Opinion
2013-09498.
04-27-2016
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Darren STATON, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Bryan D. Kreykes of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Ellen C. Abbot, and Merri Turk Lasky of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Bryan D. Kreykes of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, Ellen C. Abbot, and Merri Turk Lasky of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, SHERI S. ROMAN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Latella, J.), rendered September 12, 2013, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, assault in the second degree, and robbery in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the photographic identification procedure employed in this case was unduly suggestive. Initially, contrary to the People's assertion, the defendant's argument is preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ). However, the defendant's contention is without merit.
“While the People have the initial burden of going forward to establish the reasonableness of the police conduct and the lack of any undue suggestiveness in a pretrial identification procedure, it is the defendant who bears the ultimate burden of proving that the procedure was unduly suggestive” (People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 335, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 ; see People v. Jackson, 98 N.Y.2d 555, 559, 750 N.Y.S.2d 561, 780 N.E.2d 162 ; People v. Dobbins, 112 A.D.3d 735, 736, 976 N.Y.S.2d 213 ). “In determining whether a photographic array was ‘unduly suggestive’ the hearing court should consider whether there was any substantial likelihood that the defendant would be singled out for identification” (People v. Dunlap, 9 A.D.3d 434, 435, 780 N.Y.S.2d 171, quoting People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d at 336, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 ; see People v. Burroughs, 98 A.D.3d 583, 583, 949 N.Y.S.2d 211 ). “There is no requirement that the photograph of a defendant shown as part of a photo array be surrounded by photographs of individuals nearly identical in appearance” (People v. Starks, 91 A.D.3d 975, 975–976, 937 N.Y.S.2d 323 ; see People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d at 336, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608 ; People v. Burroughs, 98 A.D.3d at 584, 949 N.Y.S.2d 211 ).
Here, the People satisfied their initial burden of establishing that the photo array was not improper, and the defendant failed to demonstrate that the procedure was unduly suggestive. The participants in the photo array were sufficiently similar to the defendant in appearance such that there was little likelihood that he would be singled out for identification based on particular characteristics (see People v. Thomas, 104 A.D.3d 710, 711, 962 N.Y.S.2d 281 ; People v. Brown, 89 A.D.3d 1032, 1033, 933 N.Y.S.2d 339 ; People v. Ragunauth, 24 A.D.3d 472, 472, 805 N.Y.S.2d 654 ). We do not agree with the position of our dissenting colleague that the defendant appears to be significantly older than the other individuals in the array, and that the characteristics of his picture draw the viewer's attention toward it. The six-photograph array depicted men who appeared to be relatively close in age. Additionally, the participants were sufficiently similar to the defendant in skin tone, hairstyle, facial hair, pose, and attire (see People v. Ferguson, 55 A.D.3d 926, 927, 866 N.Y.S.2d 346 ; People v. Wright, 297 A.D.2d 391, 391, 746 N.Y.S.2d 611 ; People v. Robert, 184 A.D.2d 597, 598, 585 N.Y.S.2d 445 ). Although it appears that the defendant is the only participant in the array with salt and pepper hair, that difference, when considered together with the other similarities in the photographs, did not render the array unduly suggestive (see People v. Epolito, 101 A.D.3d 1603, 957 N.Y.S.2d 518 ; People v. Ferguson, 55 A.D.3d at 927, 866 N.Y.S.2d 346 ; see also People v. Ortiz, 61 A.D.3d 1003, 1003, 880 N.Y.S.2d 77 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.
The defendant next contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that one of the complainants suffered physical injury within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(9), as required for his convictions of robbery in the second degree and assault in the second degree (see Penal Law §§ 160.10[2] [a] ; 120.05[12] ). However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the complainant suffered physical injury within the meaning of Penal Law § 10.00(9) (see People v. Chiddick, 8 N.Y.3d 445, 447, 834 N.Y.S.2d 710, 866 N.E.2d 1039 ). Moreover, upon our independent review of the evidence pursuant to CPL 470.15(5), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to the counts of robbery in the second degree and assault in the second degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ). The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
RIVERA, J.P., ROMAN and SGROI, JJ., concur.
HALL, J., dissents, and votes to reverse the judgment, grant that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony, and order a new trial, to be preceded by an independent source hearing.
In my view, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.
Upon viewing the photographic array, my attention is immediately drawn to the defendant's photograph, since the defendant appears to be significantly older than all other individuals in the array (see People v. Dobbins, 112 A.D.3d 735, 737–738, 976 N.Y.S.2d 213 ). This age disparity is sufficiently apparent as to orient the viewer toward the defendant as a perpetrator of the crimes charged (see People v. Robinson, 123 A.D.3d 1062, 1063, 999 N.Y.S.2d 499 ). Moreover, the defendant is the only individual in the array with salt and pepper hair, a feature specifically noted by one of the complainants in her description of the perpetrator (see People v. Pena, 131 A.D.3d 708, 16 N.Y.S.3d 184 ). In addition, the defendant is the only individual in the array wearing a bright green shirt, and his photograph depicts a larger portion of his chest than the other individuals. In my view, these characteristics make the defendant's photograph pop out and draw the viewer's attention toward it, so as to indicate that the police had “made a particular selection” (People v. Curtis, 71 A.D.3d 1044, 1045, 900 N.Y.S.2d 68 ). Thus, the photographic array is unduly suggestive.
Moreover, I find that, under the circumstances of this case, the passage of 7 and 12 days, respectively, between the complainants' viewing of the photographic array and their respective identifications of the defendant at a lineup, was insufficient to attenuate any possible taint from the viewing of the array (cf. People v. Ortiz, 84 A.D.3d 839, 840, 922 N.Y.S.2d 192 ; People v. Nedd, 79 A.D.3d 1150, 913 N.Y.S.2d 564 ; People v. Butts, 279 A.D.2d 587, 719 N.Y.S.2d 680 ). Consequently, it is my opinion that the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.
I agree with all other determinations made by the majority.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent, and vote to reverse the judgment and order a new trial, to be preceded by an independent source hearing.