Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. GA 075220, Collete N. Serio, Commissioner.
Murray A. Rosenberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and David Zarmi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FLIER, J.
Appellant Adrienne Spratt appeals from a judgment of conviction following trial. The jury found appellant guilty of possession for sale of cocaine base in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11351.5. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her pretrial motion to suppress evidence. We agree, as this case presents a nonconsensual encounter and unlawful detention. We therefore reverse the judgment.
FACTS
On November 24, 2008, Deputy Shauna Roseborough and Deputy Eric Salvato were driving down Vermont Street in Altadena when they encountered appellant sitting in the driver’s seat of a parked vehicle on a residential block. Appellant was sitting slouched back in the driver’s seat. As far as Roseborough could see, there was only one person in the parked vehicle, and appellant was not doing anything illegal. There were no people loitering around the vehicle. It was 10:30 p.m., and the street was dark and poorly lit. Roseborough knew that area of Vermont Street to be a location for drug activity. She had been present on two to three occasions when drug arrests were made on that street. Roseborough testified that she decided to make contact with appellant to check on her welfare.
Appellant’s vehicle was legally parked between two other vehicles, with several feet separating it on each end from the other vehicles. Deputy Roseborough was driving her patrol vehicle westbound on Vermont Street, where the street was narrow. The vehicle in which appellant was sitting was facing east. Roseborough pulled her patrol vehicle almost alongside appellant’s vehicle so that the two vehicles were essentially side to side. The deputy shined her driver’s side spotlight on appellant and exited her patrol vehicle. She had her flashlight in one hand when she exited the patrol vehicle, though the flashlight was off. Deputy Salvato also exited the patrol vehicle with his flashlight; he walked around the back of appellant’s vehicle to the passenger side. Both deputies were armed and in uniform, though when Roseborough approached appellant, she did not have her hand on her gun.
Deputy Roseborough went to the driver’s side window of the vehicle where appellant was seated and tapped on her window. The deputy could not recall whether appellant rolled her window down or opened her door, but she did one of the two. The deputy asked appellant if she lived in the area. Appellant answered that she did not live in the area. The deputy asked appellant if she knew anyone who lived in the area, and appellant responded that she did not. She also asked appellant if she knew what street she was on, and appellant again responded that she did not. She then asked appellant what she was doing in the area; appellant replied that she was delivering medication from a pharmacy to her grandmother, and she had pulled over to make a phone call. Roseborough could see that appellant had her cellular phone when the deputy initially approached her. Roseborough asked where appellant’s grandmother lived, and appellant said on “El Sereno.” Roseborough then asked for appellant’s name, and appellant responded that she was Adrienne Spratt. Appellant did not appear to be under the influence, and she appeared to be coherent and in good health.
Deputy Roseborough asked appellant for her identification. Appellant said she had identification and started rifling through a handful of approximately 10 to 15 credit cards that she pulled from her purse. She looked through these cards for roughly one minute. Roseborough was less than six inches from appellant’s window and at this point had her flashlight on. With her flashlight shining on the cards, she was able to see the cards as appellant rifled through them. She noticed that the majority of the cards had names on them that did not match the name appellant had given her. She noted approximately five names other than “Adrienne Spratt” on the cards, including the name “Kimberly Williams.” Roseborough believed she saw a California driver’s license in the stack, but appellant did not hand her the card.
Based on the observation that appellant had a number of cards in more than one person’s name, Deputy Roseborough believed that appellant was possibly in possession of stolen property or was using credit cards in someone else’s name. She then asked appellant to step out of her vehicle. She asked appellant if her identification was on her person, and appellant replied that she did not believe it was on her person. The deputy conducted a search of appellant for her identification and did not find it. She then seated appellant in the backseat of the patrol vehicle while Deputy Salvato continued to look for appellant’s identification inside appellant’s vehicle. Roseborough did not handcuff appellant at this time.
Inside appellant’s purse, Deputy Salvato located appellant’s identification, the driver’s license of a male, a medical card for another male, approximately $3,700 in cash, and roughly 50 additional credit cards in the names of various people. After discovering these things in appellant’s purse, Salvato used the mobile digital terminal in the patrol vehicle to run the license plate of appellant’s vehicle. The vehicle was registered in the name of Kimberly Williams.
Appellant was placed under arrest for identity theft. After the arrest, Deputy Roseborough called another deputy, Deputy Rohas, on his cellular phone and asked him to go to the home of Ms. Williams to determine whether the vehicle belonged to her or appellant. Rohas did so and reported to Roseborough that appellant had the permission of Ms. Williams to take the vehicle. A field sergeant eventually showed up at the scene with Ms. Williams. There, Ms. Williams denied the vehicle belonged to her and said that it was registered in her name to establish credit, but the vehicle, in fact, belonged to appellant. Ms. Williams also stated that appellant had permission to have the credit cards in Ms. Williams’s name.
The deputies continued to search appellant’s vehicle and discovered a plastic bag containing what appeared to be rock cocaine. The bag of narcotics was found in the glove compartment of the vehicle. The narcotics were contained in a small Ziploc bag, and along with a digital scale, they were packaged inside a larger plastic shopping bag. Deputy Roseborough did not see appellant open the glove compartment at any point during the incident.
In their appellate papers, the People discuss the evidence presented at trial regarding appellant’s encounter with Deputies Roseborough and Salvato. We do not discuss this evidence because the only issue being appealed is the trial court’s pretrial ruling on appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. Our review is therefore limited to the evidence that was before the trial court when it ruled on that motion. (People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1105, fn. 2.)
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress, we accept the court’s express and implied factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) “All presumptions favor the proper exercise of the trial court’s power to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences.” (People v. Llamas (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 441, 447.) We exercise our independent judgment, however, in selecting the applicable rule of law and in applying that law to the facts. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.) Thus, in determining the legality of a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, we exercise our independent judgment. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
2. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress because her initial encounter with the deputies was neither a consensual encounter nor a lawful detention, and even if the encounter were lawful, the deputies’ later search of her glove compartment was unlawful. We agree that appellant’s initial encounter with the deputies was neither consensual nor a lawful detention. Accordingly, the trial court should have granted her motion to suppress. Because we hold that the deputies unlawfully detained appellant, we need not decide whether the later search of her glove compartment was unlawful.
a. The Deputies’ Contact with Appellant Was a Detention and Not a Consensual Encounter
Police encounters, such as that here, may be placed into three broad categories, from the least intrusive to the most intrusive: (1) consensual encounters resulting in no restraint of liberty; (2) detentions, which involve seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and (3) formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual’s liberty. (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) We are presently concerned with the distinction between consensual encounters and lawful detentions.
Consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821 .) Thus, unlike detentions, they do not require an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. (Ibid.) When a police officer approaches a defendant on a public street, “[a]s long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required on the part of the officer. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individual’s liberty, does a seizure occur.” (Ibid.) We consider the totality of the circumstances “‘to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’” (Ibid., quoting Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439.) Circumstances relevant to whether a seizure has occurred include the presence of several officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, the officer’s physical touching of the defendant, or the use of language or a tone of voice indicating that the officer might compel compliance with his or her request. (Ibid.)
In consideration of the circumstances, we find that a detention—not a consensual encounter—occurred. Deputy Roseborough pulled the patrol vehicle alongside appellant’s vehicle so that the two vehicles were almost side by side. There were cars parked both in front of and behind appellant at a distance of only a few feet on each side. Thus, appellant’s exit was effectively blocked when the deputies pulled alongside her. Roseborough shined her vehicle’s spotlight on appellant. She and Deputy Salvato, both uniformed and armed, then proceeded to exit their vehicle and surround appellant’s vehicle, with Roseborough on the driver’s side and Deputy Salvato on the passenger’s side. Roseborough next tapped on appellant’s window and asked her a series of questions, including whether she lived in the area, whether she knew anyone that lived in the area, whether she knew where she was, and what she was doing in the area. A reasonable person in this situation—spotlight shining on the person late at night, blocked in by a police car with no choice but to remain, two armed and uniformed officers surrounding the person’s car—would have felt that his or her liberty was restrained. That individual would not have felt “free to disregard the police and go about his or her business.” (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821 .)
We find ample support for our holding in previous cases decided by this court. For instance, the show of authority here was more intimidating than in People v. Wilkins (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 804, 807, when the court held that a detention had occurred. In Wilkins, an officer driving a marked patrol vehicle through a convenience store parking lot noted two occupants in the front seat of a parked station wagon. (Ibid.) The officer drove through the parking lot a second time and parked diagonally behind the station wagon, essentially blocking the station wagon’s exit. (Ibid.) The officer then got out of his patrol vehicle, approached the driver’s side of the station wagon, and asked several questions of the occupants, including what the two were doing in the area. (Ibid.) The court held that “the occupants of the station wagon were ‘seized’ when [the officer] stopped his marked patrol vehicle behind the parked station wagon in such a way that the exit of the parked vehicle was prevented. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” (Id. at p. 809.) Here, not only was the exit of appellant’s parked vehicle prevented, but there was an officer on each side of her vehicle and a spotlight shining on her.
In People v. Garry, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pages 1111-1112, the court held that a detention occurred when a police officer observed the defendant standing on a street corner, “bathed defendant in light, exited his police vehicle, and, armed and in uniform, ‘briskly’ walked 35 feet in ‘two and a half, three seconds’ directly to” defendant, while asking him if he was on probation or parole. The combined effect of the officer’s actions was “a show of authority so intimidating as to communicate to any reasonable person” that he or she was not free to decline the officer’s requests or terminate the encounter. (Id. at p. 1112.) While no “brisk” approach occurred here, the deputies’ blocking appellant’s exit was just as intimidating.
In People v. Jones (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 519, 523, the coercive effect of the officer’s conduct was also “clear.” The defendant was standing on a street corner with two other men when a marked police vehicle pulled across the street toward them and into the wrong side of the road, parking diagonally against traffic a mere 10 feet away. (Ibid.) The officer then exited the car, and when the defendant began walking away, said something like, “‘“Stop. Would you please stop.”’” (Id. at p. 522.) The court held that “[a] reasonable man does not believe he is free to leave when directed to stop by a police officer who has arrived suddenly and parked his car in such a way as to obstruct traffic. Clearly, appellant was detained.” (Id. at p. 523.) Both in Jones and here, the use of the patrol vehicle as a show of authority is plain. Although the deputies here did not issue a command or request to “stop, ” that is because appellant had no opportunity to attempt an exit. Instead, Deputy Roseborough tapped on appellant’s window, which a reasonable person would interpret as a command or request to lower the window and listen to the deputy.
As the United States Supreme Court has noted, the test for whether law enforcement officers have seized a person “is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.” (Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, 573.) Accordingly, it comes as no surprise that the facts of People v. Wilkins, People v. Garry, and People v. Jones differ slightly from those before us. Still, they provide apt analogies. As in those cases, a reasonable person in appellant’s situation would not have felt free to terminate the encounter with the deputies.
b. The Deputies’ Detention of Appellant Was Unlawful
Having concluded that the deputies detained appellant, we must now determine whether that detention was lawful. We hold that it was not.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the detention of a person by law enforcement officers when the detention is unreasonable. (People v. Madrid (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055.) A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the circumstances known or apparent to the officer “include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to a crime has taken place, is occurring, or is about to occur; and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (People v. Jones, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 524.)
Here, there were no specific and articulable facts causing the deputies to suspect that a crime was occurring or about to occur and that appellant was involved. Indeed, Deputy Roseborough testified at the suppression hearing that, as far as she could see, appellant was not doing anything illegal. Furthermore, she testified that she decided to make contact with appellant to check on appellant’s welfare, not because of any suspicion of criminal activity. Although appellant was in an area known for drug activity, this alone cannot support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 478-479 [“[W]e have explained that persons may not be subjected to invasions of privacy merely because they are in or passing through a ‘high crime area.’ [Citations.]... A history of past criminal activity in a locality does not justify suspension of the constitutional rights of everyone, or anyone, who may subsequently be in that locality”].) There was nothing inherently suspicious about appellant’s sitting in a parked car in a residential area.
We note that the People do not urge otherwise. Instead, the People contend that any detention of appellant was lawful under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment. We disagree.
The community caretaking exception recognizes that, “in addition to their investigative tasks, police officers regularly perform ‘“community caretaking functions”—helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, assisting and protecting citizens in need.’” (People v. Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1056, quoting People v. Ray (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464, 467.) “‘The appropriate standard under the community caretaking exception is one of reasonableness: Given the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions?’” (Id. at p. 1056, quoting People v. Ray, supra, at pp. 476-477.) Officers are entitled to draw reasonable inferences in light of their experience, but they must be able to point to specific and articulable facts from which they concluded their actions were necessary. (Ibid.) Reasonableness depends on a balancing between the public interest and an individual’s right to be free from arbitrary interference from law enforcement officers. (Id. at p. 1058.) “In engaging in this weighing process, courts must act as vigilant gatekeepers to ensure that the community caretaking exception does not consume the warrant requirement.” (Ibid.)
In People v. Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at 1059, the court set forth a nonexclusive list of four factors relevant to whether an officer has acted reasonably: (1) the nature and level of distress exhibited by the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance independent of the officer; and (4) to what extent the individual presented a danger to herself and others, if not assisted. The first factor, the nature and level of the distress, is entitled to the greatest weight, though it is not necessarily dispositive. (Ibid.) A particular level of distress may be more or less serious depending on the remaining three factors. (Ibid.)
The deputies’ encounter with appellant fails the reasonableness test. Most important, appellant was not exhibiting any great distress. Deputy Roseborough could see that appellant was slouched back in the driver’s seat of her vehicle. But there was no evidence that appellant was unmoving, unconscious, or otherwise exhibiting signs of distress. (See People v. Madrid, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060 [defendant walking with an unsteady gait, at one point using a shopping cart to steady himself, apparently sweating, but able to walk 50 feet without assistance, exhibited a “low level of distress”].) Any claim that appellant could have been dead or unconscious is entirely speculative and unsupported by facts. Moreover, appellant was legally parked in a residential area, as opposed to an industrial or business district. There is nothing especially dangerous, or unusual, about occupying a parked vehicle in a residential area, where presumably many people live and could hear or see signs of distress. Although appellant was alone in the car, no reasonable basis existed for the deputies to conclude that appellant presented a danger to herself or others when the only possible sign of distress was her sitting slouched back. In short, this was thin evidence and did not provide a reasonable basis for detaining appellant to discharge community caretaking functions.
In sum, the deputies unlawfully detained appellant. The trial court should have suppressed the evidence seized as a result of this unlawful detention.
In light of our ruling, we need not address the People’s argument that we should modify the judgment of conviction to impose additional mandatory fees.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is reversed.
WE CONCUR: BIGELOW, P. J., RUBIN, J.