People v. Silver

46 Citing cases

  1. People v. Moore

    43 Cal.2d 517 (Cal. 1954)   Cited 90 times
    Finding prejudicial error where jury instructions on self-defense were stated exclusively from the viewpoint of the prosecution and opining "[t]here should be absolute impartiality as between the People and the defendant in the matter of instructions"; see id. , pp. 527, 530–531, 275 P.2d 485

    [8] An instruction which finds no support in the record, even though a correct statement of an abstract proposition of law, is improper when it finds no support in the evidence, and it is ground for reversal if it is calculated to mislead the jury (24 Cal.Jur. 831, 832). In People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 723 [ 108 P.2d 4], we said: "Where errors in instructions occur, the question always arises as to whether or not they are prejudicial. Here it may be said that where the proof of a defendant's guilt is clear, and no extenuating circumstances appear, such errors may not be prejudicial.

  2. People v. Chenault

    74 Cal.App.2d 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)   Cited 15 times

    Objection was made to this question and was sustained. It is now urged that the trial court committed prejudicial error in sustaining the objections to the questions propounded, citing People v. Fong Sing, 38 Cal.App. 253 [ 175 P. 911]; People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714 [ 108 P.2d 4]; People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177 [ 148 P.2d 627]; People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2d 401 [ 164 P.2d 753]. People v. Fong Sing, supra, was a murder case in which the defense was an alibi.

  3. People v. Vogel

    46 Cal.2d 798 (Cal. 1956)   Cited 139 times
    Observing strict liability criminal offenses are "enacted for the protection of the public health and safety," that they "usually involve light penalties," and that "wrongful intent is not required in the interest of enforcement"

    ( Mutual LifeIns. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 [12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed 706].) He also cites People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177 [ 148 P.2d 627], People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714 [ 108 P.2d 4], and People v. Chenault, 74 Cal.App.2d 487 [ 169 P.2d 29], in support of his position. Declarations of intent have generally been held admissible to prove a completed act only where the declarant is dead or otherwise unavailable ( People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal.2d 177, 185-188 ( supra); People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2d 401, 420-423 [ 164 P.2d 753]) or where they fall within other exceptions to the hearsay rule. ( People v. Silver, supra, 16 Cal.2d 714; People v. Chenault, supra, 74 Cal.App.2d 487; People v. Fong Sing, 38 Cal.App. 253 [ 175 P. 911].)

  4. People v. Ceballos

    12 Cal.3d 470 (Cal. 1974)   Cited 121 times
    Holding that a justifiable homicide statute similar to NRS 200.160 was a codification of the common law

    Nakashima, in reversing the judgment in the plaintiff's favor, concluded that the defendant's act was a justifiable homicide under Penal Code section 197, subdivision 2. That case manifestly differs on its facts from the present one in that, among other things, here no one except the asserted would-be burglar and his companion was on the premises when the gun was fired.People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714 [ 108 P.2d 4], does not aid defendant. In Silver the defendant, a watchman assigned to guard a mine, killed a boy, who with two other boys after dark trespassed on the guarded property for the purpose of stealing gasoline.

  5. People v. Osslo

    50 Cal.2d 75 (Cal. 1958)   Cited 135 times
    In Osslo, the court explicitly rejected this contention, declaring: "It does not appear that the policy of sections 681a and 1050 was disregarded. [The trial court's] explanation of the condition of the calendar shows that defendants were not being deprived of precedence over civil cases for any arbitrary reason and that the continuances to enable trial in Department 4 [(the presiding criminal department)] were not made for the purpose of improperly channeling the case into that department.

    As we said in People v. Dail, 22 Cal.2d 642, 650 [ 140 P.2d 828], "It is also true, however, that in a close case where the evidence is sharply conflicting, substantial and serious errors vital to defendant that may have resulted in a miscarriage of justice must be regarded as prejudicial and grounds for reversal. ( People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 723 [ 108 P.2d 4].)" In the case at bar, the district attorney managed to interject much immaterial and irrelevant matter concerning strikes, the use of pickets, and assaults in other strikes which could not have had any other effect than to prejudice these defendants who were not claimed to have taken part therein.

  6. People v. Lyons

    47 Cal.2d 311 (Cal. 1956)   Cited 106 times
    In People v. Lyons, 47 Cal.2d 311, 317 [ 303 P.2d 329], where the prosecution alluded on the cross-examination of the defendant's wife to a prior conviction of defendant, we said: "It would be an impeachment of the legal learning of counsel for the People to intimate that he did not know the aforesaid questions to be improper, wholly unjustifiable and peculiarly calculated toprejudice the appellant before the jury."

    The addition of such words to the cautionary instruction was wholly unnecessary. Just as the accurate statement of a proposition of law which is entirely inapplicable to the facts of a case may mislead a jury to the prejudice of a party ( People v. Silver (1940), 16 Cal.2d 714, 722 [ 108 P.2d 4]; People v. Roe (1922), 189 Cal. 548, 558 [ 209 P. 560]), so may overemphasis on a particular point ( People v. Hatchett (1944), 63 Cal.App.2d 144, 158 [ 146 P.2d 469]). In the circumstances of this case, where the words were wholly unnecessary to a fair and clear statement of the pertinent proposition of law and were supererogated in the handwriting of the judge on the already adequate printed instruction which was taken into the jury room, their overemphasis upon conviction is manifest.

  7. People v. Deloney

    41 Cal.2d 832 (Cal. 1953)   Cited 56 times
    Discussing instruction on admissions of defendant

    He does not contend that the instructions were incorrectly worded, but invokes the rule that it is error to give instructions on principles of law that have no application to the facts of a case. ( People v. Sanchez, 30 Cal.2d 560, 572 [ 184 P.2d 673]; People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 722 [ 108 P.2d 4]; People v. Roe, 189 Cal. 548, 558 [ 209 P. 560]; People v. Geibel, 93 Cal.App.2d 147, 178 [ 208 P.2d 743].) "The right of self-defense exists only as against an unlawful attack.

  8. People v. Cornett

    33 Cal.2d 33 (Cal. 1948)   Cited 36 times

    Such an instruction therefore may have misled the jury on a matter vital to the defense of defendant. (See People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 723 [ 108 P.2d 4]; People v. Dail,supra, 22 Cal.2d 642, 659.) After a consideration of the entire record it is clear that the giving of this erroneous instruction, particularly when considered with the other erroneous instructions, has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

  9. State v. Couch

    52 N.M. 127 (N.M. 1948)   Cited 25 times
    Recognizing that the defense is grounded in the theory that "[t]he home is one of the most important institutions of the state, and has ever been regarded as a place where a person has a right to stand his [or her] ground and repel, force by force, to the extent necessary for its protection"

    When the police officers visited appellant's home on Wednesday night prior to the tragedy they directed their inquiries to the ascertainment of the identity of the enemy or enemies of appellant, and no one suggested that juveniles might be involved. There are cases reported where juveniles have been shot while committing burglary, like Viliborghi v. State, supra; State v. Terrell, supra, and People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 108 P.2d 4, and while engaged with men in committing other offenses in the night, like Patten v. People, 18 Mich. 314, 333, 100 Am.Dec. 173, and Higgins v. Minaghan, 78 Wis. 602, 47 N.W. 941, 11 L.R.A. 138, 23 Am.St.Rep. 428, but counsel have cited no case, and we have found none, where the facts were similar to those in the case at bar. The connection, if any, between the intruder into appellant's home and the midnight attacks thereon is of small moment, since the matter should be considered solely from the viewpoint of appellant at the time the fatal shot was fired.

  10. People v. Tuthill

    31 Cal.2d 92 (Cal. 1947)   Cited 85 times
    In People v. Tuthill (1947) 31 Cal.2d 92, 187 P.2d 16, we addressed the mental state question in the context of first degree murder by lying in wait. We began by noting the need for interpretation of the statutory language before declaring that a "literal[ ]" understanding of the term lying in wait includes "[t]he elements of waiting, watching, and secrecy."

    However, the giving of an instruction outside the issues or beyond the applicable facts is not reversible error unless it can be said to have been prejudicial. ( People v. Silver, 16 Cal.2d 714, 722-3 [ 108 P.2d 4]; People v. Boggs, 12 Cal.2d 27, 37 [ 82 P.2d 368]; People v. Shallen-berger, 25 Cal.App.2d 402, 407 [ 77 P.2d 506]; People v. Russell, 59 Cal.App.2d 660, 664 [ 139 P.2d 661].) Here there is no indication of prejudice. The jurors were presented with clear and convincing proof of defendant's guilt, and within an hour of submission of the cause to them returned their verdict of guilty.