Opinion
A158343
02-25-2021
In re S.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.C., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J1900026)
Defendant S.C. appeals from an order committing him to Contra Costa County's Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (OAYRF). He argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering this commitment because substantial evidence does not support the court's findings that a commitment to OAYRF would be of probable benefit to him or that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. He also argues that the condition of his probation requiring that he "report any police contacts to his [probation officer] within 24 hours" is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We dismiss his appeal as moot because defendant has completed his commitment at OAYRF and his probation and we cannot grant effective relief.
We requested and received supplemental briefing from the parties regarding mootness and the status of defendant's commitment and probation. In this supplemental briefing, the parties informed us that defendant has successfully completed both his OAYRF commitment and his juvenile probation.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant pled no contest to two counts of misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243.2) in an amended wardship petition and to one count of misdemeanor battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)) in a supplemental wardship petition. Given our disposition, the particulars of defendant's offenses are not relevant to this appeal challenging the propriety of the juvenile court's exercise of discretion in committing defendant to OAYRF and the constitutionality of one condition of his probation. It suffices to pick up the narrative at the August 2019 dispositional hearing where the juvenile court adjudged defendant a ward, committed him to OAYRF for a six-month regular program and an additional 180-day conditional aftercare period, and imposed conditions of probation. Defendant timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
"As a general rule, ' " 'the duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.' " ' [Citation.] Thus, an ' "action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events." ' [Citations.] Put another way, ' "[a]n appeal should be dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant defendant any effective relief." ' " (People v. Pipkin (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1146, 1149-1150.)
We will not resolve defendant's appeal on the merits because his successful completion of both his OAYRF commitment and his probation have rendered this appeal moot. Defendant does not persuasively support his claim that the appeal is not moot because the juvenile court would consider "this adjudication" in deciding a disposition should defendant be the subject of another juvenile petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. Defendant does not challenge the validity of his no contest pleas, and the only authorities he cites to support his argument, In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484 (I.A.) and In re Edwardo V. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 591 (Edwardo V.), are inapposite. In Edwardo V., unlike here, the court decided the merits of the appeal despite the defendant's deportation where the defendant presumably did not choose to leave the country, he challenged the validity of the court's finding that he committed a crime, and he sought to avoid a strike under the Three Strikes law. (Edwardo V., at pp. 592-593 & fn. 1.) In I.A., the court dismissed as moot a father's challenge to the evidence supporting the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings as to him because, even assuming the court erred, the jurisdictional order would not be reversed where the father did not challenge the court's jurisdictional findings as to the mother. (I.A., at pp. 1487-1488.) As these cases are distinguishable, defendant has failed to demonstrate that his appeal is not moot.
In his supplemental brief, defendant merely makes a general (and speculative) assertion that his trial counsel stated the juvenile court would consider "this adjudication" in deciding a disposition should defendant be the subject of another juvenile petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.
We further decline defendant's invitation to set aside "technical[] moot[ness]" and decide part of this appeal because the question of whether his probation condition was unconstitutionally vague is a question of broad public interest that is capable of repetition but likely to evade review. (See People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 646.) In their briefing, the parties agreed that this court should follow People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188 (Relkin), where the appellate court found unconstitutionally vague a probation condition very similar to the condition at issue here. In light of Relkin, this appeal does not involve an issue of public interest that evades review.
III. DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
BROWN, J. WE CONCUR: STREETER, ACTING P. J.
TUCHER, J.