Opinion
A146012
06-29-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARCUS DEWAYNE SHULA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 05-150076-8)
Defendant Marcus Dewayne Shula appeals from a judgment entered following his conviction of one count of residential burglary. He contends that the judgment must be reversed on the ground that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his multiple Marsden motions prior to and during trial. We disagree, and shall affirm the judgment.
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties are familiar with the evidence presented at trial. We briefly summarize only those facts necessary to our resolution of the appeal.
On July 15, 2014, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a felony complaint charging defendant with first degree burglary (Pen. Code §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)). The charge arose out of a June 26, 2014 incident in which defendant was seen trying the door of a house in Richmond, and a short time later was discovered by police hiding in a closet inside the same house, which had a damaged window screen that had been removed. Upon returning home, occupants of the downstairs apartment found their belongings in disarray and saw that a television set, PlayStation 3, and laptop computers had been placed in luggage and a backpack and left on a bed. Upon his arrest, defendant had two game controllers in his pockets that one of the tenants confirmed belonged to him.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The complaint further alleged that defendant had a prior strike conviction (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that he had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). After the public defender's office filed a declaration of unavailability, Anthony Ashe, a certified criminal law specialist, was appointed as defendant's trial attorney on August 13, 2014. On January 5, 2015, defendant waived his preliminary hearing and was held to answer on the complaint. On January 20, 2015, the People filed an information charging defendant with the same offense and enhancements. Defendant waived his right to a speedy trial within 60 days of arraignment on the information. (§ 1382(a)(2).)
The information contained handwritten corrections deleting the "hot prowl" allegation (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), the allegation that the charged offense was a violent felony (§ 667.5, subd. (c)), and one of the prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
A. First Marsden Motion
On April 10, 2015, defendant brought the first of five Marsden motions. He complained that Ashe had "lied to me time and time again," including about being a public defender, when in fact Ashe was a conflict attorney. He stated, "[h]e promised me if I waive my preliminary [hearing], that he would—that he would get me a deal, for four years, from somebody." Defendant asserted that he had found out that his case was "a wobbler—prosecuted either as a felony or a misdemeanor—which gave me a pretty good chance of the preliminary hearing dropping my case from first-degree burglary to second-degree burglary—which would only carry a year." Defendant asserted that Ashe "lied to me and told me that I couldn't reinstate my preliminary hearing. He lied to me and said my case couldn't be classified as a wobbler, even though my burglary occurred before 3:00 o'clock in the evening." Defendant also complained that Ashe had not provided him with an address, and although Ashe had given him a phone number, it "has a block on it" so that he was unable to write or call Ashe to confer about his case. Finally, he complained that Ashe "talks harsh to me when I try to talk about my case," and told him that the deal the district attorney offered is the only option in his case; "otherwise, we have to go to trial."
The trial court explained to defendant that he was charged with residential burglary, which is not reducible to a misdemeanor. The court also stated, "you were advised on the record, at the time that you waived preliminary hearing, that it is an unconditional waiver, and you cannot get it back."
Defendant repeatedly interrupted the court with legal argument. Eventually, the court concluded the discussion and denied the Marsden motion. Defendant responded, "I see this was planned." And "So, basically, I'm going to be railroaded." The trial court nevertheless allowed defendant to make his legal arguments again, and again explained his errors to him. Regarding his attorney's contact information, the trial court noted that defendant had been mistakenly released from custody for two months, and made no effort to locate Ashe. Defendant again complained that "I see these proceedings as just being purposely meant to be driven against me." When the trial court told defendant to be quiet or he would be removed, he responded, "Well, you're going to have to have me removed, because I'm not going to be railroaded by this man."
As defendant was leaving the courtroom, he said to Ashe, "You need to get off my case. You don't have my interest. You don't want to do nothing but railroad me into prison for people - you're conspiring to send me to prison, conspiring with the district attorney, you're conspiring against me to railroad my case. [¶] You need to get off my case. You need to get off my case."
After defendant left, counsel stated, "I really wouldn't mind getting off his case." The trial court responded, "He does not have grounds." Ashe replied, "I know he doesn't, Your Honor, and I've accepted representation and I can't declare a conflict, but I'm having trouble working with this gentleman." The court then denied the motion and set the case for trial on May 18, 2015.
B. Declaration of Doubt
At a readiness conference on May 6, 2015, Ashe declared a doubt as to defendant's competency to stand trial. (§ 1368.) Ashe represented that he had visited defendant in jail four times, but defendant had refused to meet with him. Ashe indicated, however, that he had written defendant a letter after the last court hearing explaining his options. The trial court suspended the proceedings and appointed doctors to evaluate defendant, and vacated the trial date. Defendant objected, and the trial court responded, "you do not get to hold the court system hostage by refusing to talk to your attorney." Defendant stated, "I asked to release this man from my case and you would not do that, and then all of a sudden I'm incompetent because I don't want this man to railroad me. This man put the court against me to railroad me to prison." Defendant asserted, "It's part of your conspiracy to illegally prosecute me because I don't want to take the time."
Both of the psychologists appointed to examine defendant concluded that he was competent to stand trial. On May 29, after considering those reports, the trial court found defendant competent to stand trial and reinstated the proceedings.
B. Second and Third Marsden Motions
On July 16, 2015, defendant again moved to substitute counsel. He asserted, "I've been trying to get this man off my case, and they're forcing me to go to trial with someone who doesn't have my best interest at heart." He also claimed that Ashe had "told me he would get me a deal of four years if I waive my preliminary hearing" but "came back that and told me there is no deal," and that "I should be able to get my preliminary hearing back because I'm - I'm entitled to one." Finally, he asserted that he and Ashe "haven't even conferred to put a defense together."
Once the prosecutor had left the courtroom for the Marsden hearing, defendant expanded on his complaints. First, he claimed that his "60-day right to have a trial" had been violated because he "stopped waiving time in March." Second, he repeated that Ashe had never provided him with contact information. Third, he asserted that Ashe did not file motions defendant wanted filed. Fourth, he asserted that "when [Ashe] comes to visit me, he doesn't confer with me about my case. I tried to talk to him about my case, and all he wants to do is talk me into taking a deal. [¶] And I tell him time after time, no, I would not like to take a deal. I would like to go to trial."
Ashe responded to defendant's complaints. He denied promising defendant any particular sentence if defendant waived his preliminary hearing. He explained he was hoping that the decision to waive the preliminary hearing, and thus conserve prosecutorial and court resources, would have elicited a more favorable offer from the prosecution. And, Ashe said, that strategy worked: the prosecution agreed not to use defendant's strike conviction in calculating its pretrial offer, thereby greatly decreasing the amount of time defendant would have to spend in custody.
Ashe said that the offer was for nine years at half time.
Ashe supplied 19 dates since his August 2014 appointment on which he had met with defendant. He also provided the four dates on which he had gone to visit defendant in custody but defendant refused to meet with him. He said that his communication with defendant had been "difficult," but also explained that because defendant was caught in the home he was alleged to have burglarized, defendant had agreed with him that defending the case would be "very, very difficult." Ashe said that he was and remained prepared to go to trial.
Defendant responded that on all of the dates on which Ashe had come to see him, Ashe "wanted to talk about nothing but me taking a deal. He didn't want to talk about anything else. I tried to talk to him about my case, what was my defense options." Defendant asserted that he had researched his case and had told Ashe that for burglary, "automatically - I'm entitled to half time, according to what I read." He questioned why he would have waived his preliminary hearing, when he had "an option of having my case dropped to a lesser" because "my case is a wobbler."
The trial court explained, again, that first degree burglary was not a wobbler, and defendant again insisted he was wrong. The trial court then offered to start jury selection that afternoon, or alternatively, "If you think it would be better for you, I'm willing to wait to bring jurors in on Monday and give you today and tomorrow and over the weekend to talk to Mr. Ashe."
Defendant complained he was being forced into trial unprepared. The trial court found Ashe had considered trial defenses, and it repeated its offer to delay bringing potential jurors in to start jury selection. Defendant continued to complain that Ashe's "ability to represent me adequately has already been violated or not carried out." The court stated, "I don't find that he's providing inadequate representation." Defendant then again raised Ashe's failure to provide him with contact information; the judge responded it was not necessary, and observed that Ashe "has come to visit you very often." Defendant then reiterated that he didn't "feel comfortable going in to trial with this man. He's not representing me adequately, and it seems that he's taking upon the position of a surrogate prosecutor." The court ruled, "I'm going to proceed with Mr. Ashe as your attorney."
The court then began to address the parties' in limine motions and other matters. Ashe indicated that the defense did not intend to call any witnesses, other than possibly defendant himself. Defendant spoke up, initiating another Marsden hearing.
At the hearing, defendant asserted, "The only witnesses that I know to call is . . . the person that lives across the street from the house who called the police and . . . I talked to Mr. Ashe about that and told him that I wanted to have that man called to be a witness." He complained that because Ashe had stated that "the defense doesn't intend [to call any witnesses]—that shows blatantly, Your Honor, that he doesn't intend to represent me adequately."
Ashe responded that he had asked defendant if there was anyone defendant wanted to subpoena for trial, but defendant had answered, "no." Ashe also noted that the neighbor who called the police was already listed as a witness for the prosecution.
The neighbor testified for the prosecution at trial, and was cross-examined by the defense.
The trial court inquired whether defendant wanted any other witness, and defendant responded, "Yes, . . . but I don't know how to get in contact with this person." He explained that he had gone to the house in question to visit an old friend, Orlando Collins, and that he "would like to call him . . . as a witness so that he can testify that he in fact did live at that residence." Ashe responded, "This is the first time I've heard that name." Defendant disagreed, calling Ashe "dishonest." The trial court ordered Ashe to "make all reasonable efforts to locate Mr. Collins or any proof that Mr. Collins lived at that house previously."
C. Fourth Marsden Motion
The next day, July 17, 2017, defendant made another Marsden motion. He stated that Ashe had given him "a copy of my Rap sheet yesterday." Defendant complained, "there's a ton of charges on here that I never incurred," and stated, "I can't help but think somehow that I'm being set up in some kind of way . . . to purposely be prejudiced by this court." The trial court responded, "Your Rap sheet means nothing. I don't look at your Rap sheet. I don't care about your Rap sheet. . . . It is totally irrelevant to the court." Defendant responded, "I understand what you're saying, you know, but it's relevant to me because it's assassinating my character, for one." The trial court explained that the rap sheet would not be admitted into evidence. Defendant said that he understood, but continued to complain that there were charges on the rap sheet that he didn't recall or hadn't suffered. The trial court explained to defendant that it had ruled that if defendant testified, he could be impeached with a single prior conviction, a 2011 attempted grand theft. Further, if he were convicted of the charged burglary, there would be a separate trial at which the prosecution would have to prove whether or not he was convicted of robbery in 1996, as alleged in the information. Defendant acknowledged that "I have an extensive record in my 29 years of dealing with the system," but continued to complain, "there's charges on here that I never incurred and that I never would incur." The trial court again explained, "They're not relevant. I do not consider them. The jury does not hear about them."
Defendant then asserted that he was "being forced to go into trial with counsel that I don't agree with. . . . I know this has no relevancy, so you said, but I can't understand why I even have this Rap sheet in the first place. There's about 20 charges on there, your Honor, that I never incurred." The trial court responded, "But that has nothing to do with Mr. Ashe." Defendant replied, "But Mr. Ashe is bringing this stuff to me. Mr. Ashe has been the one . . . trying to get me to take a deal when I had already told him that I wanted to go to trial and he would ignore that and still come back up there and try to influence me to take a deal and try and tell me stuff like this charge and other things to influence me to do so." The trial court stated, "that's part of his job," and noted that "Mr. Ashe is more than capable of representing you at trial." Defendant continued complaining about the purportedly inaccurate rap sheet.
Defendant then again repeated his earlier complaints that Ashe had advised him to waive his preliminary hearing, and had "promis[ed] me a deal that I never got." As to the first point, the trial court responded, "you waived that right. What's done is done. You need to focus on today." The court denied the motion.
D. Fifth Marsden Motion
At the beginning of the second day of trial, defendant made a final Marsden motion. The trial court denied it as untimely. Later, the trial court conducted a hearing. It explained, "I said it was untimely because we were about to start the prosecution's case."
Defendant complained that at the first Marsden hearing, he had been promised "that I would get a couple of days to confer with my attorney and put our defense together . . . and that has not happened yet." He also asserted, "this photograph that was just not allowed in, it is very relevant to my case because it shows a gang of stuff against the side of the closet where I was claimed to have bolted out of." The court responded that the photograph was irrelevant to the Marsden proceedings.
Ashe again stated that he had gone to speak to defendant about his defense multiple times. Further, a defense investigator had come in that morning "to explain to [defendant] why we think it is a bad idea to call [a potential] witness."
Defendant complained further that the court had "previously told me that there's no such thing as a lesser being a second degree [burglary]." The court responded that the jury would be instructed on both first degree and second degree burglary.
Both instructions were given.
Ashe requested the court to voir dire defendant about his decision on whether to testify. The court declined, but allowed Ashe to do so. Ashe asked defendant whether he had been shown the portions of his statement that were made "outside of Miranda," and defendant said he recalled Ashe doing so. Defendant indicated he still desired to take the stand. The court later confirmed that defendant understood that he had an absolute constitutional right not to testify, and confirmed that defendant wished to testify. The court also confirmed that defendant understood that if he testified, he could be impeached with statements he had made that otherwise would not be admissible. Defendant responded, "I understand perfectly."
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
E. Defendant's Testimony
After the prosecution presented its case, defendant testified that he had grown up in Richmond, and on the day of the alleged burglary had visited with friends in the area, with whom he drank alcohol, smoked marijuana, and snorted powder cocaine. He claimed that he had entered the house in search of a friend who had lived there some 20 years earlier and whom he had last seen in about 2007. Although there was no one home, defendant said he decided to go into the house and wait to see if his friend or his friend's grandmother would return, and to rest and sober up. He admitted removing the screen and climbing into the house through the window. After defendant entered the downstairs apartment, the interior seemed unfamiliar to him, and he began to realize that his friend might not live there any longer. He then went into the upstairs unit, where he saw family photographs that confirmed that impression. When defendant attempted to leave the house, however, he saw the police, and decided to hide so that they would not harm him. He denied that he had game controllers in his pocket. He claimed that when he entered the residence, he did not intend to take any property. He also claimed that he didn't touch anything in the house other than doorknobs. He specifically denied moving any of the luggage or electronics, insisting that the police had planted all of that evidence. He also claimed that the police had beat him up and sicced the dog on him after handcuffing him.
On rebuttal, an officer testified that at the hospital, when asked why he did not submit to arrest, defendant "told me that he didn't want to get caught because he knew he was doing something wrong and that he had hidden from police dogs successfully in the past and he thought he was going to not be located." On surrebuttal, defendant denied having made those statements.
F. Defendant's Conviction and Sentencing
The jury found defendant guilty of burglary in the first degree. In a bifurcated trial, the jury also found true the prosecution's allegations that defendant had suffered prior felony convictions for second degree robbery (1996), attempted grand theft (2011), and assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury (2011), and had served a separate prison term on the latter two of those offenses. The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of 6 years, doubled due to the strike prior under sections 667 subdivisions (b)-(i) and section 1170.12, plus 5 years for his prior serious felony conviction under section 667 subdivision (a)(1), plus a prison prior pursuant to section 667.5 subdivision (b), for a total term of 18 years.
DISCUSSION
The rules governing a Marsden motion to substitute appointed counsel are well-established: "The governing legal principles are well settled. 'Under the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, " ' "[a] defendant is entitled to [substitute another appointed attorney] if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result." ' " [Citation.] Furthermore, " ' "[w]hen a defendant seeks to discharge appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance." ' " ' [Citations.] ' "[S]ubstitution is a matter of judicial discretion. Denial of the motion is not an abuse of discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney would 'substantially impair' the defendant's right to assistance of counsel." ' " (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal. 4th 73, 95; accord People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599.)
Defendant does not contend (nor could he) that trial counsel did not provide adequate representation. Rather, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motions prior to and during trial on the sole ground that he and his trial attorney, Anthony Ashe, had an "irreconcilable conflict." In particular, defendant points to eight "objective circumstances" that, he contends, demonstrate the existence of such an irreconcilable conflict. They are: "(1) counsel's acknowledgment that his communication with [defendant] was difficult; (2) counsel acknowledged that he would not mind being relieved in the case; (3) there were fundamental disagreements about the degree to which counsel met with [defendant] to prepare for trial; (4) there were fundamental disagreements about why [defendant] agreed to waive the preliminary hearing; (5) there were fundamental disagreements about whether [defendant] should accept a plea offer; (6) [defendant] went so far as to refuse to meet with his counsel when he came to visit; (7) in turn counsel declared a doubt pursuant to Penal Code section 1368 further alienating [defendant]; and (8) counsel clearly did not want [defendant] to testify even though the case against [defendant] was overwhelming in the absence of some explanation for his presence in the house." In our view, none of these factors, singly or collectively, gave rise to an irreconcilable conflict sufficient to constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying defendant's motions.
That Ashe acknowledged that his communication with defendant was "difficult" or that he "would not mind" being relieved as counsel does not suffice to establish an irreconcilable difference. "The mere ' "lack of trust in, or inability to get along with," ' counsel is not sufficient grounds for substitution." (People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 600.) "If a defendant's claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment, and by a process of elimination could obtain appointment of their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not the law. [Citations.]" (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1246.)
Defendant's refusal, on four occasions, to meet with Ashe, did not require Ashe's substitution. A defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by his own conduct that manufactures a conflict. (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 697.) Further, " ' "[t]he number of times one sees his attorney, and the way in which one relates with his attorney, does not sufficiently establish incompetence." ' " (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 96; accord People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 230, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 834 [no abuse of discretion in denying Marsden motion where defendant's claim that counsel failed to communicate with him was based primarily on counsel's failure to speak with him during the two-week period between the first penalty phase mistrial and the motions for relief of counsel].) The record establishes that Ashe met many times with defendant to discuss his defense and prepare for trial. (See People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 876 [where defendant claimed that counsel had made himself unavailable, but counsel had met with defendant eight to ten times and had discussed the case with him by phone on numerous occasions, record failed to reveal that disagreement was irreconcilable or likely to result in ineffective representation].)
Defendant's disagreements with Ashe regarding the adequacy of his preparation for trial, his advice to waive a preliminary hearing, or his advice on whether defendant should accept a plea deal or testify at trial, were not grounds for removing Ashe as counsel. " 'A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an "irreconcilable conflict." ' " (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 95; accord People v. Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 230-231.) Here, as in Valdez, "[a]lthough counsel did not agree with all of defendant's suggestions, he maintained that he was prepared to go to trial and would be able to work with defendant to address his concerns." (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 95-96.) Indeed, the record reveals not only that Ashe met with defendant to discuss his defense, but that on multiple occasions during trial, Ashe consulted with defendant regarding Ashe's cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, jury instructions, and other issues. Further, Ashe persuaded the trial judge to give a voluntary intoxication instruction, which likely was the only potentially viable defense available to defendant in light of his testimony and the other evidence presented at trial.
The record reveals beyond dispute that Ashe's advice was competent and well-founded. As to Ashe's advice that defendant waive a preliminary hearing and accept the prosecution's offer, defendant concedes that "[t]he plea offer of nine years with 50 percent credit for time served was a favorable deal given the facts of this case." Indeed, that is an understatement. Defendant, who had an extensive criminal history including a prior strike, was seen casing houses and was then caught red-handed hiding inside a residence in possession of stolen property, without any plausible defense. Having rejected the prosecution's offer, defendant then predictably received a far harsher sentence: 18 years in state prison, with only 20 percent credit for time served. Moreover, defendant's insistence on testifying over Ashe's advice indisputably backfired. Defendant was unable credibly to explain away the voluminous evidence against him. Further, the trial court cited his lack of truthfulness in testifying as a factor in sentencing him, observing, "I have absolutely no reason to believe that anything he told us on the stand was true, and I would comment that I find it disconcerting that a man who tells us that he has a strong belief in God and the Bible had no problem at all getting up, swearing to tell the truth 'so help me God' and then lying to the Court and the jury. So I do impose the upper term of six years."
To be sure, defendant may be correct in suggesting that Ashe's action in declaring a doubt as to his competency to stand trial interfered with the attorney-client relationship. (See, e.g., People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 596-597 [after defense counsel requested a competency hearing, indicating defendant was uncooperative, uncommunicative, delusional, and paranoid, and had told her he was experiencing auditory and visual hallucinations, defendant responded that he believed counsel had "turned against him" and stated, "So far my attorney believes that I am incompetent and for that reason I decide that I need another attorney"]; People v. Govea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 57, 61 [defendant stated on several occasions that he wanted new counsel because an irreconcilable conflict had arisen, claiming that counsel acted in bad faith when he declared a doubt that defendant was competent to stand trial].) Significantly, however, Ashe did not declare a doubt until after defendant had filed his first Marsden motion and expressed the view that Ashe was conspiring with the district attorney to "railroad" him. It seems more likely that defendant's complaints were driven by his own paranoia and misplaced arrogance than by Ashe's reporting his concerns about defendant's fitness to stand trial. Regardless, that a lawyer expresses a doubt as his client's competence under section 1368 does not automatically compel a trial court to grant a Marsden motion. (See People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 596-600 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's multiple requests for substitution of counsel before competency hearing where it reasonably could conclude that "replacement of counsel was not required because any deterioration in the attorney-client relationship that had occurred was due to defendant's willful, defiant attitude or to a mental problem that was either feigned or real"].)
In asserting that the trial court erred in denying his Marsden motions, Defendant relies almost exclusively on three federal cases, but that reliance is misplaced. " 'On direct review of the refusal to substitute counsel, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considers "the following three factors: '(1) timeliness of the motion; (2) adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between the defendant and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.' " ' " (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 490.) Here, as in Abilez, "the alleged conflict between defendant and his defense counsel was not so serious that we must conclude communication between them had become so poisoned defendant was effectively denied his right to counsel." (Id. at p. 491.) These facts distinguish defendant's cited legal authority, including U.S. v. Walker (9th Cir. 1990) 915 F.2d 480, overruled on another ground in U.S. v. Norby (9th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3d 1053, 1059, and U.S. v. Adelzo-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 772. In each of those cases, the district court failed to make any serious inquiry into an apparent irreconcilable conflict between counsel and client that was brought to its attention. (People v. Abilez, supra, at p. 491; see U.S. v. Walker, supra, 915 F.2d at pp. 482-483 [attorney stated that she and Walker were experiencing irreconcilable differences that were preventing her from representing him, and moved to withdraw, yet district court denied defendant's motion to substitute counsel without reading defendant's letter and "made virtually no attempt to discover the causes underlying Walker's dissatisfaction with his counsel"]; U.S. v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, supra, 268 F.3d at pp. 777-778 [district court conducted only "perfunctory inquiries" to "determine the extent of the break-down in communication," despite "clear indications of serious discord and friction" between defendant and his counsel].) Here, in contrast, the trial judge patiently entertained defendant's repeated requests to replace appointed counsel, and held repeated hearings at which he inquired of both defendant and Ashe regarding the asserted bases for those requests. " 'To the extent there was a credibility question between defendant and counsel at the hearing, the court was "entitled to accept counsel's explanation." ' " (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1245.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motions.
Likewise, in U.S. v. Williams (9th Cir. 1979) 594 F.2d 1258, the third federal case that defendant cites here, counsel did not dispute that he and his client were "totally incompatible" so far as trial preparation was concerned and were "at serious odds and had been for some time"; indeed, in his response to defendant's renewed motion, counsel confirmed that "the course of the client-attorney relationship had been a stormy one with quarrels, bad language, threats, and counter-threats." (Id. at pp. 1259-1260.) The district court nevertheless summarily denied defendant's first motion to replace appointed counsel and denied his renewed motion, expressing the view that it would be improper to allow an indigent defendant with counsel appointed at government expense to replace his attorney. (Id. at p. 1260.) That case is not remotely comparable to the one before us.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Schulman, J. We concur: /s/_________
Streeter, Acting P.J. /s/_________
Reardon, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of California, City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. --------