Opinion
11-23-2016
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Roger STROUD, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Bryan D. Kreykes of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Victor Barall, and Kristen A. Carroll of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Bryan D. Kreykes of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, Acting District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Victor Barall, and Kristen A. Carroll of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (J. Goldberg, J.), rendered November 27, 2012, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
“It is well-settled that an application to proceed pro se must be denied unless [a] defendant effectuates a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel” (People v. Stone, 22 N.Y.3d 520, 525, 983 N.Y.S.2d 454, 6 N.E.3d 572 ). “To ascertain whether a waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, a court must undertake a ‘searching inquiry’ designed to ‘[insure] that the defendant [is] aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel’ ” (People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d 469, 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255, quoting People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 582, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632 ). In particular, the record should show that the court “ ‘adequately warn[ed] [the] defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, and appris[ed] [the] defendant of the singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication’ ” (People v. Rafikian, 98 A.D.3d 1139, 1140, 951 N.Y.S.2d 226, quoting People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154 ). “[W]hen deciding whether a defendant actually understood the dangers of self-representation, a reviewing court may look to the whole record, not simply to the questions asked and answers given during a waiver colloquy” (People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d at 580–581, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632 ).
Here, the defendant was properly allowed to represent himself at the suppression hearing and the trial. The record, as a whole, demonstrates that the defendant made knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waivers of his right to counsel (see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d at 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255 ; People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d at 582, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632 ; People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d at 104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154 ). Both the hearing court and the trial court undertook sufficiently searching inquiries of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right to counsel were impressed upon him (see People v. Vivenzio, 62 N.Y.2d 775, 776, 477 N.Y.S.2d 318, 465 N.E.2d 1254 ; People v. Dashnaw, 116 A.D.3d 1222, 1231, 983 N.Y.S.2d 681 ; People v. Anderson, 94 A.D.3d 1010, 1012, 942 N.Y.S.2d 561 ; People v. Hall, 49 A.D.3d 1180, 1181, 856 N.Y.S.2d 360 ; People v. Trivino, 266 A.D.2d 323, 324, 699 N.Y.S.2d 60 ; cf. People v. Rafikian, 98 A.D.3d at 1140, 951 N.Y.S.2d 226 ).
LEVENTHAL, J.P., COHEN, MILLER and LaSALLE, JJ., concur.