Opinion
B301393
05-27-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANTHONY JOSE SANCHEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric J. Kohn, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VA151013) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Debra Cole-Hall, Judge. Affirmed. Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Eric J. Kohn, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Defendant and appellant Anthony Jose Sanchez was detained without a warrant for trespassing on railroad property in violation of Penal Code section 369i. Sanchez was charged with possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). After his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 was denied, he entered into a case settlement agreement in which he pled guilty to the charged offense. Sanchez was sentenced to 16 months in state prison, to be served in county jail.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
On appeal, Sanchez contends that the warrantless detention was unlawful, because he was not trespassing on railroad property as defined by the statute, and was not actually or potentially interfering with, interrupting, or hindering the safe and efficient operation of a train. He claims that the evidence obtained as the result of the unlawful detention should have been suppressed.
We conclude that the warrantless detention was reasonable, and affirm.
FACTS
The facts are taken from the hearing on the motion to suppress.
Prosecution
Sanchez was detained on June 14, 2019, near the railroad tracks by Regent View Avenue in Downey. The railroad tracks are located on top of a gravel embankment, with a chain link fence that runs parallel to the tracks, and separates the tracks from private businesses. There is a dirt emergency access road located between the gravel embankment and the fence.
Sanchez was detained by Downey Police Department Detective Jeffrey Frotton, who regularly coordinated with the Union Pacific Railroad to perform homeless outreach in the area. The railroad requested assistance with respect to a homeless encampment located near the tracks, and Detective Frotton patrolled the area daily. The railroad tracks were frequently used by transients, and the wall adjacent to the tracks was often vandalized with graffiti. Detective Frotton had detained numerous people there for narcotics paraphernalia and large amounts of narcotics. Weapons had also been recovered along the railroad tracks.
The railroad had informed Detective Frotton that "20 feet from where the gravel stops is an extension of the railroad tracks. . . . [T]hat covers essentially the whole area between the fence that divides that private property and the businesses that run along the railroad tracks." Detective Frotton explained, "The whole area is encompassed, to me, as railroad property." Anyone within 20 feet of the embankment would be trespassing. Detective Frotton had advised numerous people that they were prohibited from trespassing in the area. The dirt road is for emergency use only; vehicle and pedestrian traffic are prohibited.
As Detective Frotton approached the area, he noticed an older model pickup truck parked along the tracks. Several people were standing around the vehicle, which the detective described as inside the fenced area "[n]o more than 20 feet" from the tracks. Sanchez was standing next to a bicycle near the truck's open door, just in front of the bed. The detective made contact with Sanchez because he was trespassing on the railroad's property.
The detective did not measure the distance from the railroad tracks to the vehicle. He estimated the distance from general experience and his knowledge of the area. The detective did not measure the distance from the actual tracks to the edge of the gravel embankment, or the distance from the base of the embankment to the fence.
Defense
Investigator Ruben Ornelas, a former Los Angeles Police Department officer, testified as an expert for the defense. Ornelas reviewed body camera videos recorded on the day of Sanchez's detention, and used the video and stills taken from it to approximate the location of the pickup truck. Ornelas then used his estimation of the truck's location to measure the distance between the truck and the gravel embankment. By his calculations, the front of the truck was 25 feet from the embankment. Ornelas also measured the distance from the base of the gravel embankment to the railroad tracks, and determined that the distance was 10 feet. On cross-examination, Ornelas stated that the gravel extension from the tracks is "not straight" and conceded that some portions extend father towards the fence line than others. Ornelas was unable to determine where the truck was in relation to where the gravel extensions were.
DISCUSSION
"Generally, in reviewing a determination on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual findings which are supported by substantial evidence and independently determine whether the facts of the challenged search and seizure conform to the constitutional standard of reasonableness." (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641, 1650.)
Police may lawfully detain an individual based on no more than reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation or violation of some other law. (See United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 682; People v. Castellon (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1376, fn. 3.) Reasonable suspicion requires only that "the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity." (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) "[R]easonable suspicion is 'something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'"' [citation], but something less than probable cause, . . ." (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 387.)
Here, Detective Frotton testified that he detained Sanchez for trespassing on railroad property in violation of section 369i, subdivision (a), which provides: "Any person who enters or remains upon the property of any railroad without the permission of the owner of the land, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession and whose entry, presence, or conduct upon the property interferes with, interrupts, or hinders, or which, if allowed to continue, would interfere with, interrupt, or hinder the safe and efficient operation of any locomotive, railway car, or train is guilty of a misdemeanor."
Just prior to calling Detective Frotton at the suppression hearing, the prosecutor informed the court, "I have spoken with counsel off the record. It appears that the only justification that the People are being asked to show is the reason for the initial detention, specifically the violation of 369 (I) [sic]." In light of the prosecutor's clear articulation of the issue, we reject the Attorney General's assertion that Sanchez waived the argument that the People failed to demonstrate Sanchez's actions interfered with, or would interfere with, the safe and efficient operation of trains. A violation of section 369i requires two separate showings, and the parties did not indicate that Sanchez conceded either requirement. --------
The facts support the conclusion that Detective Frotton reasonably believed Sanchez was trespassing on railroad property. Section 369i defines "'property of any railroad'" as property "[a] distance of 20 feet on either side of the track, which is owned, leased, or possessed by a railroad." (§ 369i, subd. (a).) Detective Frotton was present at the scene and was very familiar with the area. The detective testified that, from his personal experience and knowledge of the area, the truck was within 20 feet of the railroad tracks. The logical inference is that Sanchez, who was standing next to the truck, was also within 20 feet of the railroad track. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's implied finding that Sanchez was within 20 feet of the railroad tracks, or that the detective's belief that he was within 20 feet of the tracks was reasonable.
The facts also support the conclusion that Detective Frotton reasonably believed that Sanchez was engaging in illegal activity that could interfere with train operations, or that Sanchez's presence was a potential hindrance to safe operations. Detective Frotton testified that the railroad police had requested help from the police department, and, as a result, he patrolled the area daily. The railroad tracks were known as a site of frequent criminal activity, including vandalism and narcotics possession, and weapons had been recovered there. Clearly, criminal activities along the railroad tracks could interfere with train operations. Detective Frotton also testified that he regularly advised people that neither vehicle nor pedestrian traffic was permitted in the area where the truck was parked, as it had to remain clear for emergency vehicles. It is reasonable to infer that a truck with open doors surrounded by people and a bicycle could create an obstruction to emergency vehicles if allowed to remain on the property. In light of the circumstances, the investigatory detention was not unreasonable.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying Sanchez's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 is affirmed.
MOOR, J.
We concur:
RUBIN, P. J.
KIM, J.