Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC063530
Siggins, J.
Raul Sanchez appeals his conviction for grand theft and argues it was barred by the statute of limitations. Sanchez also contends his conviction should be reversed because the trial court failed to obtain a waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights when it accepted his slow plea and determined he was guilty of the charged offense. We conclude the statute of limitations was tolled when the prosecution added grand theft charges by amendment, and that Sanchez’s plea was voluntary and intelligent. We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the record of defendant’s preliminary hearing, two men forced their way into Maria Galvan’s home in August 2003, threw her to the floor, bound and gagged her, and left carrying a safe that contained an estimated $100,000 in cash and jewelry. Galvan identified Sanchez in a photo lineup.
Sanchez was charged by information in April 2007 with robbery, burglary, false imprisonment, and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. In October 2007, the district attorney filed an amended information that added charges of grand theft from the person and grand theft of property. The amended information also alleged an enhancement based upon the value of the property with regard to the robbery and grand theft counts. All but the grand theft counts were then dismissed on the prosecution’s motion.
The court denied a defense motion to dismiss the information on the ground that the grand theft charges were barred by the statute of limitations. We denied Sanchez’s petition for writ of prohibition, and the California Supreme Court denied review. After the trial court denied Sanchez’s motion for reconsideration, he waived a jury trial and submitted this case for decision on the transcript from the preliminary hearing. The court found Sanchez guilty of grand theft of property exceeding $400 in value, and, pursuant to the negotiated disposition, dismissed both the grand theft from a person count and the excessive taking enhancement. The court imposed an eight-month prison term, consecutive to a state prison term Sanchez was already serving, and ordered Sanchez to pay $70,000 in restitution to the victim. Sanchez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Statute of Limitations
Sanchez argues the grand theft charges were barred by the statute of limitations because the amended information was filed more than four years after the date of the alleged offenses. But Sanchez does not address whether the statute of limitations may have been tolled when the information was amended.
Penal Code section 803 establishes the circumstances that may toll the statute of limitations in criminal cases. It provides in relevant part: “(a) Except as provided in this section, a limitation of time prescribed in this chapter is not tolled or extended for any reason. [¶] (b) No time during which prosecution of the same person for the same conduct is pending in a court of this state is a part of a limitation of time prescribed in this chapter.” For these purposes a prosecution is commenced with the filing of an indictment or information. (§ 804.)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The information filed April 24, 2007, charged Sanchez with robbery, burglary, false imprisonment, and assault for acts committed on August 20, 2003, against victim Maria Galvan. The amended information filed October 15, 2007, added charges of grand theft arising from the same incident committed upon the same victim. (See People v. Superior Court (Mendella) (1983) 33 Cal.3d 754, 764 [prosecution may amend information under § 739 “ ‘to charge any offense . . . transactionally related to the crimes for which the defendant has previously been held to answer’ ”].) This case does not involve “completely separate instances of criminal conduct,” where the tolling provision of section 803, subdivision (b) would not apply. (People v. Terry (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 750, 769.) The grand theft charges were based on the same conduct as the charges included in the original information, and Sanchez does not argue otherwise. (See People v. Greenberger (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 298, 369 [“the kidnapping was part of the same conduct that resulted in [the victim’s] murder”]; People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1064 [forgery and false filings arose from same conduct as rent skimming offenses]; People v. Whitfield (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1652, 1658-1660 [rape and soliciting prostitution charges were prosecutions for the “same conduct”].)
In this case, the information filed on April 24, 2007, tolled the running of the statute of limitations against Sanchez for offenses he may have committed against Maria Galvan that were related to the robbery and burglary. (§§ 801.5, 803, subd. (c)(1); People v. Price (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 987, 990 [applying four-year statute of limitations to grand theft].) Because the grand theft charges were based on the same conduct as the robbery and burglary offenses, the statute of limitations was tolled as to the grand theft charges as of April 24, 2007. Thus, the grand theft charges were not time-barred even though they were filed more than four years after the August 20, 2003 events.
Although Sanchez’s section 995 motion argued that the grand theft charges were subject to a three-year, rather than a four-year, statute of limitations, he contends on appeal that the charges were untimely “[r]egardless of which statute of limitation actually applies . . . .”
B. Waiver of Rights
Before a defendant may submit a criminal case for adjudication based on the transcript of a preliminary hearing, which is “tantamount to a plea of guilty,” the trial court must obtain a waiver of the defendant’s right to confront witnesses, right to jury trial, and privilege against self-incrimination. (People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 491-492.) If the court fails to do so, the plea “is valid if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175.)
Sanchez contends his conviction must be reversed because the court failed to advise him of his Fifth Amendment rights when he agreed to submit his case based on the transcript of the preliminary hearing, and “the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that [his] waiver was not voluntary and intelligent.” But at the plea hearing defense counsel repeated an admonishment that he provided Sanchez about all his rights, including “the right to either take the stand and testify on his own behalf or to remain silent . . . .” When the court inquired of Sanchez whether he understood what his counsel had stated to the court, Sanchez responded, “Yes.” The court went on to advise Sanchez of the jury trial rights he would give up by agreeing to submit his case on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. We conclude that the totality of these circumstances shows that Sanchez’s plea was “intelligent and voluntary because it was given with an understanding of the rights waived.” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 361.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Pollak, J.