs to a detective, who obtained a search warrant and found drug evidence as a result thereof. Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained in the search, arguing that the initial warrantless intrusion onto his property was illegal.
Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Officer Shane Carpenter testified that he was on duty when he heard over the radio that a baby had been abducted from Child Protective Services (CPS) in Oroville. The baby's father was the suspect, and had fled on foot toward a residential subdivision between CPS and the river. Multiple officers, people from other agencies, and a helicopter were actively canvasing the area. Eyewitnesses had reported that the suspect ran toward the north side of the river, so Carpenter began looking for an access road on the north side of the river and found one. Carpenter went down the access road and found there was a dead end into the side of a hill a little beyond defendant's property. Carpenter then parked and searched the area on foot, walking the riverbank first. He returned to his car and noticed an access gate to a driveway; he went up the driveway to the house to ask if anyone had seen the suspect or baby.
Carpenter went to two different doors of the house and knocked, but no one answered. He checked the doors to see if the suspect could have entered the home, but the doors were locked. He noticed a detached outbuilding near the house and smelled marijuana; the smell grew stronger as he approached the outbuilding.
Carpenter testified that while still searching for the suspect and baby, rather than investigating the marijuana smell, he knocked on the door of the outbuilding and announced his presence. No one responded, so he opened the unlocked door. The room smelled strongly of marijuana. Carpenter stepped into the outbuilding to check the corners of the room for the suspect and the baby. No one was in the room. As he looked around the room, he saw indicia that the room might contain a honey oil lab, including steel tubes containing a green substance, as well as butane canisters. He explained that from his training and experience, a honey oil lab is used to compress and condense marijuana to extract concentrated THC. Once Carpenter knew the building was secure and that the baby was not there, he took two photographs of the room with his cell phone and shut the door.
Carpenter then continued his search for the suspect and baby. He went to a large barn on the property, announced his presence, and entered through an open door. There was no one in the barn, but Carpenter saw several canisters of butane inside. He took a photograph, communicated with the helicopter crew to inquire as to areas remaining to be searched, then walked back to his car and continued his search elsewhere. He searched for another hour until he was notified that the baby had been returned to CPS. Carpenter later provided the Butte County Sheriff's Department with the photographs he took of the drug evidence during his search for the baby.
Ruling on the Motion
After hearing Carpenter's testimony and both parties' arguments, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court explained: "[T]he Court agrees with the People. I will say that I read this and I had my mind made up, and I realized that I had to hear from Deputy Carpenter because he was going to be the key. And I expected that, having read counsel's briefs and hearing that he selected one house out of hundreds to search, I thought, well, that's interesting. If that's the facts, then I'm going to suppress the evidence. That's not what happened. [¶] He came out and he searched an area in Oroville after an individualized -- not in the sense that we're talking about in terms of the house -- but he -- they segregated different areas for different officers to search, and he searched that area. I asked him if he touched any other doorknob. What I meant was, did he go into a neighborhood and go from house to house, breaking in, trying to get it. He did not. He selected one house, because it was on the bank of the river . . . . [¶] But the bottom line is that is a likely place that a father might hide with his infant son. I do find an exigent circumstance. They don't get much more exigent than that. Someone takes a baby and they run, this baby is at risk . . . ." The court continued: "What I do find is that the officer saw exigent circumstances and went through the only house that was in his path as he searched the river bank. And, again, . . . I think if he was going through a neighborhood and he smelled marijuana and went into the only house that smelled of marijuana, we would have a different result here. That's not what happened. So I'm denying the motion."
Defendant subsequently pleaded no contest to manufacturing concentrated cannabis (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379.6, subd. (a)), maintaining a place for selling or using concentrated cannabis (id., § 11366), and possession of marijuana for sale (id., § 11359, subd. (b)), a misdemeanor. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years, subject to various conditions and with credit for 15 days of time served.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He argues the warrantless search of his outbuilding and barn were not justified by exigent circumstances. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) We agree.
The search is reviewable, despite defendant's subsequent no contest plea. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m); People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 601.) We defer to the trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence but exercise our independent judgment to determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Ovieda (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1034, 1041 (Ovieda).) Federal constitutional standards govern the suppression of evidence derived from police searches and seizures. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 24; Ovieda, at p. 1041.) " '[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' [Citation.] And a principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest." (Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748.) A warrantless entry is "presumptively unreasonable." (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586.) When officers lack a search warrant, the People bear the burden of establishing "either that no search occurred, or that the search undertaken by the officers was justified by some exception to the warrant requirement." (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830.)
The Attorney General argues that the warrantless entry into defendant's outbuilding and barn was justified by exigent circumstances based on the "emergency aid" exception to the warrant requirement. The trial court accepted this rationale below. Pursuant to the emergency aid exception, "police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury." (Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 400.) But this well-recognized exception "require[s] that articulable facts support a reasonable belief that an emergency exists." (Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1048.) "Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception." (Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 U.S. 45, 49.) The test is "whether there was 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger . . . ." (Ibid.) "[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given not to his unparticularized suspicions or 'hunches,' but to the reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in the light of his experience; in other words, he must be able to point to specific and articulable facts from which he concluded that his action was necessary." (People v. Block (1971) 6 Cal.3d 239, 244.)
Here, although it is clear that Carpenter was engaged in a general search for a missing man and his baby, no evidence justified a warrantless search of the outbuilding and barn specifically under the exigent circumstances doctrine or on any other basis. There is no dispute but that both structures were on defendant's property; indeed, Carpenter had also tried the (locked) doors of defendant's actual residence, also on the property. While there was evidence that the suspect was on foot and heading in the general direction of the river, there was no objectively reasonable basis for believing that he was hiding on defendant's property. Carpenter's entries into the outbuilding and barn was based on his hunch that the man and his baby might be there. But there was no evidence the baby was there or, for that matter, that anyone was occupying those structures, let alone an occupant who was in danger or in need of medical assistance, as the doctrine requires. There were no eyewitness reports, no other reports, no sounds, no smells, no sightings, no traces or trackings; there was simply no evidence that anyone was inside the outbuilding or barn, whether in danger and needing aid or not.
"The line between a mere hunch and a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts can be a fine one, but such a line does exist. If all that is required is the possibility that someone in some house might require aid, any officer on patrol might urge that people in homes often need help and the officer entered to make sure assistance was not required. . . . 'Ignorance of a fact, without more, does not raise a suspicion of its existence.' [Citation.]" (Ovieda, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1048.) Without something more supporting a reasonable suspicion related specifically to defendant's property, a general hunch is insufficient to justify the warrantless intrusion. Thus, in this case the prosecution did not carry its burden of producing evidence to justify the search. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 134, 136-137 [prosecutor must prove a justification for a warrantless search or seizure and cannot merely respond to defendant's argument].)
If the prosecution cannot meet the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for a warrantless search, the exclusionary rule generally requires the suppression of evidence obtained from the search. (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-488.) "The exclusionary rule operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of Fourth Amendment rights through the rule's general deterrent effect." (Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S. 1, 10.) This is why the reasonableness of a search "must be determined based upon the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted"; otherwise, the test would be inconsistent with "the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct." (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 332.)
The Attorney General's alternative arguments against the application of the exclusionary rule in this case are unavailing. Under the good faith exception, evidence will not be suppressed if the law enforcement officers had an objectively reasonable belief that the search and seizure was constitutionally permissible. (People v. Pearl (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1292; see also United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 922.) Our Supreme Court has held that an unlawful warrantless search cannot be sanitized by incorporating it into a warrant application, and the good faith exception does not apply to cases in which the police use the fruit of an otherwise illegal search to obtain a subsequent search warrant. (People v. Machupa (1994) 7 Cal.4th 614, 617, 626, 631-632.) Because we have concluded the search was illegal, we reject the argument that the good faith exception redeems the warrant issued based on the fruit of an illegal search.
We also reject the Attorney General's argument that the exclusionary rule should not apply in this case because Carpenter's conduct was "nonculpable" and exclusion would have no "meaningful deterrent effect."
First, the argument that there was no precedent prohibiting Carpenter's conduct is specious; we have cited numerous authorities that clearly qualify as precedent supporting our decision that Carpenter's conduct ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment. Further, it is well-settled that "the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence." (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 144.) Examples where suppression has been held inappropriate include where police have relied on a statute authorizing a warrantless administrative search that was later held to be unconstitutional (Illinois v. Krull (1987) 480 U.S. 340, 342, 349-350), where police have relied on erroneous entries by a court clerk in a law enforcement database reflecting an outstanding arrest warrant (Arizona v. Evans, supra, 514 U.S. at. pp. 4-5), and where police have reasonably relied on an error in a police database regarding warrants and the "error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest" (Herring, at p. 137). These cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at hand. Here, Carpenter's warrantless entry and search of defendant's outbuilding and barn without an objectively reasonable basis for the entry was deliberate, even if well-meaning, and violated longstanding precedent. This is not "nonculpable" conduct as that concept has been defined. Indeed, such a warrantless entry is "presumptively unreasonable." (Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 586.) It is clear that properly applying the exclusionary rule here to exclude consideration of the results of this warrantless search will serve to deter such illegal searches in the future.
We hold defendant's motion to suppress was incorrectly denied and instead must be granted. Accordingly, his no contest plea is subject to a timely motion to withdraw.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The case is remanded with directions to enter an order granting defendant's motion to suppress and permit defendant to withdraw his no contest plea.
/s/_________
Duarte, J. We concur: /s/_________
Raye, P. J. /s/_________
Blease, J.