Opinion
No. 2018-12084 Ind. No. 1670/15
11-09-2022
Jillian S. Harrington, Staten Island, NY, for appellant. Anne T. Donnelly, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Tammy J. Smiley and Jason R. Richards of counsel), for respondent.
Jillian S. Harrington, Staten Island, NY, for appellant.
Anne T. Donnelly, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Tammy J. Smiley and Jason R. Richards of counsel), for respondent.
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, J.P., ANGELA G. IANNACCI, WILLIAM G. FORD, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Howard E. Sturim, J.), rendered August 29, 2018, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, attempted assault in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (two counts), aggravated criminal contempt, and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court did not err in permitting the admission into evidence of testimony regarding a prior incident of domestic violence between the defendant and the complainant. "'The evidence provided relevant background material to enable the jury to understand the defendant's relationship with the complainant and also served as proof of the defendant's intent'" (People v Gonzales, 186 A.D.3d 1711, 1712, quoting People v Braswell, 181 A.D.3d 818, 819; see generally People v Frankline, 27 N.Y.3d 1113, 1115). Moreover, any prejudice to the defendant was minimized by the court's limiting instructions (see People v Durrant, 173 A.D.3d 890).
The defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by two instances of prejudicial testimony that were stricken from the record. The jury is presumed to have followed the Supreme Court's instructions not to consider stricken testimony (see People v Murphy, 168 A.D.3d 880). Additionally, contrary to the defendant's contention, the complainant's testimony that the defendant "had been away" prior to returning to live with the family was not prejudicial.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, viewing the record in its entirety, the defendant received meaningful representation (see People v Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 713; People v Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137). Further, he was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel under the United States Constitution (see Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668; People v Richards, 208 A.D.3d 603).
The defendant's contention that the sentence imposed improperly penalized him for exercising his right to a jury trial is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Cherry, 127 A.D.3d 879). In any event, the contention is without merit. The fact that the sentence imposed after trial was greater than the sentence offered during plea negotiations, is not, standing alone, an indication that the defendant was punished for proceeding to trial (see People v Perez, 132 A.D.3d 911, 912). There is no indication in the record that the sentence was the result of vindictiveness or retribution for the defendant's refusal to accept a plea offer and the exercise of his right to a jury trial (see id. at 912). Furthermore, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
CONNOLLY, J.P., IANNACCI, FORD and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.