Opinion
1999-00636
Submitted May 28, 2002.
September 10, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Marlow, J.), rendered January 7, 1999, convicting him of criminal contempt in the first degree (31 counts) and aggravated harassment in the second degree (8 counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Yasmin Daley-Duncan, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se.
William V. Grady, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Bridget Rahilly Steller of counsel), for respondent.
Before: FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., LEO F. McGINITY, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, THOMAS A. ADAMS, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence is unpreserved for appellate review, as his motion for a trial order of dismissal was general in nature (see CPL 470.05; People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19; People v. Bynum, 70 N.Y.2d 858; People v. Dieppa, 285 A.D.2d 558). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, he was not deprived of a fair trial by the introduction of uncharged crimes and prior bad acts involving the complainant. Such evidence was admissible to establish whether the defendant placed the complainant in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death (see Penal Law § 215.51[b][iii]). In addition, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in weighing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect (see People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 54-55; People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233; People v. Caldarola, 288 A.D.2d 234, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 752).
Although the consecutive sentences imposed are legally permissible because the convictions stem from separate and distinct acts (see Penal Law § 70.25), the aggregate term of imprisonment of 24 to 72 years violates the statutory maximum (see Penal Law § 70.30[e]). However, since the Department of Correctional Services will administratively recalculate the sentence to reflect the legally authorized limit, there is no reason to modify the judgment (see People v. Moore, 61 N.Y.2d 575, 578; People v. Sheppard, 273 A.D.2d 498, 500; People v. Brunskill, 200 A.D.2d 752, 754).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
SANTUCCI, J.P., McGINITY, LUCIANO and ADAMS, JJ., concur.