Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. FSB703282 Arthur A. Harrison, Judge.
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Bradley A. Weinreb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.
Appellant Joe Anthony Sanchez was convicted by a jury of manslaughter, and it was found true that he used a knife to commit the crime. He contends he was denied his right to a fair trial because the prosecutor excused several Hispanics from his jury panel and the court excluded negative evidence about the victims. He also claims the court erred in sentencing him to the upper term on the manslaughter count. Finding no basis to disturb the judgment, we affirm.
FACTS
In July 2007, appellant separated from his wife Charity and moved out of the family house. At the time, appellant suspected Charity was cheating on him and told her that if he ever caught her with another man, he would kill them both.
A few weeks later, on August 18, appellant’s suspicions were confirmed. That evening, Charity hooked up with her neighbor Jose Madrigal and they ended up having sex in her bedroom. As they were lying in bed afterwards, they heard appellant outside their window. He was scratching at the screen and yelling for Charity to let him in the house. She told him to go around to the front door, which he did. She also told Madrigal to hide in the closet, but he refused.
At the front of the house, Charity talked to appellant through a barred security door. He said he wanted to come inside and talk to her, but she demurred. It was only after appellant begged to come inside to use the bathroom that she let him in. Once inside, appellant headed straight for the bedroom. Upon seeing Madrigal in the bed, he asked, “Is this why I can’t come in the fucking house, Charity?”
Appellant told Charity to leave the bedroom and proceeded to retrieve a knife from a dresser drawer. He then attacked Madrigal with the weapon. Madrigal struggled to defend himself, but appellant stabbed him over and over again. Charity ran outside for help and contacted Madrigal’s friend Alex Cervantes, who was in the area. He ran into the bedroom, saw appellant attacking Madrigal with the knife, and then ran back outside again.
Moments later, Madrigal staggered out of the house, collapsed in the front yard, and died. Appellant followed, a blank look on his face. He chased Charity into the street with the knife, but she got away and called the police. By the time they arrived, appellant had fled the area. He later tried to escape to the mountains with his and Charity’s children, but was apprehended.
At trial, appellant claimed he didn’t know Madrigal was in the bedroom when he entered the house. He said once he was inside, he heard Charity talking to someone in the bedroom, but the lights were off and he couldn’t tell what was going on. All he heard was Charity saying something like, “If he walks in here, stop him or stab him.” Then the lights went on, and appellant saw Charity hand a knife to Madrigal, who was standing there naked. According to appellant, Madrigal attacked him with the knife, but he was able to seize the weapon and use it against him. Appellant further claimed that when he ran after Charity in the street afterwards, he simply wanted to talk to her, not harm her.
As to Madrigal, the jury found appellant guilty of manslaughter, a lesser included offense to the charge of murder. And as to Charity, the jury found him not guilty of attempted murder. The court sentenced him to the upper term of 11 years on the manslaughter count, plus 1 year for using a knife during the offense.
I
Appellant contends the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination by exercising peremptory challenges against prospective jurors of Hispanic ethnicity. We uphold the trial court’s ruling to the contrary.
During voir dire, the trial court estimated that somewhere between 15 and 40 percent of the people on the jury panel were Hispanic or Latino. At issue here is the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges against five of those people, prospective jurors 22, 14, 60, 46 and 70.
Prospective juror 22 said she worked in the chemical dependency unit of a university medical center. Knowing Charity’s drug use might become an issue in the case, the prosecutor expressed concern prospective juror 22 would be particularly sympathetic to defense arguments on the issue. He therefore excused her from the jury panel.
Explaining why he excused prospective juror 14, the prosecutor said she seemed disinterested in his questions. In addition, she “appeared to be a little too eager” as far as the prosecution’s burden of proof was concerned.
The prosecutor also said he got a bad vibe from prospective juror 60. He said, “The thing about... 60 that troubled me was that he was concentrating on me. I would often look over and he seemed to be looking at me in a rather insensitive stare. Not particularly mad or grimacing, but insensitive expression on his face and looking at me. And it – there was something discomforting about the rather intensity [sic] that he was examining me. And... that’s why I exercised that peremptory.” The prosecutor was also troubled by the fact prospective juror 60 had previously served on a jury that was unable to reach a verdict in a criminal case.
For prospective juror 46, the issue was his faculty with the English language. He said he cannot read or speak English very well, but is pretty good at understanding it. He also said he had avoided jury duty in the past because of his English deficiencies. The judge reassured him his English was fine. However, the prosecutor said he had some doubts about prospective juror 46’s ability to fully understand the proceedings. Explaining why he challenged him, the prosecutor said, “I felt based upon his heavy Spanish accent and perhaps some difficulty with being able to speak and be able to comprehend the complicated legal English, I was concerned there.” Because prospective juror 46 had been married for 30 years, the prosecutor also felt he might harbor some resentment against Charity because of her infidelity.
Prospective juror 70 said he came to the United States from the Philippines in 1991 and currently works as a budget analyst. Noting he spoke with a very heavy accent, the prosecutor said he had “concerns about [prospective juror 70’s] ability to understand, read and understand the legal concepts” and excused him for that reason.
At a hearing on the issue, defense counsel alleged the prosecutor’s challenges demonstrated a pattern of discrimination against Hispanics. The trial court found there was a prima facie showing of discrimination. However, it also found the prosecutor’s justifications to be “readily apparent, ” “neutral” and “sincere.” Therefore, it upheld the challenges and found no violation of appellant’s rights.
It is well established that “the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277; see also Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 86 [practice also violates federal Constitution].) However, “[a] party’s use of peremptory challenges is presumed to be valid.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 187.) In reviewing a claim of group bias, we must keep in mind that “peremptory challenges are not challenges for cause - they are peremptory. [The Supreme Court has] said that such challenges may be made on an ‘apparently trivial’ or ‘highly speculative’ basis. [Citation.] Indeed, they may be made ‘“without reason or for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 294.) Even a hunch will suffice, so long as it is not based on impermissible group bias. (People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 165.) “We give great deference to the trial court in distinguishing bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Unless the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous, we may not disturb them. (Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 477, 479 [describing this standard of review as being “highly deferential”].)
We do not believe the trial court’s ruling was clearly erroneous in this case. The prosecutor’s stated concerns about the negative body language and expressions he picked up from prospective jurors 14 and 60 may seem picayune and short on substance. However, “peremptory challenges are properly made in response to ‘“bare looks and gestures”’ by a prospective juror that may alienate one side. [Citation.]” (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 171.) They are, after all, peremptory. Furthermore, prospective juror 60’s “experience of sitting on a hung jury constitutes a legitimate concern for the prosecution, which seeks a jury that can reach a unanimous verdict.” (Id. at p. 170.) Because the prosecutor’s stated reasons for challenging prospective jurors 14 and 60 were not related to any type of impermissible group bias, the trial court was entitled to consider them, and could reasonably find they were sufficient to justify a peremptory challenge.
The same goes for the prosecutor’s challenge to prospective juror 22. The prosecutor’s stated fear that her work in the field of chemical dependency might make her particularly sympathetic to defense arguments regarding Charity’s alleged drug use was a sufficient nondiscriminatory reason for her excusal. (See People v. Barber (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 378, 393-396 [accepting as reasonable prosecutor’s stated belief that prospective juror’s occupation as a kindergarten teacher might predispose her toward the defense].)
So were the prosecutor’s stated concerns about the ability of prospective jurors 46 and 70 to understand English. (People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 169 [“Of course, where a prosecutor’s concern for a juror’s ability to understand is supported by the record, it is a proper basis for challenge.”].) Prospective juror 46 admitted he could not read or speak English very well and had avoided jury duty in the past for that reason. And although the judge indicated he could understand him, the judge ultimately accepted the prosecutor’s challenge to prospective juror 46 as being nondiscriminatory. He also accepted the prosecutor’s challenge to prospective juror 70, who like prospective juror 46, was noted by the prosecutor to have a very heavy accent.
Considering all the evidence, we do not believe the court’s assessment of the prosecutor’s explanations for his peremptory challenges was unreasonable or clearly erroneous. Because the challenges were based on nondiscriminatory reasons and are supported by the record on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that no purposeful discrimination occurred in the jury selection process.
II
Appellant also contends the exclusion of certain evidence infringed his constitutional right to present a defense. Particularly, he claims the court erred in barring evidence that 1) Madrigal was an illegal alien and had cocaine and marijuana in his system at the time he was killed; and 2) Charity had a history of fighting with others. We find no constitutional violation in the exclusion of this evidence.
“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, [citation], or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, [citations], the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690.) However, a defendant’s right to present evidence in his favor is not unlimited. The right only applies to “relevant and material” evidence. (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 23.) Evidence lacking significant probative value may properly be excluded without offending the constitution. (People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 684.)
Besides the core issue of relevancy, considerations of prejudice and delay are also pertinent in any evidentiary analysis. Under state law, the trial court may exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) The trial court has broad discretion in this regard, and its decision to exclude certain evidence will not be disturbed unless it is arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd. (People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 512; see also People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103 [application of the ordinary rules of evidence generally does not infringe the defendant’s right to present a defense].)
The exclusion of evidence regarding Madrigal’s status as an illegal alien was consistent with these principles. Appellant argues “the fact that [Madrigal] was an illegal alien and could easily escape back to Mexico after the killing enhanced the likelihood that he violently attacked appellant. Knowing he could easily escape, [Madrigal] would have no compunction against killing his rival.” However, it is unclear how Madrigal’s status as an illegal alien would have allowed him to “easily escape back to Mexico.” He and Charity obviously did not expect to see appellant on the night in question, and the chaos that ensued upon appellant’s arrival aroused the attention of many people in the neighborhood. Appellant’s assumption that illegals are more inclined to commit crimes because they can easily escape back to their country of origin finds no support in law or logic.
Assuming evidence of Madrigal’s immigration status was somehow probative to the case, it also carried the potential for prejudice. Indeed, it could have caused some of the jurors to dislike Madrigal simply because he was in the country illegally, which would have made it hard for them to assess the facts in a fair and impartial manner. Proving Madrigal was actually an illegal immigrant could also have necessitated a great deal of time and energy, which would have bogged down the case considerably. All things considered, we cannot say the court abused its discretion or infringed appellant’s right to present a defense by precluding evidence on the issue of Madrigal’s immigration status.
The evidence that Madrigal had drugs in his system at the time of his death was also properly excluded. Appellant contends the evidence was relevant to his claim of self-defense, in that it showed Madrigal acted violently and irrationally in attacking him with the knife. But appellant’s self-defense claim was grounded in the notion that Madrigal and Charity conspired to kill him, not that Madrigal attacked him in a drug-induced rage. Therefore, the evidence of Madrigal’s drug use was of dubious relevance from a tactical standpoint.
In addition, while there was evidence Madrigal had trace amounts of cocaine and marijuana in his system, and those drugs could have had a “physiological effect” on him, there was no evidence they were actually inclined to make him act aggressively or violently during his fatal encounter with appellant. Therefore, even if the evidence of Madrigal’s drug use had some bearing on the case, its exclusion would not be cause for reversal. (See People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 585-586 [absent evidence regarding the effects of the defendant’s drug use, exclusion of drug evidence was not prejudicial].)
Turning to Charity, appellant notes that when questioned outside the presence of the jury, she admitted she has been in fights, been in a gang and been kicked out of school. Appellant claims this evidence was relevant to show she had a violent character and was the type of person who would be inclined to want to kill her spouse. (See generally Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1) [allowing the defense to introduce evidence of the victim’s character to prove she acted in conformity with such on the occasion in question].)
However, as Charity explained, most of her turbulent behavior occurred when she was an adolescent. She said she grew up in rural New Mexico and got kicked out of school for unwittingly bringing a work knife to class. She said her “gang” was basically just “a little group of kids acting stupid.” And she said her fighting has largely ceased since she moved to California and became a mother. The one exception was when she got into it with some folks she encountered at a Wal-Mart store. But, according to Charity, she acted in defense of her family on that occasion and was never arrested in connection with that incident.
On the whole, the evidence of Charity’s past misdeeds was not particularly probative of her propensity for the sort of violence that appellant accused her of plotting in this case, i.e., murder. It is also evident that most of the proffered evidence was rather remote and would have necessitated a considerable consumption of time both in its presentation and rebuttal. Therefore, we cannot say the court erred in excluding it. No evidentiary or constitutional violation has been shown.
III
Lastly, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the upper term of 11 years on the manslaughter count. He contends the court should have imposed the middle term of five years instead, but we find no reason to disturb the court’s sentencing decision.
The court selected the upper term based on the vulnerability of the victim, the circumstances of the crime as compared with other instances of the same crime, appellant’s lack of remorse, and the risk he poses to society. Judging appellant to be a stubbornly self-righteous individual, the court surmised he felt justified in killing Madrigal because he believed Madrigal “took something” from him. The court stated, “I think that is simply part of this defendant, and if somebody were to take something from him in the future, I would not be shocked at a similar response.”
We afford great deference to the court’s assessment and weighing of the pertinent sentencing factors that may exist in a given case. It is the defendant’s burden to show the court’s sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) “‘In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 977-978.)
Appellant argues Madrigal was not a particularly vulnerable victim, meaning someone who was defenseless, unguarded, unprotected or susceptible to the crime in question. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421; People v. Bloom (1983) 142 Cal.App.3rd 310, 320-321.) But Madrigal didn’t know appellant would be coming around that night, he didn’t know Charity was going to let him in the house, and being naked and unarmed, he surely wasn’t prepared for a fight when appellant entered the bedroom and attacked him. He did try to defend himself when appellant came at him with the knife, but in the end, his efforts were fruitless. His vulnerability stemmed not from the nature of the crime itself, as appellant claims, but from the “total milieu in which the commission of the crime occurred.” (People v. Ramos (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 591, 607.) Therefore, his vulnerability was a legitimate consideration in the court’s sentencing decision.
Appellant also contends his actions were not distinctively worse than those displayed in other manslaughter cases, and he did not use any more force than was necessary to commit the crime. But according to the medical examiner, Madrigal was stabbed at least 22 times, and many of his wounds were inflicted about his face and neck, including a severe gash to his jugular vein. This degree of savagery is not evidenced in most manslaughter cases, and it is not a circumstance appellant can easily dismiss. While appellant is correct that his actions were provoked by the sight of seeing Madrigal in bed with his estranged wife, there can be little question that the pain and suffering he inflicted on Madrigal in the final minutes of his life far exceeded that experienced by most manslaughter victims.
In addition to the sheer violence involved in appellant’s actions, the trial court was also rightly concerned with the fact appellant expressed the belief he had a “God given right” to do what he did. Appellant claims he shouldn’t be penalized for clinging to the belief his actions were justified, but neither can the trial court be required to blind itself to the likelihood of a repeat performance by appellant. The court did not err in this respect.
Considering all the circumstances in this case, we certainly cannot say the court’s sentencing decision was arbitrary or capricious. We therefore uphold appellant’s sentence in its entirety.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: ARONSON, J., IKOLA, J.