Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. FSB702601. Robert J. Lemkau, Judge.
Marylou Hillberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Gaut, J.
Defendant, Joel Kenneth Sims, was convicted by a jury of various drug charges and sentenced to 14 years in state prison. He appeals, asking us to review the sealed transcript of the in camera review of Officer Hernandez to determine whether the denial of the motion to discover those records was error. He also contends that his statement that he was the owner of the cell phone found during the search of his vehicle during a traffic stop was obtained in violation of Miranda. We affirm.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
BACKGROUND
On May 11, 2007, Officers Hernandez and Block were on patrol when they observed the defendant pass the limit line at an intersection, partially in the intersection when the vehicle finally stopped. Officer Hernandez contacted defendant and his female passenger, and informed defendant of the reason for the stop. The defendant informed the officer he was on parole, so the officer asked defendant if he had anything illegal. Defendant denied having any contraband.
Officer Hernandez asked defendant to step out of the vehicle. The officer searched the vehicle, locating a blue pouch under the driver’s seat. The pouch contained two separate plastic bags. Inside one were 15 individually packaged baggies, containing a white crystalline substance believed to be methamphetamine. Inside the other bag, the officer found four rock-like objects believed to be cocaine. The quantity present and the packaging of the items indicated to the officer that defendant possessed the contraband for the purpose of sales.
Officer Hernandez also found $146 on defendant’s person. The bills were all folded in different ways into tiny squares. Bills folded in this manner are easier to conceal during drug transactions. The officer also found a cell phone, either in the vehicle or on the defendant’s person. Officer Hernandez asked defendant if the cell phone belonged to him, and the defendant responded that it did.
During the contact with defendant, the cell phone rang several times. On one occasion, Officer Block answered the phone. A male caller asked for “Zo” and said he was looking for downers. Officer Block set up a meeting with the caller. Defendant is known as “Zo.” A subsequent search of defendant’s residence turned up more methamphetamine hidden between the mattress and box spring of his bed, as well as a digital scale and packaging material.
Defendant was arrested and interviewed after being advised of his Miranda rights. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436.) He agreed to be interviewed and informed the officers he had just purchased the drugs for his own personal use. When asked about the telephone call, defendant explained that people call him because they know he uses and they try to get drugs from him; defendant shares his drugs with friends. However, the officers who searched defendant’s vehicle found no drug paraphernalia, and they noted he did not appear to be under the influence.
Defendant was charged with transporting cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 1352, subd. (a), count 1), possession for sale of cocaine base. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5, count 2.) As to counts 1 and 2, it was further alleged that defendant had two prior drug convictions. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a).) Defendant was also charged with transporting methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a), count 3), and possession for sale of methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378, count 4.) As to counts 3 and 4, it was further alleged the defendant had two prior drug convictions. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (c).) It was further alleged the defendant had four prior felony convictions for which he had been sentenced to state prison. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b), (prison priors).)
Defendant was tried by jury and convicted of all counts and special allegations. He admitted all the prior conviction allegations (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11370.2, subds. (a)(c), Pen. Code. § 667.5, subd. (b).) He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 14 years in state prison. Defendant subsequently appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. The Pitchess Procedures Were Followed Correctly.
In the trial court, defendant filed a discovery request for disclosure of information in deputy Hernandez’s personnel file relating to “dishonesty, false arrest, fabrication of charges, fabrication of evidence, planting evidence, falsifying police reports, “‘creative report writing,’ perjury, and/or ‘testilying.’” The motion was made pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, relating to discovery of information subject to governmental privilege. (Evid. Code, § 1043, et seq.) The trial court determined the personnel records contained no discoverable evidence. Defendant requests that we review the sealed transcript of the in camera hearing to determine the propriety of the trial court’s ruling that the records produced no discoverable material. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1232.)
After reviewing the sealed transcript of the in camera proceedings, we conclude, as the trial court did, that the records contain no discoverable material pertinent to the defendant’s request. There was no error.
2. The Defendant’s Statement That the Cell Phone Was His Was Properly Admitted Into Evidence.
Defendant contends that he should have been advised of his Miranda rights before being asked if the cell phone belonged to him by the police officer during the traffic stop. He argues that his status as a detainee for a traffic offense constituted “custody” for Miranda purposes. We disagree.
Miranda advisement is required prior to police interrogation after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) Whether a person is in “custody” is determined by an objective test. (People v. Lopez (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 602, 605, 606.) Where no formal arrest has taken place, the relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation. (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442.)
While a person who has been stopped for a traffic offense and is awaiting citation is technically an “arrested person,” who is not free to depart until he has been cited, the detention which results is ordinarily brief, and the conditions of restraint are minimal. (People v. Montoya (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 807, 810, quoting People v. Hubbard (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 827, 833.) A traffic stop is considered a “transitory” restraint for Miranda purposes, as opposed to the significant restraint that is associated with interrogation at the police station. (See People v. Manis (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 668-669.) Thus, persons temporarily detained for brief questioning by police officers need not be warned about incrimination and the right to counsel, until such time as the point of arrest or accusation has been reached or the questioning has ceased to be brief and casual and has become sustained and coercive. (In re Victor B. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 521, 524-525.)
Defendant relies on the holding of People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, as support for the conclusion that Miranda warnings should have been given. However, in that case, the defendant was transported to the police station for an interview that lasted approximately two hours of accusatory questioning about an incident of gang violence. The officers pressured the defendant to admit his complicity and at one point the officers told defendant he could not leave until he divulged a girl’s name. (Id. at pp. 1159, 1160.) The court in that case concluded the interview was “a typical custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. (Aguilera, supra, at pp. 1165-1166.) The court also concluded the circumstances were not comparable to a traffic stop (id. at p. 1165), which is what is involved here.
A traffic stop does not place a suspect in custody, within the meaning of Miranda. (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 441-442.) Miranda warnings are not required during the course of a brief detention unless the suspect is placed under restraints normally associated with a formal arrest. (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1404.) Thus, Miranda advisements are not required in the context of a traffic stop (see, People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1754; People v. Bellomo (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 195, 198), or during a Terry stop (i.e., a temporary detention for investigation per Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1.) (See People v. Vasquez (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1163.) The Miranda rule is generally inapplicable in these situations because the restraint on liberty often occurs in a nonthreatening or noncumpulsive public environment and the duration is limited. (People v. Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165.)
The question of defendant’s ownership of the cell phone occurred during a traffic stop, not during a custodial interrogation. However, even if we concluded the statement was erroneously admitted, reversal would not be required. During the traffic stop, the phone rang several times and one call was answered by Officer Block. The caller asked for defendant and informed the officer he wished to purchase “downers.” Even without defendant’s admission that the cell phone belonged to him, other evidence of his connection to the phone was admissible and would have led inevitably to the conclusion that the phone belonged to the defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ramirez, P. J., Hollenhorst, J.