Opinion
E071140
06-17-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN ELDON SAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.
Doris M. LeRoy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SWF1601114) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Stephen J. Gallon, Judge. Affirmed. Doris M. LeRoy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Brian Eldon Saylor was sentenced to 25 years to life after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). The verdict was the result of a retrial; in Taylor's first trial, a mistrial was declared after the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict.
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Saylor argues here that the trial court erred by (1) during his first trial, finding him competent to stand trial; (2) granting his requests to represent himself during both trials; (3) during his second trial, failing to conduct a new competency hearing after his behavior cast serious doubts as to his competency; and (4) denying his posttrial motion to reduce his conviction to second degree murder.
We find no error and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 13, 2016, the victim and her daughter were making a purchase at a drugstore in Temecula, California. Saylor had been in the checkout line behind them, and was purchasing a bottle of whiskey at an adjacent register. Saylor did not speak with or otherwise interact with the victim or her daughter while they were shopping or in line for checkout, and there is no evidence the victim or anyone in her family had ever met or interacted with Saylor in any way.
Saylor's cashier scanned his bottle of whiskey, put it in a bag, and set the bag on the counter. Saylor took the bottle out of the bag, looked over at the victim and her daughter, and then put the bottle on the counter. Saylor's cashier asked if there was anything else he needed. Saylor responded, "Oh, yeah, one more thing," picked up the bottle, turned towards the victim, and struck her on the top of the head with the bottle.
After striking the victim, Saylor left the bottle on the counter and walked outside the store, pulling out a cigarette and asking for a light as he did so. The cashier who had been helping the victim observed that the request did not seem directed at anyone in particular. Saylor stood outside the store for a short time until the store's manager came out and asked him, "Are you the one responsible for this?" Saylor responded "Yes." The manager asked Saylor to come back inside the store, and Saylor complied. They walked back into the store to the manager's office. As they did so, Saylor asked the manager for a light. Police arrived shortly thereafter and took Saylor into custody.
When Saylor hit the victim, she had been talking to her cashier about her credit card not working. She was immediately knocked unconscious by the blow, which shattered her skull and caused massive internal bleeding and bruising in the brain. At the hospital, doctors determined that she was brain dead; after a day, she was taken off life support and died shortly thereafter. The cause of death was "blunt force craniocerebral trauma"; she had been an healthy 54-year-old woman before Saylor hit her.
Saylor was charged with one count of first degree murder. He was initially represented by appointed counsel, who declared a doubt as to Saylor's competency. Saylor was examined by three court-appointed experts and a defense expert; two of the court-appointed experts concluded Saylor was competent to stand trial, while one of the court-appointed experts and the defense expert opined that he was not. The trial court also heard testimony from a clinical therapist who interacted with Saylor at the jail. The trial court found that Saylor suffers from a mental disorder, but that he was nevertheless competent to stand trial.
After Saylor was found competent to stand trial, immediately before the preliminary hearing, he requested that he be permitted to represent himself. The request was granted. Saylor then represented himself through most of the trial, but at his request, defense counsel was reappointed during jury deliberations. The trial ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.
Prior to retrial, Saylor made another motion to represent himself, which was granted. On retrial, the jury convicted Saylor of first degree murder. After the verdict, Saylor again requested representation by counsel. The request was granted, and appointed counsel represented Saylor on a motion for a new trial and at sentencing.
The trial court denied Saylor's motion for a new trial, and sentenced him to 25 years to life.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Competency to Stand Trial
Saylor contends that the trial court's finding, made in advance of his first trial, that he was competent to stand trial was not supported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, he argues, this finding continued to have practical effects in his second trial, asserting that "the absence of challenges to [Saylor's] competence at the second trial can be traced directly to the rulings made prior to the first trial." We find that the trial court's ruling was supported by substantial evidence.
We agree with Saylor that the mistrial did not render the issue moot, given that he has also challenged on appeal the trial court's failure to grant him a second competency hearing. "[O]nce a defendant has been found competent to stand trial, a second competency hearing is required only if the evidence discloses a substantial change of circumstances or new evidence is presented casting serious doubt on the validity of the prior finding of defendant's competence." (In re Sims (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 195,209.) Thus, the trial court's initial finding that Saylor was competent, made during his first trial, had continued practical effect on whether Saylor was entitled to a second competency hearing during his retrial. Saylor's claim of error regarding the trial court's initial competency decision, therefore, is not moot. (See People v. J.S. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 163, 171 [where an initial judicial determination has "significant practical effects" on subsequent analyses, a challenge to the initial determination is not moot].) We turn, then, to the merits of Saylor's argument.
It is a violation of federal due process fair trial rights, and California constitutional and statutory law, to criminally try an incompetent person. (Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354; People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 194-195; § 1367, subd. (a).) "[A] defendant is not incompetent if he can understand the nature of the legal proceedings and assist counsel in conducting a defense in a rational manner." (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 797 (Blacksher); § 1367.) A defendant is presumed competent unless the contrary is proven by a preponderance of the evidence by the party contending he or she is incompetent. (Blacksher, supra, at p. 797.) Generally, our review of rulings regarding competency is for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) Here, Saylor had the burden of proving that he was incompetent, and the trial court found that he did not meet that burden. Our question then, is whether the evidence compelled a different conclusion as a matter of law. (See ibid. [finding that evidence did not compel a finding of incompetence as a matter of law]; Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466 (Sonic Manufacturing) [in conducting substantial evidence review, where, as here, "'the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof . . . the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law'"].)
Here, it is uncontested that Saylor had a mental disorder, but that he nevertheless understood the nature of the legal proceedings. Saylor disputes only the trial court's finding that he had the ability to assist counsel in conducting a defense in a rational manner. Two of the four experts that examined Saylor, however, opined that he was able to assist counsel in a rational manner. One of those two experts noted that Saylor was "mildly tangential and mildly difficult to redirect" during their discussion, and opined that Saylor "may well have been delusional at the time of the crime," but the expert "did not conclude that any areas of difficulty demonstrated by Mr. Saylor . . . on balance, precluded him in an absolute sense from being able to cooperate with his attorney in a rational manner in presenting his defense." The second expert who found Saylor competent also noted his tendency to respond tangentially to open ended questions, but found him to be "organized and productive" in response to more structured questioning, and his demeanor to be "calm" and "cooperative." Although there was also some evidence of incompetence, it was not "'"uncontradicted and unimpeached"'" or "'"of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding"'" of competence. (Sonic Manufacturing, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) There is no appropriate basis, therefore, for us to disturb the trial court's finding that Saylor was competent to stand trial. B. Requests for Self-Representation
Saylor argues that, even if we conclude he was competent to stand trial, it was nevertheless error for the trial court to allow him to represent himself in either of his trials. We are not persuaded.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution "grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense." (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 819.) Before Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), the trial court's finding that Saylor was competent to stand trial would have meant he also maintained his constitutional right to represent himself. In Edwards, however, the court allowed states to deny the right of self-representation to so-called "gray area" defendants who are competent to stand trial but not competent to represent themselves. (Id. at p. 172.)
Our Supreme Court adopted the authority Edwards authorized in People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519 (Johnson). Johnson discusses various "relevant factors to consider" in identifying a gray area defendant who is competent to stand trial but nevertheless is unable to represent himself, recommended by two "thoughtful" law review articles. (Johnson, supra, at pp. 529-530.) The holding of Johnson, however, is straightforward. "[T]he standard that trial courts considering exercising their discretion to deny self-representation should apply is simply whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel." (Id. at p. 530.) Johnson emphasizes: "Self-representation by defendants who wish it and validly waive counsel remains the norm and may not be denied lightly. A court may not deny self-representation merely because it believes the matter could be tried more efficiently, or even more fairly, with attorneys on both sides." (Id. at p. 531.) On appeal, "we must defer largely to the trial court's discretion." (Ibid.)
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to allow Saylor to represent himself during his first trial. Some of the experts who examined Saylor for competency to stand trial observed characteristics that also support the conclusion that he could carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense. He understood the nature of the legal proceedings. His demeanor was "calm" and "cooperative," and his responses to structured questioning were "organized and productive." Although he showed some tendency toward tangential thinking, he could be redirected with only mild difficulty. The trial court had already concluded that Saylor was capable of rationally assisting his counsel in presenting a defense. Even if the evidence could have supported a different conclusion, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude he was also capable of carrying out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without counsel.
The People contend that any challenge to the trial court's decision to allow Saylor to represent himself during the first trial is moot, since that trial ended in a mistrial. Again, however, we find it appropriate to reach the merits of Saylor's arguments, since the initial decision to allow him to represent himself at the first trial was at least arguably a factor in the later decision to allow him to represent himself on retrial.
Moreover, it appears that the trial court's conclusion regarding Saylor's ability to carry out the basic tasks of presenting his defense was correct. Saylor conducted his own defense through most of the first trial, including all of the presentation of evidence and argument. As he concedes on appeal, he "was able to take many and sometimes sophisticated procedural steps." After deliberations began, Saylor requested that counsel be reappointed, indicating he believed it would be "prudent" to have legal assistance in dealing with questions being sent out by the deliberating jury. In considering Saylor's request, the trial court noted that Saylor had presented his case "ably . . . in a lot of ways," and that even in dealing with previous questions from the jury, Saylor had provided "valuable input" that the court had "considered and actually implemented to some extent."
We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to allow Saylor to represent himself in his retrial, made at a trial readiness conference. The judge who considered this request and who then presided over the retrial was not the judge who made the initial decisions regarding Saylor's competency and who presided over the first trial. However, defense counsel informed the court that Saylor previously had been found competent, both to stand trial and to represent himself, and that he had carried out the tasks of presenting his defense through most of the trial, from preliminary hearing until the matter was submitted to the jury. No party raised any concerns about Saylor's competence to represent himself on retrial. The trial court engaged in an extended colloquy with Saylor about self-representation; he responded rationally and intelligently to the court's questions. We find the trial court's decision to grant Saylor's request to represent himself on retrial to be well within the bounds of reason.
Moreover, again, the trial court's judgment about Saylor's competence appears to have been correct, as our review of the record shows that he represented himself ably in many respects in the second trial. For example, he presented a detailed closing argument that engaged with the facts and the jury instructions, and which contained a focused argument on what was perhaps his best (though unsuccessful) jury argument, a claim that the People had not proven premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt.
Saylor faults the trial court for failing to inquire further about the "information which was brought to light during the competency hearing . . . ." Specifically, he argues that the trial court should have reviewed and reweighed the expert reports that were submitted in connection with the competency hearing, rather than relying on previous findings of Saylor's competence to stand trial or to represent himself in making its decision. There is no authority, however, requiring the trial court to engage in such an inquiry. It would seem, moreover, that the best predictor of whether Saylor would be able, on retrial, to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his defense without counsel is whether he had done it before. He had done so, and done so "ably . . . in a lot of ways," according to the judge who presided over his first trial.
Saylor further proposes that his request to represent himself, followed by a later request for counsel to be reappointed, followed by another request to represent himself, demonstrates an "equivocal attitude toward self-representation" and a "lack of capacity to consistently and effectively organize his defense." The trial court, however, found Saylor to have "well-thought-out reasons" for his first request for reappointment of counsel, during jury deliberations in his first trial. Our record reveals nothing equivocal about Saylor's attitude toward self-representation: he wanted to be the one representing himself during the presentation of evidence and argument to the jury. He did so, twice, and we find nothing in the record that supports the conclusion he was unable to carry out the basic tasks required to do so.
Saylor's second request for appointment of counsel, immediately after the jury's guilty verdict on retrial, seems to have been less about seeking help with complex legal issues than his first such request. After the trial court informed Saylor that he had a right to be sentenced by a particular date, Saylor said: "I prefer to just be killed." The trial court told Saylor: "That's not going to be an option. That's not something that would be done in our system." Saylor responded: "In that case, let's just reappoint public counsel. I don't want to deal with it at this point. There's not much I can do." After the trial court asked for confirmation that he was requesting counsel, Saylor stated: "I'd just like to relieve myself as counsel. I presume since I lost a fairly substantial case, I'm probably not qualified to be an attorney." The trial court then appointed the public defender as Saylor's counsel.
We find no abuse of discretion in either of the trial court's rulings, allowing Saylor to represent himself at trial. C. Second Competency Hearing
Saylor argues that his behavior during his retrial constituted new evidence of his incompetence, and that the trial court erred by failing to declare a doubt regarding his competence order new psychological examinations before proceeding. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion.
"A trial judge is required to suspend trial proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning defendant's competence to stand trial." (In re Sims (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 195, 208.) "'"Evidence of incompetence may emanate from several sources, including the defendant's demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations."'" (Ibid.) Evidence of mental illness alone, however, is insufficient to raise a doubt as to competency. (Id. at p. 209.) Bizarre statements or actions, taken in isolation, also do not require a court to hold a competency hearing. (Ibid.) "Further, once a defendant has been found competent to stand trial, a second competency hearing is required only if the evidence discloses a substantial change of circumstances or new evidence is presented casting serious doubt on the validity of the prior finding of the defendant's competence." (Ibid.) "The court's decision whether to grant a competency hearing is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507.)
Saylor asserts that his history of mental illness and refusal of treatment in jail showed a "distinct possibility" that he would "become incompetent at some point, even if he was not incompetent at the time the first competency hearing was held." Saylor's history of mental illness and refusal of treatment in jail, however, were considered during the first competency hearing. More would be needed to require the trial court to hold a second competency hearing. (In re Sims, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 209.)
Saylor argues that such additional evidence of incompetence may be discerned in his attempts, during motions in limine in advance of the retrial, to have certain irrelevant evidence admitted. He proposed, for example, to include as a witness the "brother-in-law" of a "co-participant," apparently because of his connections with the Chicago police department and "corruption issues"; to introduce articles about several mass shooting events, and evidence of "LGBT bullying statistics." The connections between such evidence and the events at issue in the trial are difficult to discern.
The evidence of "LGBT bullying statistics" apparently relates to Saylor's contention, expressed in a document he wrote prior to his first trial, discussed during the first competency hearing, suggesting that the attack was motivated by slurs he believed the victim had directed at him. The perceived relevance of the other evidence is not as apparent.
As noted, however, Saylor's tendency toward tangential thinking was discussed at some length during the first competency hearing. The trial court was not required to view Saylor's odd evidentiary requests as giving rise to any new doubts about Saylor's competency to stand trial or to represent himself. Moreover, although Saylor's views regarding the outer boundaries of relevance were obviously unconventional, his behavior during the evidentiary hearings was calm, reasonable, and cooperative, even when the trial court rejected some of his proposed evidence. The trial court reasonably could have viewed Saylor's demeanor during the hearings as further evidence that he was able to carry out the basic tasks of his defense.
Saylor has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order a second competency hearing. D. Sufficiency of Evidence
Saylor argues that the trial court should have granted his posttrial motion to reduce his conviction to second degree murder because there was no substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support his first degree murder conviction. We find the trial court was correct to deny Saylor's motion.
A murder is of the first degree if it was "willful, deliberate and premeditated." (§ 189.) In this context, "'premeditated' means 'considered beforehand' and 'deliberate' means 'formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.'" (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2.) "'The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. "The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . ."'" (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636.)
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27, our Supreme Court "identified three categories of evidence relevant to determining premeditation and deliberation: (1) events before the murder that indicate planning; (2) a motive to kill; and (3) a manner of killing that reflects a preconceived design to kill." (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 663 [discussing People v. Anderson].) These factors "are not all required [citation], nor are they exclusive in describing the evidence that will support a finding of premeditation and deliberation." (Gonzales, supra, at p. 663.) "It also is not necessary that any of these categories of evidence be accorded a particular weight [citation], and it is not essential that there be evidence of each category to sustain a conviction." (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 875, 887.) Rather, these factors are intended "to aid reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse." (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125.)
"In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the . . . record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) "Reversal [for lack of sufficient evidence] is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction.'" (Ibid.) "'We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness's credibility.'" (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 917.)
Applying the factors of People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, and reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that the murder was the result of premeditation and deliberation. The jury reasonably could have concluded that when Saylor announced that he needed "one more thing," and then turned to the victim and struck her, he was carrying out a plan, even if that plan was developed just a moment earlier, as he turned to look at the victim and took the whiskey bottle out of the bag, setting it on the counter. (See People v. Lee, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 636 ["cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly"].) Moreover, Saylor's attack on the victim, carried out from behind, without warning, and with tremendous force, is reasonably viewed as an execution, demonstrating a preconceived design to kill, every bit as much as a bullet to the back of the head. (See People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 172 ["'an execution-style killing may be committed with such calculation that the manner of killing will support a jury finding of premeditation and deliberation, despite little or no evidence of planning and motive'"].) Even though the evidence arguably could have supported different inferences regarding Saylor's state of mind, there was ample evidence in support of the jury's conclusions here.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. FIELDS
J.