Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County Super. Ct. No. RIF120520, Patrick F. Magers, Judge.
O'ROURKE, J.
A jury convicted Floyd Stewart of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true allegations that he personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, §§ 12022, subd. (b)(1); 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). Following a bench trial, the court found true allegations that Stewart had suffered two prior prison term convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). It sentenced Stewart to a total prison term of 18 years to life, consisting of a 15-year-to-life term for the murder conviction and three consecutive one-year terms for the personal use and prior prison term enhancements.
On appeal, Stewart contends the trial court prejudicially erred by (1) admitting evidence of two prior incidents of uncharged misconduct under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b); (2) instructing the jury it could consider those uncharged acts in determining his credibility; and (3) excluding evidence of the victim's "anger management problems." Stewart contends the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial, warranting reversal. We affirm the judgment.
All statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Stewart does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his conviction or the deadly weapon enhancement allegation, and thus their underlying facts are relevant only for purposes of assessing the similarity of the instant offense with the prior uncharged acts admitted under section 1101, subdivision (b). We summarize the facts with that purpose in mind, in the light most favorable to the trial court's rulings. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1148.)
Present Offense
On November 25, 2004, Stewart stabbed Joel Palencia during an argument over possession of a pickup truck that Palencia was keeping for a friend, Rebecca Trester, who had died from a drug overdose three days earlier. Until about three weeks before her death, Trester was Stewart's girlfriend; their relationship had been "off and on" for about four years. Stewart normally went by the nickname "Detroit."
In November 2004, Trester was keeping the truck in an alley behind Palencia's residence and had given Palencia the truck's keys in the event it needed to be moved. The day after Trester died, Stewart came to see her daughter Shelly and told her he wanted the truck, claiming his name was on the title. When Shelly responded that Stewart was not getting it because her brother was going to take it, Stewart became angry and upset and stormed out of her apartment.
At about 3:00 p.m. on November 25, 2004, Ronal Harvey was smoking with two friends near the location where Trester's pickup truck was parked when he saw Palencia and Stewart walking in the alley. The two men stopped at the truck about 20 feet away from Harvey, who heard parts of their conversation. Stewart said, "I paid for that," and Palencia responded to the effect of, "I cannot give it to you. It's not mine to give you. It belongs to Shelly." Palencia then said, "You know what –" and Stewart, who pulled a knife from a sheath on his leg, made a slashing motion at Palencia's throat. Harvey saw Palencia reach into the bed of the truck and pull out a stick. Stewart turned and took a few steps away from Palencia, but then switched the knife to his left hand, turned back and lunged at Palencia, stabbing him in the chest to the blade's hilt with enough impact to make a "thud" or "thunk" noise Afterwards, Harvey heard Stewart say, "I told you about that. I told you about that." Stewart quickly left the alley.
Palencia was transported to a hospital but died as a result of the stab wound. Blood tests revealed he had a .09 blood alcohol level as well as the presence of amphetamines, opiates, and cocaine.
Stewart's Prior Uncharged Acts
At Stewart's trial on the murder charge, the court permitted the prosecutor to present evidence of two prior uncharged incidents involving Stewart, one occurring in March 1993 and the other in April 1993.
March 1993 Incident
A few days before March 9, 1993, Deborah Dudonis (then Deborah McAffee) had purchased a television set from Stewart and still owed him $20 toward the purchase price. On March 9, 1993, Stewart came to the apartment where Dudonis lived with her boyfriend William Washburn, kicked in the front door, and confronted Dudonis and Washburn. Stewart was "crazy," "out of it," and "ranting and raving" about how they owed him money, needed to pay him, and he would not take no for an answer. Stewart pulled a switch blade knife from his back pocket, grabbed Dudonis from behind, and put the knife to her throat, saying, "Bitch, if you don't pay me, I'm going to kill you."
Stewart held the knife to Dudonis's throat for a minute or two, the entire time screaming and ranting about the money, how he needed it, and they needed to pay it. According to Dudonis, Stewart told her eight or nine times, "If you don't pay me, I'm going to kill you. I'm going to come back and kill you." Stewart then punched Washburn, who attempted to defend himself. Dudonis heard Stewart say, "I'm gonna come back in two hours. I want my money. If you don't have my money, you're dead. . . . I'll kill you. I'll kill your ol' lady." Dudonis, who was eight months pregnant at the time, was scared and immediately reported the incident to police.
Washburn testified Stewart also choked him until he almost passed out.
April 1993 Incident
Linda Elliott testified that in April 1993, she was homeless and living in a motel with her boyfriend Derek Blythe. At the time, Elliott and Blythe were acquainted with Stewart and his then girlfriend, Connie Stewart. Before April 12, 1993, Connie Stewart had taken Elliott and Blythe to a market and bought them $20 worth of groceries, telling them they did not owe her anything and not to worry about it. Based on those statements, Elliott believed the groceries were a gift.
According to Elliott, on April 12, 1993, she and Blythe were walking on a sidewalk near the market when Stewart and Connie Stewart drove up in a car. Stewart jumped out of the vehicle and came toward them upset and angry, with a knife in his hand. Elliott either tripped and fell or Stewart threw her to the ground and stood above her with the knife. When Elliott tried to find out what was going on, Stewart responded, "Well, you owe me 20 bucks." After Elliott told him that was not her understanding, Stewart turned and began chasing Blythe up the motel's stairs, punching him several times in the face. A Riverside police officer who responded to the incident testified Elliott had reported that Stewart had threatened her and Blythe with the knife and demanded money they assertedly owed him. The officer, who interviewed Stewart about the incident, recovered a knife from Stewart's vehicle.
Blythe testified that he vaguely recalled having a confrontation with Stewart outside the motel, after Blythe had donated plasma for $25. Blythe, who at the time was a drug user and fugitive as a result of charges in Florida, still had $5 with him after purchasing methamphetamine, which he then used. According to Blythe, Stewart was irritable and angry because he thought Blythe was "picking up" on Stewart's girlfriend Connie, and asked Blythe to step outside. When Blythe did, Stewart punched him in the face several times, pulled out a knife and put it against Blythe's throat, and said, "Give me your money or else." Blythe took that to mean he would be killed if he did not give Stewart his $5, and did so. Blythe went to an automated teller machine and took out an additional $20 for Stewart because he feared for his life. He testified that his drug use at that time affected his ability to perceive what was going on, and he was only vaguely able to recall details when he spoke to police.
Defense Evidence
Stewart, who was homeless at the time of the incident with Palencia, testified that on the day in question, he went to see Palencia and Palencia's roommate Gary because he needed to retrieve something out of the truck, which he and Trester had assertedly purchased together. He denied at any time attempting to take the truck, claiming instead that he had been trying unsuccessfully to get inside it for several weeks. Stewart testified that Palencia was friendly and cooperative that day as they walked out to the alleyway toward the truck but began asking why Stewart was trying to get into it. Stewart told Palencia he wanted a metal box he had placed behind a speaker containing a watch, jewelry and methamphetamine. After Palencia told Stewart he had found the methamphetamine, they began having a louder argument, with Palencia calling Stewart a "moocher" and "gold digger," and telling him he did not need anything in the truck. According to Stewart, when Palencia got to the truck, he reached in and grabbed a board, saying, "Well, I'll just beat your ass, and you ain't going to get nothing." Stewart started to leave but when Palencia hit him across his back, he turned around, unsnapped a knife at his waist and swung it at Palencia. Stewart testified that he only lunged at Palencia and stabbed him after Palencia drew the board back a second time as if he were going to swing a baseball bat. When Stewart saw Palencia's blood, he got scared and ran off.
Stewart testified that he never threatened to kill or stab Palencia; that he had known Palencia for years and "he was a friend." Stewart pulled out his knife because he felt threatened by the board and Palencia, who was much bigger than him. According to Stewart, he never intended to stab Palencia or kill him; he would not have pulled his knife or stabbed at him if Palencia had not grabbed the board.
On cross-examination, Stewart admitted the board Palencia grabbed was light and could be described as a wooden slat. Though Stewart said Palencia hit him across his back, he admitted the impact from Palencia's swing was "not that hard." Stewart testified he intended to inflict an injury on Palencia, but not as he did in the chest. He also explained that he was frightened of Palencia because he had "run-ins" with him before, though he never mentioned that to police in the several interviews he gave them after the incident.
DISCUSSION
I. Admission of Prior Uncharged Acts
Stewart contends the court prejudicially erred when it admitted evidence of the uncharged acts of March and April 1993 to show Stewart's intent at the time of his offense against Palencia. Specifically, Stewart maintains (1) the element of intent was not at issue in his case; (2) the events were too dissimilar to support an inference of similar intent; (3) the events were not relevant to intent; and (4) the evidence was unduly prejudicial, time consuming, confusing to the jury and cumulative.
Under section 1101, subdivision (b), " '[E]vidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove, among other things, . . . the intent with which the perpetrator acted in the commission of the charged crimes. [Citation.] Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove . . . intent only if the charged and uncharged crimes are sufficiently similar to support a rational inference of . . . intent.' " (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1147; see also People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 202; People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 795-796.) "The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged offense) is required in order to prove intent. [Citation.] '[T]he recurrence of a similar result . . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . ." (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402, quoting 2 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) § 302, p. 241.) Our state's high court has " ' "long recognized 'that if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably harbors the same intent in each instance' [citations], and that such prior conduct may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the actor's most recent intent. The inference to be drawn is not that the actor is disposed to commit such acts; instead, the inference to be drawn is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at the time of the second event, must have had the intent attributed to him by the prosecution." ' " (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 706.)
A trial court must scrutinize with great care the admissibility of prior act evidence under sections 1101 and 352. (People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 202.) Section 352 provides that "[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." On appeal, we review the trial court's ruling on the issue, essentially a determination of relevance, for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1147; Gray, at p. 202.) We will not disturb a trial court's exercise of discretion under section 352 in the absence of manifest abuse, on a finding that its decision was palpably arbitrary, capricious and patently absurd. (People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314; see also People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10; People v. Mullens (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 648, 658.)
Under these standards, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling (People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1148), we cannot conclude the trial court's ruling in admitting Stewart's prior acts was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly absurd, or exceeded the bounds of reason. (People v. Mullens, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 658.) Stewart argues intent was not at issue because he admitted he intended to assault Palencia; that the only issue in the case was whether Stewart acted in self-defense. Stewart concedes, however, that a defendant's not guilty plea places in issue all elements of the charged offenses (People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 422-423; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 379 [not guilty plea put in issue all of the elements of the offenses, including intent]), and he has not shown he offered any concession before or during trial that limited the issues or relieved the prosecution from proving all elements of the charged crime, including malice aforethought, i.e., either intent to kill (express malice) or implied malice intent (see People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 684). (E.g., People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 857-858 [when defendant did not isolate the issue of identity until after the prosecutor's case-in-chief, trial court did not err in permitting the prosecutor to present evidence of prior criminal conduct to prove other issues].) Stewart relies upon Daniels for its proposition that the defendant's plea does not put in issue elements of "any affirmative defense." (Id. at p. 858, fn. 13, citing People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 775-776, fn. 13.) But we fail to see – and Stewart does not explain – how that principle serves to eliminate the prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief at trial. The prosecutor here did not seek to " 'credit [Stewart] with fancy defen[s]es in order to rebut them at the outset with some damning piece of prejudice,' " as was warned against in Schader (supra, at p. 776, fn. 13).
The trial court correctly recognized that Stewart's intent was at issue. In making its ruling, it considered the arguments of both counsel – including defense counsel's argument that the prior acts were insufficiently similar, and stated: "I would agree with you, Mr. Aquilna [defense counsel], if the 1101[, subdivision b] evidence was being introduced on the issue of identity. That is not the issue in this case. [¶] . . . [T]he pivotal issue here is specific intent, or mental state of the defendant, at or about the time of the victim's demise from stab wounds. Was he acting with intent to merely defend himself, or good faith intent to defend himself, or was he there with the intent to assault, injure, or rob, or take the property at whatever cost was at his disposal. [¶] So I do believe under 352, the Court in evaluating the evidence feels that it is highly probative of his intent in this case." Stewart has not shown that this ruling, reflecting careful consideration of counsel's arguments and a weighing of the evidence's probative value, was a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion.
Nor do we agree that the prior act evidence was insufficiently similar to the present offense. Stewart concedes the evidence was "superficially similar" but that there are not enough shared characteristics to show the prior conduct is "substantially similar" to the charged offense. He argues that in the present case, he was not seeking to recover a debt as in the prior incidents and did not engage in a physical altercation in the present case as in the prior incidents. To be admissible to show intent, the prior conduct and the charged offense need only be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant probably harbored the same intent in each instance. (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1194; People v. Brandon (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1048-1049.) We conclude such similarity exists by virtue of the fact that in each prior instance and also in the present case, Stewart attempted to recover a material item – money or property – that he believed belonged to him and demanded the property using threat of force while wielding a knife. In the present case, like the prior uncharged incidents, when Palencia declined to give Stewart the truck Stewart attempted to engage in a physical altercation with him, i.e., swinging at Palencia with the knife before stabbing him. The conduct in each case was similar enough to permit a reasonable jury to infer Stewart acted with the same intent to forcibly obtain property from the victims (in the present case, leading to Palencia's murder) as opposed to some other innocent intent, i.e., defending himself from Palencia. (Accord, People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 635-638 [evidence of uncharged robbery properly admitted under section 1101, subdivision (b) on issue of intent in defendant's trial on first degree murder with special circumstance allegations because in both charged and uncharged crimes the defendant overcame the victim by force then reached into the victim's back pocket to obtain his wallet; incidents were sufficiently similar to support an inference that defendant harbored the same intent in both instances – to forcibly obtain cash from the victim]; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 616-619 [evidence of prior assault admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b) in defendant's trial for robbery, burglary and first degree murder to establish defendant intended to rob victim when he assaulted and killed him; in both cases defendant assaulted male victim in motel room, bound them with coat hangers, and searched another room at the motel for property].)
Stewart's contention that the prior events were not relevant to intent also fails. The premise of his argument is that with respect to the uncharged incidents, no jury could draw an inference that the possible consequences of his acts were dangerous to human life or that he acted in conscious disregard for human life. However, we are of the view that a reasonable jury could easily draw such an inference from Stewart's actions in putting a knife against Dudonis's or Blythe's throats and standing over Elliott in a threatening manner while wielding a knife.
Finally, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding admission of Stewart's 1993 acts would not be unduly prejudicial under section 352. As Stewart acknowledges, for purposes of applying section 352, the fact that evidence is harmful to a particular party does not establish prejudice. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 958.) Rather, evidence is unduly prejudicial only if it "uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias" against one party (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1070-1071) or to cause the jury to prejudge the issues based on extraneous factors (People v. Zapien, at p. 958). In support of his prejudice argument, Stewart points out he did not suffer any criminal charges from his prior misconduct, and argues the lack of charges implies that the events were not serious or the victims not credible. He maintains the jury would not have known why he was not prosecuted for them (no 1993 convictions were used to impeach him whereas he was impeached with other convictions from 1981 and 1994), and thus the jurors could have been tempted to convict him because he had not been punished, or they might believe he should be punished for those incidents. The jury, however, was not informed one way or the other about the legal outcome of these prior incidents, and we decline to engage in speculation about what jurors might have thought about those incidents absent evidence in the record demonstrating (or from which we might infer) their thought process. There is no indication in the record demonstrating the jury was confused about how to handle the evidence of prior offenses, particularly when it was given proper instructions (a modified version of CALCRIM No. 375, the giving of which we uphold in part II, post) relating to the admission of such evidence. We presume the jury followed the instructions absent evidence to the contrary. (People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 743; People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.)
Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2006-2007).
II. Instructional Error
The court gave the jury a modified instruction, CALCRIM No. 375, pertaining to their consideration of uncharged offenses, as follows:
"During the course of this trial certain evidence was introduced that the accused, Floyd Stewart, prior to the stabbing of Joel Palencia, was involved in other uncharged assaults which involved the use of a knife. Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by you to prove that Floyd Stewart is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit such offenses. Such evidence was received and may be considered only by you for the limited purpose of determining whether Floyd Stewart had the specific intent to kill Joel Palencia at the time of the stabbing and as a factor in determining the defendant's credibility as a witness.
"For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in this case. You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose. You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact committed the charged acts.
"If you decide that the defendant committed the uncharged acts, you may, but are not required to consider that evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not the defendant had the specific intent to kill and as a factor in determining the defendant's credibility as a witness.
"If you conclude that the defendant committed the uncharged acts, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of murder or manslaughter. The People must still prove each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." (Italics added.)
Stewart contends the court erred when over his counsel's objection, it added to CALCRIM No. 375 the point that the jury could consider his 1993 uncharged acts on the issue of his credibility as a witness. He points out that the jury had earlier been told his prior 1993 acts would be introduced only for purposes of section 1101, subdivision (b) and the jury's use of prior crime evidence was addressed in another instruction pertaining to the jury's consideration of other crimes or misconduct of witnesses (CALCRIM No. 316), thus highlighting his uncharged misconduct. Stewart argues the instruction was akin to an improper argumentative pinpoint instruction, contradictory, and prejudicial because the witness instruction contained an additional protective provision – absent in CALCRIM No. 375 – telling the jurors that the prior crime or misconduct would not "necessarily destroy or impair" that witness's credibility. According to Stewart, the instruction enhanced the credibility of the witnesses and diminished his own. We disagree.
The court additionally instructed the jury: "If you find that a witness has been convicted of a felony you may consider that fact in evaluating the creditability [sic] of a witness's testimony. The fact of a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair a witness's creditability [sic]. It is up to you to decide the weight of that fact and whether that fact makes the witness less believable. [¶] If you find that the witness has committed a crime or other misconduct you may consider that fact in evaluating the creditability [sic] of the witness's testimony. The fact that a witness may have committed a crime or other misconduct does not necessary [sic] destroy or impair a witness's credibility. It is up to you to decide the weight of that fact and whether that fact makes the witness less believable."
Argumentative instructions " 'select[] certain material facts, or those which are deemed to be material, and endeavor[] to force the court to indicate an opinion favorable to the defendant [or People] as to the effect of such facts, by incorporating them into instructions containing a correct principle of law.' " (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135.) We perceive nothing argumentative or confusing about CALCRIM No. 375's instructions combined with CALCRIM No. 316, dealing with witness testimony. The instructions are not unduly long, they are phrased in a neutral manner and both provide the jury with correct statements of the law. Indeed, Stewart does not contend it was an error of law for the court to change CALCRIM No. 375 or advise the jury that his prior misconduct could be considered as a factor in determining his credibility. Assuming the jury applied both instructions to Stewart as he asserts, the jurors would have also taken into account CALCRIM No. 316's directive that the prior misconduct does not "necessarily destroy or impair" that witness's credibility. The instructions as a whole reveal that the jury was provided additional proper instructions on how to assess witness credibility and each of the factors to take into account. There is no indication from the record – only speculation – that the jury was unduly influenced to find the People's witnesses more credible than Stewart, or confused by the instructions. We are required to presume in the absence of some evidence to the contrary the jury understood them and properly weighed all relevant factors in assessing Stewart's testimony with those of the witnesses in making its credibility determinations. (People v. Sanchez, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 852; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17 [appellate court is required to "presume that jurors comprehend and accept the court's directions"].)
III. Evidence Concerning Victim's Anger Control
After the close of the prosecution's case, Stewart's counsel proffered evidence under section 1103 that in December 2003, Palencia was admitted to the Department of Mental Health and told a social worker he was bipolar, had a history of auditory hallucinations and used illicit drugs to avoid hearing them and since 2002 he had problems controlling his anger. Counsel stated that defendant continued as a patient with the Department of Mental Health into 2004. The prosecutor objected to the evidence on grounds it did not meet the foundational requirements for relevancy under section 1103. The court excluded the evidence under section 352, finding it "far afield of [section] 1103." On appeal, Stewart contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it refused to admit the evidence of Palencia's admission to problems with anger control because it was highly probative of whether Palencia was aggressive or violent.
Section 1103, subdivision (a) provides in part: "In a criminal action, evidence of the character or a trait of character (in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct) of the victim of the crime for which the defendant is being prosecuted is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is: [¶] (1) Offered by the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in conformity with the character or trait of character. [¶] (2) Offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence adduced by the defendant under paragraph (1)."
Section 1103 sets forth exceptions to the rule of section 1101, subdivision (a) that character evidence is generally inadmissible to prove a person acted in conformity with it on a given occasion. (People v. Myers (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 546, 552; People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442, 446-448.) One of its exceptions permits a criminal defendant to offer evidence of the victim's character to show the victim acted in conformity with it. (Myers, at p. 552, citing§ 1103, subd. (a)(1).) "Wigmore, on whose treatise []section 1103 is based [citation], notes the relevance of character evidence is premised on a continuity of character over time: ' "Character at an earlier or later time than that of the deed in question is relevant only on the assumption that it was substantially unchanged in the meantime, i.e. the offer is really of character at one period to prove character at another . . . ." ' " (People v. Myers, at pp. 552-553.) The trial court has broad discretion under section 352 to exclude such character evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." (§ 352; Shoemaker, at p. 448.)
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered evidence. The offense against Palencia took place in November 2004, and Stewart's proffer was essentially that Palencia had acknowledged anger management problems in 2002 and 2003. In weighing the probative value of the prejudicial effect of this evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Palencia's anger issues did not extend to the end of 2004, particularly where Stewart's counsel indicated that Palencia's statement came while he was under treatment with the Department of Mental Health. The court could also conclude that the evidence was too vague to be probative on Palencia's actions or attitude toward Stewart at the time of his death. Counsel's proffer was that Palencia acknowledged having "problems controlling his anger" – a proffer that was absent any indication that Palencia's anger issues resulted in acts of violence or aggression.
In fact, Stewart's counsel expressly disclaimed any admission as to violence: "[Defense counsel]: Just so the Court is clear, this is not [the social worker's] opinion. . . . These are statements from Mr. Palencia himself. She's not giving a diagnosis as an expert. She's just relating what he informed her. [¶] The Court: That he is violent without – [¶] [Defense counsel]: He didn't use the word 'violent.' He has past problems with anger control."
Further, " 'to justify an act of self-defense . . ., the defendant must have an honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him.'" (People v. Minifie, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1064; see also People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082.) Defense counsel's proffer under section 1103 said nothing about whether Stewart was aware, even tangentially, of Palencia's anger control problems (unlike cases in which the victim had previously threatened or assaulted the defendant, e.g. People v. Gonzales (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1663-1664), and thus the court reasonably concluded that its relevance to Stewart's self-defense claim was minimal and outweighed by the collateral matters of Palencia's bipolar disorder, auditory hallucinations and admission to the Department of Mental Health. Stewart has not shown the court's ruling was palpably arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. (People v. Jennings, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)
IV. Cumulative Error
"Under the 'cumulative error' doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial." (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32.) Having assessed Stewart's evidentiary and instructional challenges and finding no error in the trial court's rulings, we reject Stewart's contention that any cumulative effect of errors requires reversal. Contrary to Stewart's assertions otherwise, there was no miscarriage of justice requiring reversal on this record.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., AARON, J.