People v. Snyder

Full title: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE SNYDER, Defendant

Court: Supreme Court, Erie County

Date published: Jul 29, 1985

129 Misc. 2d 137 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)

492 N.Y.S.2d 890

Opinion

July 29, 1985

R. Scott Atwater, Assistant District Attorney, for plaintiff.

Phillips, Lytle, Hitchcock, Blaine Huber (Michael B. Powers of counsel), for Better Business Bureau.

Robert Murphy for defendant.

JOHN J. CONNELL, J.

The above-named defendant was indicted by the Erie County Grand Jury on charges of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree involving an alleged incident on August 16, 1983, in which William Fugate was shot to death by the defendant.

In the case at bar, the defense, both in the voir dire and opening statement to the jury, had raised the defense of justification claiming that the defendant shot and killed William Fugate in self-defense. Mention was also made by defense counsel in his opening statement of the victim and defendant's participation with the Community Dispute Resolution Center prior to the fatal shooting. Because of these statements the District Attorney subpoenaed any and all records pertaining to such mediation between the defendant and the victim and involving a third person, Deborah Nelson.

Attorneys for the Better Business Bureau Foundation which administers the Community Dispute Resolution Center program in Erie County served an order to show cause on the District Attorney's office, signed June 7, 1985 and made returnable on June 10, 1985, seeking that the said subpoena be quashed pursuant to CPLR 2304. On the return date arguments were heard from the attorney for the Better Business Bureau Foundation, the District Attorney's office and defense counsel for George Snyder. Subsequent to the oral argument, and after review of the paper submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, and upon review of the applicable statutory law, the motion to quash the subpoena was granted. There appears to be no reported case construing Judiciary Law § 849-b (6).

The Community Dispute Resolution Center's program was established in 1981 by the New York State Legislature to enable the creation of community dispute centers to resolve neighborhood and interpersonal disputes. The goal of the Legislature in creating these centers was to provide a "quick, inexpensive and voluntary resolution of disagreements, while at the same time serving the overall public interest by permitting the criminal justice community to concentrate its resources on more serious criminal matters." (1981 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2630.) It was the feeling of the Legislature that in order for such programs to be successful, the parties availing themselves of the services of these forums must feel that they can air their disputes "in an informal atmosphere without restraint and intimidation." (L 1981, ch 847, § 1.)

In order to assure confidentiality to the parties involved, and thereby encourage their full, frank, and open participation, Judiciary Law § 849-b (6) was enacted as follows: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this article, all memoranda, work products, or case files of a mediator are confidential and not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative proceeding. Any communication relating to the subject matter of the resolution made during the resolution process by any participant, mediator, or any other person present at the dispute resolution shall be a confidential communication."

In spite of the first sentence in this statute, there appears nowhere else in the article an exception to the restrictive language of the statute.

I find that even if the defendant can be found to have waived the confidentiality of the records pertaining to the mediation sessions in which he was involved, the statute, as drafted, permits no such waiver. The items sought by the District Attorney are by definition "confidential communications."

Confidential communications are, by their very nature, guided by rules of exclusion. Most commonly rules of exclusion are drafted to prevent evidence being presented to a jury that is of no probative value or of a kind that may unfairly prejudice one of the parties or misdirect the jury's attention from the primary issue at hand. The confidentiality of certain communications, however, is meant to nurture very specific interpersonal or professional relationships that the courts, society and the Legislature deem desirable. (Fisch, New York Evidence § 511, at 335 [2d ed].)

The Court of Appeals recently strictly construed Public Health Law § 2306 which relates to information concerning sexually transmittable diseases. That section reads as follows: "All reports or information secured by a board of health or health officer under the provisions of this article shall be confidential except in so far as is necessary to carry out the purposes of this article." In Matter of Grattan v People ( 65 N.Y.2d 243), the court held that the goal of the statute cannot be defeated simply by the consent of the source to release the information. "The requirement of confidentiality (Public Health Law § 2306) is integral to a statutory scheme designed to encourage afflicted persons to seek and secure treatment, which in the case of communicable disease serves individual interests as well as those of society." (Matter of Grattan v People, supra, at p 245.)

Section 849-b (6) is even more restrictive in its language by specifically referring to excluding disclosure from "any judicial or administrative proceeding."

Section 849-b (4) (a) places funding for the dispute centers in jeopardy unless "it complies with the provisions of this article and the applicable rules and regulations of the chief administrator". The intent of the Legislature to provide forums for the resolutions of disputes as alternatives to structured judicial settings is, therefore, clearly defined in the statutory language itself as well as the funding provisions for the dispute centers.

To grant the District Attorney's request to review the records of the Community Dispute Resolution Center would subvert the Legislature's clear intention to guarantee the confidentiality of all such records and communications.

Accordingly, the subpoena is hereby quashed.