Opinion
No. 2012–1638 D CR.
2014-09-22
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Justin D. STEWART, Appellant.
PRESENT: IANNACCI, J.P., TOLBERT and GARGUILO, JJ.
Appeal from six judgments of the Justice Court of the Town of Amenia, Dutchess County (Norman R. Moore, J.), rendered June 18, 2012. The judgments convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, reckless endangerment in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, resisting arrest and harassment in the second degree, respectively.
ORDERED that so much of the appeal as is from the judgments convicting defendant of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, reckless endangerment in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree and harassment in the second degree is dismissed as abandoned; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgments convicting defendant of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest are affirmed.
On January 19, 2011, the People charged defendant, in six informations, respectively, with criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation (Penal Law § 121.11), reckless endangerment in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.20), unlawful imprisonment in the second degree (Penal Law § 135.05), obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (Penal Law § 195.05), resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), and harassment in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.26[1] ). At a nonjury trial, the proof established that, on January 19, 2011, a verbal altercation between defendant and his live-in girlfriend escalated to a physical encounter when defendant pinned her to their bed and choked her. When she managed to free herself and entered the living room of the apartment that they shared with defendant's mother, defendant forcefully ejected her from the apartment, causing her to strike a porch railing and to fall to the ground. After a time, the victim attempted to reenter the apartment to retrieve her belongings, and defendant ejected her in the same manner as before. From a neighbor's house, she called 911 for police assistance to recover her property from the apartment. State Troopers arrived several minutes later and encountered the victim in the driveway, upset and exhibiting injuries. She stated that defendant had choked and assaulted her, and had forced her out of the apartment that she shared with him. She directed the Troopers to the doorway of her apartment, and, when the Troopers knocked on the door, defendant (or his mother) answered the door and defendant stepped out onto the porch. The Troopers announced that they wanted to speak with defendant, and he immediately refused, reentered his apartment, blocked the doorway with his body, and attempted to close the door. The Troopers “pushed” their way into the apartment and, following a brief interview, arrested defendant after a physical struggle.
At the trial, following the testimony of a third Trooper, who had documented the victim's injuries, the defense moved to dismiss the charges of resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, the only convictions at issue on this appeal, on the ground that the warrantless arrest in his home had violated defendant's Payton rights ( see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 [1980] ). As an element of both charges is lawful police conduct, the defense argued that the People had failed to prove the commission of either offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Justice Court denied the motion, and, in a written decision that issued 20 days after the trial ended, the court found the arrest lawful and convicted defendant of all of the charges. On appeal, defendant contends that the illegal arrest required the dismissal of the charges of resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, and that, in any event, the 20–day delay in rendering the verdicts deprived him of his right to a prompt determination of guilt or innocence ( see CPL 350.10).
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments convicting defendant of resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree. First, the Troopers' entry into the apartment that the victim shared with defendant and his mother was proper pursuant to the victim's consent. “It is well settled that the police may lawfully conduct a warrantless search when they have obtained the voluntary consent of a party who possesses the requisite degree of authority and control over the premises or personal property in question” ( People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 290 [1979] ), a principle applicable to official entry to conduct a warrantless arrest ( e.g. People v. Hook, 80 AD3d 881, 882 [2011]; People v. Gardner, 45 AD3d 1371 [2007] ). Accordingly, “where two or more individuals share a common right of access to or control of the property to be [entered], any one of them has the authority to consent ... in the absence of the others” ( Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d at 290) and over the objection of another having an authority in common to consent. There is no dispute that, at the time of the incident, the victim had resided with defendant in defendant's home for over a year, and that a reason for her desire for re-entry was to recover her belongings ( see id. at 289; People v. Watson, 101 AD3d 913, 914 [2012]; People v. Obee, 299 A.D.2d 426, 427 [2002]; People v. Cyprien, 181 Misc.2d 978 [Crim Ct, N.Y. County 1999] ). Consequently, the Troopers properly relied on the victim's apparent authority to enter the premises.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the People ( People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621 [1983] ), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the convictions of resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree. The Troopers, seeking to exercise their lawful governmental function of arresting defendant based on probable cause, lawfully entered the premises shared by defendant and his girlfriend upon the latter's consent and arrested defendant, in the course of which defendant committed acts which constituted those offenses.
Further, in the exercise of our factual review power, we would find that the guilty verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007] ). According great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear their testimony, observe their demeanor and assess their credibility ( People v. Lane, 7 NY3d 888, 890 [2006]; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 [1987] ), we conclude that the Justice Court could properly find the testimonies of the victim and the Troopers to be plausible on the facts, internally consistent, and corroborated in significant aspects by the testimony of defendant's mother.
Defendant's claim that the court's 20–day delay in rendering a verdict violated CPL 350.10 is not preserved for appellate review since defendant never protested the length of the adjournment ( People v. Leone, 42 Misc.3d 127[A], 2013 N.Y. Slip Op 52146[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013]; People v. Nowakowski, 30 Misc.3d 138[A], 2011 N.Y. Slip Op 50216[U] [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011] ).
In any event, the claim is without merit. “There is no specific number of days within which a court must render its verdict” ( People v. Santana, 232 A.D.2d 663, 663 [1996] ), and the determination as to whether a delay is unreasonable “turn[s] largely on the circumstances of the individual case” ( People v. South, 41 N.Y.2d 451, 454 [1977] ), “the most salient of which are whether the court issues a written decision, the complexity of the issues of fact and law, and the nature and quantity of the evidence to be reviewed” ( People v. Morgan, 30 Misc.3d 52, 53 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2010] ). While the testimony concluded within a single day, the factual sufficiency of the proof of several charges was at issue, and the court, in a lengthy decision, reviewed in detail the evidence with respect to every charge and its reasons for according weight thereto, to explain the basis of the verdicts, as is required ( see CPL 350.10[5] ). Under the circumstances presented, 20 days is not so lengthy a posttrial period as to have violated defendant's right to a prompt verdict.
As no issue is raised on appeal with respect to the judgments convicting defendant of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, reckless endangerment in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree and harassment in the second degree, we deem so much of the appeal as is from these judgments to be abandoned and, thus, we dismiss that portion of the appeal.
Accordingly, the judgments convicting defendant of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest are affirmed.