Opinion
774 KA 18–00365
09-27-2019
DAVID J. FARRUGIA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LOCKPORT (THERESA L. PREZIOSO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. CAROLINE A. WOJTASZEK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (THOMAS H. BRANDT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
DAVID J. FARRUGIA, PUBLIC DEFENDER, LOCKPORT (THERESA L. PREZIOSO OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
CAROLINE A. WOJTASZEK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOCKPORT (THOMAS H. BRANDT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree ( Penal Law § 155.30[8] ). Contrary to defendant's contention, his waiver of the right to appeal is valid (see generally People v. Lopez , 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006] ). Supreme Court engaged defendant in "an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice" ( People v. Hicks , 89 A.D.3d 1480, 1480, 932 N.Y.S.2d 412 [4th Dept. 2011], lv denied 18 N.Y.3d 924, 942 N.Y.S.2d 463, 965 N.E.2d 965 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted] ), and the record establishes that he "understood that the right to appeal is separate and distinct from those rights automatically forfeited upon a plea of guilty" ( Lopez , 6 N.Y.3d at 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ). The valid waiver of the right to appeal encompasses defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence (see id. at 255–256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ).