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People v. Stricklin

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Apr 18, 2019
327 Mich. App. 592 (Mich. Ct. App. 2019)

Summary

In Stricklin, 327 Mich.App. at 601, this Court considered a similar situation in which the defendant was faced with two lawful choices.

Summary of this case from People v. Franklin

Opinion

No. 340614

04-18-2019

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Collin James STRICKLIN, Defendant-Appellee.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Jeffrey S. Getting, Prosecuting Attorney, and Heather S. Bergmann, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. Frederick J. Taylor, Portage, for Collin J. Stricklin.


Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Jeffrey S. Getting, Prosecuting Attorney, and Heather S. Bergmann, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Frederick J. Taylor, Portage, for Collin J. Stricklin.

Before: Meter, P.J., and Sawyer and Cameron, JJ.

Per Curiam. By leave granted, the prosecution appeals the district court’s suppression of blood-draw evidence after it held that defendant, Collin James Stricklin, was subject to a warrantless search during a suspected drunk-driving encounter with the police. Defendant was arrested and charged with operating while intoxicated in violation of MCL 257.625. It is uncontested that the arresting police officer informed defendant that under the implied-consent law, should he refuse consent to a blood draw, he would temporarily lose his license and be subject to the mandatory imposition of six points against his driving record. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court suppressed the blood-draw evidence, concluding that law enforcement obtained it during an illegal warrantless search. The circuit court affirmed, concluding that defendant’s alleged consent to the blood draw was involuntary and had been coerced because defendant drove for a living and feared the impact that losing his license would have on his economic livelihood. The prosecution now appeals, arguing that the district and circuit courts misapplied Fourth Amendment precedent and erred by concluding that defendant’s express consent was involuntary. We agree and reverse.

People v. Stricklin , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 23, 2018 (Docket No. 340614).

See MCL 257.625a through MCL 257.625g ; MCL 257.320a.

Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from a blood draw, arguing that the blood draw was an illegal warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment because defendant was threatened with the loss of his driving privileges if he refused consent. During oral arguments on defendant’s motion, the prosecution contended that this was an issue of first impression for the court and maintained that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota , 579 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), did not apply because Michigan’s implied-consent law only provides for civil penalties. Defense counsel assured the district court that defendant was "not in any way challenging the constitutionality of Michigan’s Implied Consent Law or sanctions" but rather arguing only that the threat of sanctions affected the voluntariness of his client’s consent to the blood draw and that Birchfield reaffirmed that the validity of consent is based on the "totality of the circumstances." Defense counsel fully acknowledged that Birchfield primarily addressed the legality of criminal penalties for refusing consent but asserted that the distinction was "a red herring" and "a distraction" because "[t]he issue is voluntariness and the severe implied consent sanctions can certainly or should certainly be considered" when assessing voluntariness.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion. Police Officer Matthew Britton testified for the prosecution. On August 29, 2015, Officer Britton pulled over defendant for speeding. He performed an operating-while-intoxicated investigation, including a field sobriety test and a preliminary breath test. Given the results of this investigation, Officer Britton arrested defendant for operating while intoxicated. Subsequently, Officer Britton asked defendant to take an evidentiary chemical test. He read the instructions from standard form DI-177 to obtain defendant’s consent. The form stated, in pertinent part:

I am requesting that you take a chemical test to check for alcohol and/or controlled substances or other intoxicating substance[s] in your body. IF YOU WERE ASKED TO TAKE OR TOOK A PRELIMINARY BREATH TEST BEFORE YOUR ARREST, YOU MUST STILL TAKE THE TEST I AM OFFERING YOU.

If you refuse to take this chemical test, it will not be given without a court order, but I may seek to obtain such a court order. Your refusal to take this test shall result in the suspension of your operator’s or chauffeur’s license and vehicle group designation or operating privilege, and the addition of six points to your driving record.

Defendant consented to take the blood test. When asked whether he believed that defendant understood his rights, Officer Britton answered, "I believe so." Officer Britton also agreed that defendant was fully aware that refusal would result in a suspension of his license and in six points being added to his driving record. Overall, Officer Britton described defendant as cooperative. Given the circumstances, he could not remember why he decided to ask for a blood test rather than a breath test, stating only that it was his personal preference.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He said that at the time of his arrest he was working at Harold Ziegler Auto Group in a position that required a valid driver’s license. In addition to working, he was also enrolled in classes in the Fire Academy at Kalamazoo Valley Community College. Defendant testified that he would need a driver’s license to become a firefighter and that having a driver’s license was "pretty important" to his livelihood and career.

Defendant recalled Officer Britton reading him his rights. Defendant testified that he was fearful "of not cooperating and the consequences" to his livelihood and career. He did not feel as if he had any choice. On cross-examination, defendant admitted that the results of the chemical test indicated that he was drunk. He also acknowledged that he did have a choice to refuse to submit to the test and agreed that he consented to the blood test after the officer read him his rights. Defendant said that he "was mainly focused on being one hundred percent compliant" and was not concerned about whether the officer would obtain a warrant if he had refused chemical testing. Defendant acknowledged that his blood alcohol level could have been lower depending on how long it took the officer to obtain the warrant. He was also aware that a conviction for drunk driving would negatively impact his ability to have a driver’s license.

After hearing these two witnesses, the district court issued its decision directly from the bench. It recognized that the taking of a blood sample is a search governed by the Fourth Amendment. The district court did not actually address whether or not it found defendant’s consent involuntary or coerced, but rather reasoned that a warrant was necessary absent exigent circumstances. The district court held that there was no exigent circumstance present because the choice to draw blood rather than use a breath test was based only on the officer’s personal preference. Accordingly, the district court suppressed the blood-draw evidence. At a settlement conference held the following week, the prosecution indicated that it was unable to proceed because of this unfavorable evidentiary ruling. It asked for a stay pending appeal. The district court stated that it was "not inclined to stay" because the case was already more than a year old, and it dismissed the case without prejudice.

The prosecution appealed in the circuit court. The circuit court agreed that no exigent circumstances supported a warrantless search because the officer admitted that it was his personal preference to obtain a blood draw rather than a breath test and that nothing prevented him from obtaining a search warrant. With respect to whether defendant gave valid consent, the circuit court determined that the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that defendant’s consent to the blood draw was involuntary because he testified that "he felt coerced by the potential sanctions for failing to comply with the officer’s request" given that "having a license was important to his livelihood."

The prosecution now appeals in this Court, arguing that the district and circuit courts erred by concluding that defendant’s express consent to the blood draw was not a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

We review de novo the circuit court’s ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. However, we review its factual findings for clear error. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We overstep our review function if we substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and make independent findings. [ People v. Barbarich , 291 Mich. App. 468, 471-472, 807 N.W.2d 56 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

"But the application of constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to essentially uncontested facts is entitled to less deference[.]" People v. Woodard , 321 Mich. App. 377, 382, 909 N.W.2d 299 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). "We review de novo whether the Fourth Amendment was violated and whether the exclusionary rule applies." Id . at 382-383, 909 N.W.2d 299.

The circuit court erred by applying the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment when it affirmed the district court’s suppression of the blood-draw evidence. We conclude that defendant’s consent to the warrantless search was not coerced or involuntary under applicable precedent solely because of defendant’s stated fear of the economic consequences that would stem from the suspension of his license under the implied-consent law. In Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ––––; 136 S.Ct. at 2173, the United States Supreme Court held that the taking of a blood sample constituted a search and that in order to obtain a blood sample consistently with the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement must either obtain a warrant or satisfy an exception to the warrant requirement. The Birchfield Court held that because a blood test is highly intrusive, law enforcement may not conduct a blood test pursuant to the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception. Id . at ––––; 136 S. Ct. at 2184. There are two remaining exceptions to the warrant requirement potentially relevant to this appeal: (1) the exigent-circumstances exception, i.e., whether exigent circumstances existed constituting an emergency that justified the warrantless blood draw and (2) the consent exception, i.e., whether the defendant’s consent was valid. Both the district court and the circuit court held that the exigent-circumstances exception did not apply. The prosecution does not argue that this was error. The parties disagree over whether defendant validly consented to the warrantless blood draw.

"It is well established that a search is reasonable when the subject consents and that sometimes consent to a search need not be express but may be fairly inferred from context." Id . at ––––; 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (citations omitted). "[V]oluntariness of consent to a search must be ‘determined from the totality of all the circumstances ....’ " Id . at ––––; 136 S. Ct. at 2186, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

Important to this Court’s review is the fact that defendant does not purport to challenge the validity of the implied-consent laws, and for good reason. In Birchfield , the Supreme Court expressly recognized that it has repeatedly "referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply." Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ––––; 136 S. Ct. at 2185. Indeed, all 50 states have enacted similar laws, and "[s]uspension or revocation of the motorist’s driver’s license remains the standard legal consequence of refusal." Id . at ––––; 136 S. Ct. at 2169. In Michigan, our Supreme Court has recognized that "there is a strong public interest reflected" in the implied-consent law and that "society is aware of the need for effective laws to curtail drunken driving." People v. Perlos , 436 Mich. 305, 327, 462 N.W.2d 310 (1990).

"A consent to search permits a search and seizure without a warrant when the consent is unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given." People v. Galloway , 259 Mich. App. 634, 648, 675 N.W.2d 883 (2003). "When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given." People v. Chowdhury , 285 Mich. App. 509, 524, 775 N.W.2d 845 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The prosecutor cannot satisfy this burden by simply showing the defendant’s acquiescence to lawful authority. Id . Notably, the defendant’s knowledge of the right to refuse "is not a prerequisite to effective consent" but is merely one factor in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). In the seminal case of Schneckloth , the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires "that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force." Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 228, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The Supreme Court noted that this determination, which is commonly referred to as "voluntariness," does not lend easily to a "talismanic definition," id . at 224, but rather "reflect[s] an accommodation of the complex of values implicated," id . at 224-225, and a need to "reconcil[e] the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion," id . at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The essential question is whether, under "the most careful scrutiny," id. , the defendant’s free will "has been overborne and [the defendant’s] capacity for self-determination critically impaired," id. at 225, by official coercion. The Supreme Court recognized that some of the relevant factors in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis for assessing the psychological impact on the accused include age, educational level, whether the accused is advised of his or her constitutional rights, the nature of the detention, and the use of physical punishment. Id . at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041.

Although it related directly to the suppression of coerced confessions and not blood draws, the importance of Schneckloth is apparent. In Birchfield , the United States Supreme Court cited Schneckloth for its proposition that consent to a blood draw demands a voluntariness inquiry. See Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ––––; 136 S.Ct. at 2186. Likewise, Michigan appellate courts have regularly relied on Schneckloth to determine the validity of consent in chemical-testing cases. See, e.g., People v. Borchard-Ruhland , 460 Mich. 278, 293-294, 597 N.W.2d 1 (1999).

In this case, the evidentiary record is sparse on details concerning the financial or psychological impact of the consent decision on defendant and how these factors may have affected his ability to exercise free will. There can be little doubt that by choosing first to drive drunk, defendant left himself in a Catch-22 of choosing the lesser of two evils, at least from his point of view. If defendant consented to the blood draw, it could prove he was driving drunk, which would likely result in a drunk-driving conviction with its attendant loss of driving privileges, fine, and possible jail time. If defendant refused the blood draw, that choice would necessarily result in a license suspension and points.

This Court has previously held that "the application of constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to essentially uncontested facts is entitled to less deference[.]" Woodard , 321 Mich. App. at 382, 909 N.W.2d 299 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). Whether the Fourth Amendment was violated and the exclusionary rule applies is subject to our de novo review. Id . at 382, 909 N.W.2d 299. During the short evidentiary hearing, defendant essentially conceded that he understood his rights and the choice presented. While testifying that he felt as if he had no choice, defendant acknowledged that he understood that Officer Britton could obtain a warrant if defendant refused. He also testified that he understood the consequences of a drunk-driving conviction. We conclude that this is the testimony of someone who clearly understood and appreciated the relevant stakes when faced with two unfavorable choices, not no choice at all. Accordingly, defendant’s express consent to the blood draw was a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

We note that the district court failed to recognize that consent is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and did not make any factual determination as to the voluntariness of defendant’s consent. Because we conclude that the limited, established record could not possibly support a factual finding that defendant’s consent was involuntary, a remand would be an exercise in futility.
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A defendant may always consent to a warrantless search. Defendant admitted during the evidentiary hearing that he fully understood his choices under the implied-consent law and made an informed, reasoned decision. Having to make a choice between two undesirable options does not render defendant’s express consent to the blood draw coerced and involuntary.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Meter, P.J., and Sawyer and Cameron, JJ., concurred.


Summaries of

People v. Stricklin

STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
Apr 18, 2019
327 Mich. App. 592 (Mich. Ct. App. 2019)

In Stricklin, 327 Mich.App. at 601, this Court considered a similar situation in which the defendant was faced with two lawful choices.

Summary of this case from People v. Franklin
Case details for

People v. Stricklin

Case Details

Full title:PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLLIN JAMES…

Court:STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

Date published: Apr 18, 2019

Citations

327 Mich. App. 592 (Mich. Ct. App. 2019)
935 N.W.2d 59

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