Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR253703
McGuiness, P.J.
Victor T. Taylor (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence and appellant entered a no contest plea. Appellant’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, and requests that we conduct an independent review of the record. Appellant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not file such a brief. Having independently reviewed the record, we conclude there are no issues that require further briefing, and affirm the judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
A felony complaint was filed on April 1, 2008, charging appellant with (1) transportation of a controlled substance (Health and Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a), count one), possession of a controlled substance (Health and Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), count two), (3) giving false information to a police officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a), count three), and (4) driving with a suspended or revoked driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a), count four). The complaint alleged appellant had suffered three prior convictions (Health and Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c)) and six prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and, as to count four, alleged he committed acts in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.408, 4.421).
On April 7, 2008, appellant filed a motion to suppress on the ground that certain evidence “was obtained by an illegal detention, search and seizure in violation of his reasonable expectation of privacy and security . . . .” At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Kristin Royal testified she was working as a public safety dispatcher for the Suisun Police Department on March 28, 2008. She received a call at about 2:10 a.m. from the 600 block of Alexander Court in Suisun from a man who reported that about five minutes before he made the call, he saw a “white female approximately five [feet] three [inches tall], heavy set,” “looking into the back of his truck.” The caller told Royal that the woman “got into a gray truck with primer spots on it,” and “was no longer there [and] neither was the vehicle.” Royal relayed the information to Sergeant David Kasid of the Suisin Police Department.
Kasid testified that at about 2:10 a.m. on March 28, 2008, he responded to a dispatch call and headed toward the 600 block of Alexander Court to look for a grey primer truck. About a quarter of a mile away from his destination, he saw a truck that matched the dispatcher’s description. There was almost no “traffic out in that time of night.” The truck turned into a store parking lot and stopped in a parking space. Kasid parked his police car behind the truck, and he and the driver of the truck exited their vehicles at about the same time. Kasid asked the driver, whom he identified in court as appellant, “Hey, can I talk to you about something?” He explained to appellant why he was in the area and what he was investigating. Kasid asked appellant for identification. Appellant said he did not have any but told Kasid that his name was Marcus Jenkins. A dispatcher informed Kasid that Marcus Jenkins was an alias and that “there may be a parole warrant.” As the dispatcher investigated whether there was in fact a parole warrant, Kasid placed appellant in handcuffs and searched him for information to confirm his identity. Kasid found drug paraphernalia in appellant’s pocket and methamphetamine in his left sock. On cross-examination, Kasid testified that the dispatcher did not tell him whether the truck described by the caller had a camper shell on it. He testified that the truck appellant was driving had a camper shell on it. Kasid also testified he did not see any women in the car but found a picture of a white female inside the truck.
At about 2:46 a.m., the dispatcher received confirmation that appellant was a parolee at large, and informed Kasid of this fact.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress on the ground the stop and the subsequent detention and search were reasonable. On June 11, 2008, an amended complaint was filed deleting the allegations as to count four that appellant committed acts in aggravation. On August 6, 2008, the trial court heard and denied appellant’s motion to dismiss the information in which he renewed his motion to suppress. Appellant pled no contest to all counts and to one of the six prison priors in exchange for an agreed upon disposition of two years and four months in state prison. On August 27, 2008, the court imposed the agreed upon state prison term with 227 days of credit and dismissed all remaining charges and enhancements. Appellant timely appealed from the denial of his motion to suppress.
Discussion
We have reviewed the entire record and conclude there are no arguable issues that warrant further briefing. Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision (a)(1), provides in part: “A defendant may move . . . to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of a search or seizure on either of the following grounds: [¶] (A) The search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable.” “The clear implication of the subsection is that the evidence need not be suppressed, if the seizure was reasonable. To state the implication positively: a warrantless seizure of evidence may be valid if reasonable cause for the seizure exists.” (People v. Curley (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 732, 746.)
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure. [Citation.]” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922; see also People v. Ingram (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1750.)
Here, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the stop and subsequent detention and search were reasonable. The original stop was proper because the truck that appellant was driving matched the description of a truck the dispatcher had provided to Kasid. Appellant’s use of an alias to identify himself and information from a dispatcher that there “may be a parole warrant” gave the officer reasonable grounds to detain and search appellant while waiting for confirmation of the outstanding parole warrant.
Appellant has not sought to withdraw his no contest plea, and in any event, there is no clear and convincing evidence of good cause to allow appellant to do so. Appellant was adequately represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings and there was a factual basis for the no contest plea. There was no sentencing error. There are no issues that require further briefing.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, J. Siggins, J.