Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YA067462
THE COURT:Rodney Stockton, also known as Ronnie Stockton, appeals from the judgment entered upon his conviction by jury of petty theft with prior petty theft convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 484, subd. (a), 666). Appellant admitted having suffered four prior felony strike convictions within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d), two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and petty theft priors within the meaning of section 666. After dismissing three prior felony strikes, the trial court sentenced appellant to the upper term of three years for the petty theft conviction, doubled as a second strike, plus one year for the prior prison term enhancement.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The evidence upon which appellant’s conviction is based is as follows: On January 29, 2007, at approximately 10:30 a.m., undercover asset protection employee at the Inglewood Target store, Christopher Chavez, saw appellant in the shampoo aisle of the store. Appellant put 36 large bottles of Head and Shoulders shampoo into his shopping cart and then placed them into three to five large Target bags that were in the cart. Appellant then walked into the men’s department and put packages of socks into his cart.
After leaving the cart and checking the front doors to the store, he returned to the cart and took it past an open cashier, and out the front door, followed by Chavez. Outside, Chavez identified himself as store security, and appellant began running. Chavez gave chase, joined by uniformed Inglewood officers, who ultimately apprehended appellant. He had no store merchandise on his person.
During the course of the criminal proceedings in this matter, appellant made four Marsden motions which were all denied. In each, he claimed that his attorney had not investigated some matters that appellant wanted investigated, including appellant’s drug addiction, and had not gotten appellant into a drug program. All of the motions were denied.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
Pursuant to the policy of the Los Angeles County District Attorney, the deputy district attorney moved to dismiss three of appellant’s four prior felony strikes. The trial court granted the motion.
Appellant filed a Romero motion, seeking to strike the one remaining felony strike on the grounds that his past offenses were non-violent, a lengthy sentence would still be imposed, and his drug addiction led to the charged and prior offenses. The trial court denied the motion.
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
In sentencing appellant to the upper term of three years for the petty theft with priors, the trial court considered in aggravation appellant’s numerous, continuing and increasing prior convictions, that he was on parole when this offense occurred, and that his prior performance on parole was unsatisfactory. Further, he was given probation on his prior three violations and failed to correct his ways. It found no factors in mitigation.
We appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After examination of the record, counsel filed an “Opening Brief” in which no issues were raised. On June 30, 2008, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues which he wished us to consider.
On July 10, 2008, appellant filed a supplemental letter brief which, while not clearly articulated, appears to claim that (1) the trial court erred in denying each of his five Marsden motions because his counsel had a conflict of interest and would not investigate matters appellant brought to his attention, and, (2) his sentence was too harsh because his offense was non-violent and he had not committed a serious crime in 15 years. Appellant failed to articulate a legal theory for his last assertion.
DISCUSSION
With respect to appellant’s first contention, we have reviewed the transcripts of the Marsden hearingsand conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant failed to establish that his attorney was providing inadequate representation or had a conflict of interest. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085 [“‘“‘A defendant is entitled to [substitute appointed counsel] if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citations].’”’”]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728.) The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions. (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 95.)
With respect to appellant’s second contention, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his Romero motion. Given all of the circumstances here, we cannot say that appellant’s record is outside of the spirit of the three strikes law. (See People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 160-161.) This is particularly so in light of the fact that the district attorney voluntarily dismissed three of appellant’s prior felony strike convictions, leaving only the one that was the subject of the Romero motion. If the second contention is meant to assert that appellant’s sentence is cruel and unusual punishment under the federal or state Constitutions, it is forfeited for failure to raise it in the trial court. (People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 583; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27.)
We have otherwise examined the entire record and are satisfied that appellant’s attorney has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441.)
The judgment is affirmed.