Opinion
December 28, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Naro, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant maintains that he was subjected to an improper course of cross-examination and was thereby deprived of a fair trial. We disagree. It is well settled that trial courts have broad discretion in determining the extent to which the prosecution should be permitted to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant through use of his prior convictions or bad acts (People v Mayrant, 43 N.Y.2d 236; People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371). We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling that inquiry could be made of the defendant regarding a 1973 conviction for criminal trespass. While the lapse of time may to some extent affect the materiality of a prior conviction (People v Williams, 56 N.Y.2d 236, 239; People v Sandoval, supra, at 376), the fact that a conviction is temporally remote does not, by itself, mandate preclusion of cross-examination with respect thereto (see, People v Emmons, 123 A.D.2d 475, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 827; People v Scott, 118 A.D.2d 881, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 1056; People v Crandall, 108 A.D.2d 413).
Nor was the questioning of the defendant regarding a series of uncharged assaults improper. The general rule is that where a witness denies having committed a prior wrongful act, the cross-examiner may not undertake to refute the denial by proving contradictory facts. The cross-examiner is not, however, thereby prohibited from continuing with his inquiry in an effort to induce the witness to change his testimony (People v Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198; People v Simpson, 109 A.D.2d 461, appeal dismissed 67 N.Y.2d 1026; Richardson, Evidence § 491 [Prince 10th ed]). The prosecutor questioned the defendant in good faith and upon a reasonable basis in fact (see, People v Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, mot to amend remittitur granted 36 N.Y.2d 857, cert denied 423 U.S. 861; People v Simpson, supra) and his continued cross-examination did not transcend the bounds of propriety.
While the defendant was subjected to an improper line of questioning regarding prior traffic infractions (see, People v Dickman, 42 N.Y.2d 294, 298; People v Griffin, 116 Misc.2d 751, 758; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 155), we view this error, arising in the context of a bench trial, to have been harmless (see, People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230; People v Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168; People v Murdocca, 120 A.D.2d 682, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 815; People v Reyes, 116 A.D.2d 602, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 949).
Finally, the sentence imposed was neither inconsistent with sound sentencing principles nor inappropriate (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Bracken, J.P., Kunzeman, Spatt and Harwood, JJ., concur.