Opinion
C041672.
7-31-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID RUELAS, Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant David Ruelas appeals from the denial of his writ of coram nobis contending the trial court abused its discretion. We disagree and affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is a citizen of Mexico who came to America in 1985. In May 1992, defendant pled no contest to possessing more than 28.5 grams of methamphetamine. As part of the plea, he acknowledged that he understood if he was "not a citizen of the United States a plea of guilty or no contest could result in deportation, exclusion from admission to this country, or denial of naturalization."
In May 1998, defendant was arrested by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. He was deported in October 1999.
In February 2001, defendant made a motion to vacate his plea, conviction and judgment claiming his 1992 trial counsel had not advised or warned him of the deportation consequences of his plea. Three months later, new defense counsel acknowledged the motion was the incorrect vehicle to pursue defendants claims and requested the matter be taken off calendar. In February 2002, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or error coram nobis. Attached to this petition was the declaration of 1992 trial counsel, indicating he did not recall whether defendant had actually read the plea form, and that he did not specifically discuss any of the items on that form with defendant. Trial counsel did not discuss defendants immigration status or any immigration consequences with defendant beyond those on the form. He declared, if he had known defendant was not a United States citizen, he would have "attempted to arrive at some other disposition, such as a guilty plea to a non-deportable offense." Finally, he asserted, upon information and belief, that the trial judge would not have accepted a no contest plea from defendant "if she was aware that he had not been fully advised of possible immigration consequences of his plea. Accordingly, defendant claimed the judgment and sentence should be vacated.
The trial court denied defendants petitions finding "relief by way of a writ of error coram nobis is not available based upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, the only writ potentially available is that of habeas corpus. A review of the file indicates that [defendant] has served the sentence imposed after his plea and that he is not on state parole. Thus, at the time his petition was filed, he was not in actual or constructive state custody as a result of his conviction in this court. Accordingly, . . . he has not established the foundational requirement for habeas corpus relief." (Original emphasis.)
Defendant sought rehearing, contending he did not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather, "that a fact existed — his alien status and his ignorance of the effect of the conviction on that status — (a) which without his fault or negligence was not presented to the trial court, (b) which would have prevented the rendition of judgment, and (c) which did not go to the merits, all of which entitles him to a writ of error coram nobis." The request for reconsideration was denied.
DISCUSSION
In denying defendants petition, it appears the trial court erroneously relied on the belief that defendant was seeking relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, this error is not fatal to the judgment. ""[A] ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion."" (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976, 846 P.2d 704.) We find the trial court properly denied the petition. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.
"The writ of coram nobis is granted only when three requirements are met: (1) Petitioner must show that some fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the rendition of the judgment. [Citations.] (2) Petitioner must also show that the newly discovered evidence . . . [does not go] to the merits of issues tried; issues of fact, once adjudicated, even though incorrectly, cannot be reopened except on motion for new trial. [Citations.] . . . (3) Petitioner must show that the facts upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ. . . . [Citations.]" (People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 230, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993 (Shipman).)
Defendant relies on People v. Wiedersperg (1975) 44 Cal. App. 3d 550, 118 Cal. Rptr. 755 (Wiedersperg) to support his contention that his petition satisfied the elements of Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d 226, and that he was thus entitled to relief. However, defendant reads too much into Wiedersperg.
In Wiedersperg, the defendant was fined and placed on probation for possession of marijuana. (44 Cal. App. 3d at p. 552.) Subsequently, his record and conviction were expunged. (Ibid.) Nonetheless, Wiedersperg was later deported as a result of the conviction. (Id. at pp. 552-553.) He sought a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The trial court denied the petition, finding that since the record and conviction had been expunged, it did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition. (Id. at pp. 553-554.)
The Court of Appeal disagreed and found the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the petition. The Court of Appeal also found that if proof of the facts was sufficient, the trial court could, in its discretion, grant the relief sought. (Wiedersperg, supra, 44 Cal. App. 3d at p. 555.) The Wiedersperg court did not require the trial court to grant a writ of coram nobis, nor did it determine defendant was, in fact, entitled to such relief. (People v. Trantow (1986) 178 Cal. App. 3d 842, 846, 224 Cal. Rptr. 70.)
We are not persuaded that this defendant has met the Shipman requirements. "The first requirement under Shipman, has two elements. The first is that there be an error of fact at the time of judgment. The second is that such error of fact would have prevented the rendition of the judgment." (People v. Trantow, supra, 178 Cal. App. 3d at p. 845.) Assuming that defendant did not know that because of his alien status, his conviction would result in deportation, it does not follow that this mistake of fact would have "prevented the rendition of the judgment." (Ibid.; see also People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal. App. 3d 1470, 1477, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328.)
A judge choosing not to accept a plea is not the legal equivalent of a court being unable to render judgment. Facts which would prevent the rendition of judgment include, defendants insanity at the time of the plea or being coerced or fraudulently induced into the plea. (People v. Trantow, supra, 178 Cal. App. 3d at p. 846.) The fact of immigration consequences resulting from a plea is irrelevant to the validity of the plea and judgment. (Id. at p. 845.)
Because defendant could not satisfy the first of Shipmans requirements, he was not entitled to relief by way of a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The petition was properly denied.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P.J., ROBIE, J.