Opinion
2019-1704 K CR
04-01-2022
Appellate Advocates (Samuel Barr and Rucha Phadtare of counsel), for appellant. Kings County District Attorney (Leonard Joblove, Ann Bordley and Daniel Berman of counsel), for respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
Appellate Advocates (Samuel Barr and Rucha Phadtare of counsel), for appellant.
Kings County District Attorney (Leonard Joblove, Ann Bordley and Daniel Berman of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT: THOMAS P. ALIOTTA, P.J., MICHELLE WESTON, CHEREE A. BUGGS, JJ
Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Elizabeth N. Warin, J.), rendered October 11, 2019. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and imposed sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Insofar as is relevant to this appeal, a prosecutor's information charged defendant with nine counts and, after a jury trial, defendant was only convicted of count six criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 265.01 [1]) in that he possessed a switchblade knife. With the permission of the Criminal Court, prior to sentencing, defendant moved, pursuant to CPL 170.40, for dismissal in the furtherance of justice (see CPL 170.30 [1] [e]; [2]; 255.20 [3]). The Criminal Court subsequently denied the motion, finding that "this is not the 'rare and unusual' case where dismissal of a conviction is appropriate." Thereafter, defendant was sentenced to a conditional discharge. On appeal, defendant contends, among other things, that count six of the accusatory instrument, charging him with criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, is facially insufficient; that his statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated or, in the alternative, he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; and that his presentence motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument in the furtherance of justice should have been granted.
A prosecutor's information is jurisdictionally defective if the original information it supersedes, along with any supporting depositions, does not contain adequate factual allegations (see CPL 170.35 [3] [b]; People v Inserra, 4 N.Y.3d 30, 32 [2004]). To be sufficient, the allegations must establish, if true, every element of the offense charged (see CPL 100.15 [3]; 100.40 [1] [c]; People v Jones, 9 N.Y.3d 259, 261-263 [2007]; People v Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354 [2000]; People v Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133 [1987]). Penal Law § 265.01 (1) provides that "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree when... [h]e... possesses any... switchblade knife." Penal Law § 265.00 (4) defines a switchblade knife as "any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the knife."
We find that the prosecutor's information is not jurisdictionally defective since it can reasonably be inferred that the knife in defendant's possession was a switchblade knife based upon the police officer's allegations, in the original accusatory instrument, that the "switchblade knife opened automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the said knife" (see Penal Law § 265.00 [4]; People v Berrezueta, 31 N.Y.3d 1091, 1092 [2018]; People v Marchese, 73 Misc.3d 144 [A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51237[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2021]). We note that an information need not contain the most precise words or phrases which most clearly express the thought; rather," '[s]o long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading'" (People v Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569, 575 [2004], quoting People v Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360 [2000]; see Berrezueta, 31 N.Y.3d at 1092; People v Sedlock, 8 N.Y.3d 535, 538 [2007]).
A review of the record indicates that defendant did not move for dismissal on speedy trial grounds in the Criminal Court, which motion should be made prior to trial, in writing, and upon reasonable notice to the People (see CPL 170.30 [1] [e]; [2]; 210.45 [1]; People v Lawrence, 64 N.Y.2d 200, 203-204 [1984]). The failure to follow the statutory procedure results in a waiver of statutory speedy trial claims (see Lawrence, 64 N.Y.2d at 203-204; People v Key, 45 N.Y.2d 111, 116 [1978]).
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel contention is not reviewable on direct appeal as consideration thereof necessarily involves matters outside the record and would require this court to resort to "supposition and conjecture" (People v Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705, 709 [1988]; see also People v Love, 57 N.Y.2d 998, 1000 [1982]; People v Hernandez, 74 A.D.3d 839, 840 [2010]; People v Jackson, 19 A.D.3d 614, 615 [2005]; People v Boyd, 244 A.D.2d 497, 497-498 [1997]). We further find that the Criminal Court, upon consideration of all of the CPL 170.40 factors as they apply to this case, properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss in the furtherance of justice after finding that "this is not [the] 'rare'... case where dismissal of a conviction is appropriate."
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
ALIOTTA, P.J., WESTON and BUGGS, JJ., concur.