Opinion
109609
06-27-2019
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lennox SKYERS, Appellant.
Law Office of William J. Reddy, New City (William J. Reddy of counsel), for appellant. Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh (Jeffrey C. Kehm of counsel), for respondent.
Law Office of William J. Reddy, New City (William J. Reddy of counsel), for appellant.
Andrew J. Wylie, District Attorney, Plattsburgh (Jeffrey C. Kehm of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Lynch, J.P., Clark, Mulvey, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mulvey, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Clinton County (Ryan, J.), rendered April 4, 2016, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of assault in the first degree (two counts).
Defendant, who was on probation at the time that the underlying offenses were committed, was charged in a 13–count indictment with various crimes including, insofar as is relevant here, two counts of assault in the first degree. Approximately three weeks prior to the scheduled trial, the People offered defendant an opportunity to plead guilty to two counts of assault in the first degree with a recommendation that he be sentenced as a second felony offender to concurrent prison terms of 13 years followed by five years of postrelease supervision. Defendant initially acquiesced to the People's offer but, midway through his plea allocution, defendant asserted that he was not guilty and that "[e]verything was an accident," prompting County Court to adjourn the matter pending trial.
Defendant reappeared in court the following day – once again indicating that he wished to go forward with the proposed plea agreement, which also would resolve defendant's probation violation. After assuring County Court that he had been afforded sufficient time to confer with counsel, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault in the first degree, and the matter was adjourned for sentencing. When defendant returned to court approximately two months later and was given an opportunity to make a statement prior to sentencing, defendant expressed remorse for his crimes, stating that, on the day in question, he had "overdosed on some medications while [he] was intoxicated," he "wasn't in [his] right state of mind," he "wasn't trying to hurt anyone" and he "honestly [did not] recall what happened because after [he] took the medications [he] blacked out." County Court thereafter sentenced defendant to the contemplated concurrent terms of imprisonment, and this appeal ensued.
The statements made by defendant at sentencing, which raised the possibility of an intoxication defense and called into question the intent element of assault in the first degree (see Penal Law § 120.10[1] ), were sufficient to trigger the narrow exception to the preservation requirement, thereby imposing a duty of further inquiry upon County Court "to ensure that defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary" ( People v. Gresham, 151 A.D.3d 1175, 1177, 57 N.Y.S.3d 532 [2017] ; see People v. Brassard, 166 A.D.3d 1312, 1313, 87 N.Y.S.3d 738 [2018] ; People v. Miller, 162 A.D.3d 1231, 1232, 79 N.Y.S.3d 348 [2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 939, 84 N.Y.S.3d 866, 109 N.E.3d 1166 [2018] ; People v. Chin, 160 A.D.3d 1038, 1039, 73 N.Y.S.3d 685 [2018] ). To be sure, "there is no mandatory catechism required [at a plea or] on sentencing" ( People v. Gresham, 151 A.D.3d at 1177, 57 N.Y.S.3d 532 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v. Stutzman, 158 A.D.3d 1294, 1295, 71 N.Y.S.3d 784 [2018], lv denied 31 N.Y.3d 1122, 81 N.Y.S.3d 382, 106 N.E.3d 765 [2018] ), and "defendant was not required to recite each element of the crime[ ] or provide a further factual recitation, as his affirmative responses to County Court's questions established the elements of the crime[ ] charged" ( People v. Gresham, 151 A.D.3d at 1177, 57 N.Y.S.3d 532 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). Similarly, defendant did not say anything during the course of the plea colloquy that suggested a possible intoxication defense (see e.g. People v. Hopper, 153 A.D.3d 1045, 1046–1047, 61 N.Y.S.3d 176 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1061, 71 N.Y.S.3d 11, 94 N.E.3d 493 [2017] ), and defendant's statements at sentencing contradicted his sworn admissions during the plea colloquy (see e.g. People v. Quell, 166 A.D.3d 1388, 1389, 86 N.Y.S.3d 814 [2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1208, 99 N.Y.S.3d 204, 122 N.E.3d 1117 [2019] ). However, "statements made by a defendant that negate an element of the crime to which a plea has been entered, raise the possibility of a [particular] defense or otherwise suggest an involuntary plea require[ ] the trial court to then conduct a further inquiry or give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea" ( People v. Chin, 160 A.D.3d at 1039, 73 N.Y.S.3d 685 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v. Brassard, 166 A.D.3d at 1313, 87 N.Y.S.3d 738 ). County Court did not pursue either of those avenues here.
Although the People argue that defendant's comments were merely explanatory (see People v. Wagoner, 30 A.D.3d 629, 630, 815 N.Y.S.2d 784 [2006] ) or may be viewed simply as an attempt to elicit sympathy prior to the imposition of sentence (see People v. Matos, 27 A.D.3d 485, 486, 812 N.Y.S.2d 577 [2006] ), we find that defendant's statements that he was intoxicated, that he could not recall the underlying events and that he did not intend to hurt anyone were sufficient to warrant further inquiry by County Court – particularly in view of the initially-failed plea colloquy (see People v. Brassard, 166 A.D.3d at 1313, 87 N.Y.S.3d 738 ; People v. Chin, 160 A.D.3d at 1039–1040, 73 N.Y.S.3d 685 ; People v. Gresham, 151 A.D.3d at 1177–1178, 57 N.Y.S.3d 532 ; compare People v. Bailey, 158 A.D.3d 948, 949, 71 N.Y.S.3d 667 [2018] ; People v. McKnight, 144 A.D.3d 1334, 1335, 40 N.Y.S.3d 797 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1148, 52 N.Y.S.3d 299, 74 N.E.3d 684 [2017] ; People v. Wagoner, 30 A.D.3d at 630, 815 N.Y.S.2d 784 ; People v. Matos, 27 A.D.3d at 486, 812 N.Y.S.2d 577 ). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is reversed, and this matter is remitted for further proceedings.
Lynch, J.P., Clark, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and matter remitted to the County Court of Clinton County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.