Opinion
February 20, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (J. Goldberg, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that evidence obtained as a result of an allegedly unlawful stop and search of the automobile in which he was a passenger should have been suppressed. The police are authorized to stop a vehicle and make inquiry upon "a reasonable suspicion that its occupants had been, are then, or are about to be, engaged in conduct in violation of law" ( People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 563; see, People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 376; People v. Mills, 198 A.D.2d 236). The hearing record demonstrates that the stop of the automobile was based on reasonable suspicion, as the radio description of the vehicle used during a robbery just 15 minutes earlier and eight blocks away substantially matched that of the vehicle in which the defendant was riding ( see, People v. Landy, supra; People v. Bianchi, 208 A.D.2d 551, 552, affd 85 N.Y.2d 1022; People v. Bedoya, 190 A.D.2d 812; People v. Clark, 172 A.D.2d 679). The brief detention of the defendant and his companion at the scene for the purpose of an identification by the complainant was proper, as it occurred within close temporal and physical proximity to the robbery, and none of the circumstances indicate that the procedure was unduly suggestive ( see, People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234; People v. Bedoya, supra). Once the defendant was identified as one of the perpetrators of the robbery, the police had probable cause to arrest him ( see, People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423). Accordingly, those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress identification testimony and physical evidence were properly denied.
The defendant was not prejudiced by the court's charge to the jury on recent and exclusive possession of stolen property that the "proof" showed that the allegedly stolen property was found in the possession of the defendant within an hour of the alleged theft from the complainant. The court correctly charged the jury with respect to the permissive inference of guilt that may be drawn against an accused found to be in recent and exclusive possession of stolen property ( see, People v. Galbo, 218 N.Y. 283; People v. Norman, 204 A.D.2d 493; People v. Cole, 185 A.D.2d 893). Further, the court gave a detailed and proper instruction to the jury on the standards for assessing the reliability of the complainants' identification testimony and repeatedly stressed the jury's role as the finders of the facts. Thus, the court's charge, read in its entirety, adequately conveyed the standards to be applied by the jury in arriving at its verdict ( see, People v. Norman, supra; People v. Cole, supra).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. O'Brien, J.P., Sullivan, Copertino and Joy, JJ., concur.