Opinion
E054896 Super.Ct.No. SWJ1100544
01-13-2012
THE PEOPLE, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF RIVERSIDE COUNTY, Respondent; J.B., Real Party in Interest.
Paul Zellerbach, District Attorney, Natalie M. Pitre, Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of prohibition/mandate. Mark Ashton Cope, Judge. Petition granted.
Paul Zellerbach, District Attorney, Natalie M. Pitre, Deputy District Attorney, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
No appearance for Real Party in Interest.
In this matter, we have reviewed the petition and considered the record. Although real party in interest's response was untimely, we have considered it. We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
The California Constitution gives trial courts broad power to impose restitution on offenders for losses caused by their criminal conduct. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A) [all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for those losses].) Article I, section 28, subdivision (b)(14), also provides that a victim is entitled to prompt return of stolen property when no longer needed as evidence.
"A victim's right to restitution is broadly and liberally construed." (In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 853.)
Except when there is a question of statutory interpretation, the standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of discretion. (In re Alexander A., supra, 192 CalApp.4th. at p. 852.)
In this case, it appears that the victim Target Corporation (Target) was never notified of the proceedings, and it should have been, even assuming that it would not have sought the return of the stolen phone.
Apart from the lack of notice, we must conclude that the juvenile court erred in ordering the phone "returned" to the real party in interest's parents. Real party in interest concedes this point, noting that title to the property remained vested in its owner, Target. Real party in interest's possession of the property by mean of larceny did not vest title in him or his parents and, thus, they were not entitled to its return.
We recognize that in proceedings involving minors, the juvenile court is vested with discretion to order restitution consistent with the goals of the juvenile justice system. The goal of the juvenile justice system is to provide minors under the jurisdiction of the court with care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interests and to hold them accountable for their behavior as appropriate under the circumstances, consistent with the interests of public safety and protection. In enforcing, interpreting, and administering the juvenile court law, the juvenile court also is to consider the safety and protection of the public, the importance of redressing injuries to victims and the best interests of the minor. (In re Alexander A., supra, 192 CalApp.4th. at p. 853.)
Thus, even if the juvenile court had the authority to release the phone to real party in interest's parents, this order does not comport with the aims of the juvenile justice system. Even if we credit real party in interest's parents' promise that he would not have use of the phone, he would yet be able to see that his family benefitted from his theft.
Real party in interest asserts that the matter should be remanded to the juvenile court for purposes of holding a restitution hearing to determine the economic losses suffered by Target. He maintains that the latter should not gain a windfall by recovering both the property and its replacement value. However, the parties previously stipulated that the replacement value of the telephone was $300. In light of this stipulation, the juvenile court need not conduct a further hearing to determine value unless Target demands the return of the telephone in addition to the payment of restitution. If it does not make such a demand, the juvenile court should consider other options for disposition of the property, including its destruction.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its order of October 17, 2011, releasing the stolen property to the real party in interest's parents and to enter a new and different order after providing notice to the named victim, Target, of a hearing. If the latter declines the return of the property, the juvenile court should consider other options for disposition of the property, including its destruction.
Petitioner is directed to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
KING
J.