Opinion
F054703
2-17-2009
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RODNEY ALLEN DEL ROSARIO, Defendant and Appellant.
Michael B. McPartland, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Lloyd G. Carter, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
OPINION
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Levy, J., and Cornell, J.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
A jury convicted appellant Rodney Allen Del Rosario of one count of violating Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a)1 (section 496(a)) (receiving stolen property). In a separate proceeding, the court found true allegations that appellant had suffered eight "strikes." The court struck seven of appellants strikes and imposed a prison term of four years, consisting of the two-year midterm on the instant offense, doubled pursuant to the three strikes law (§§ 667, subd. (e)(1); 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)).
We use the term "strike" as a synonym for "prior felony conviction" within the meaning of the "three strikes" law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12), i.e., a prior felony conviction or juvenile adjudication that subjects a defendant to the increased punishment specified in the three strikes law.
On appeal, appellants sole contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We will affirm.
FACTS
California Highway Patrol Officer Steven Swanson testified to the following. On August 29, 2007, while conducting an investigation of a report of a stolen vehicle, he went to the University Inn in Fresno, where he made contact with appellant. The officer conducted a search of appellants person, and during that search found, in appellants left rear pants pocket, a California identification card (ID) bearing the name Jimmy Perez. Appellant told the officer that Perez was a friend of his, and that Perez had asked him to hold onto his ID for him.
Further references to dates of events are to dates in 2007.
The parties stipulated the search was lawful.
Jimmy Perez testified to the following. He had never met, and did not know, appellant, and had never given him permission to possess his ID. Perez was incarcerated from May 10 through July 30, and he had given his ID to his wife, Denise Esquivel, to hold for him.
Esquivel testified that on July 28, she checked into the University Inn and checked out on July 30. She was with several other persons, including appellant, and she spent her two-night stay in the hotel with appellant and her other companions, using methamphetamine.
The remainder of our factual statement is taken from Esquivels testimony.
When Esquivel checked into the motel, she had in her possession, in her wallet inside her purse, her identification and security card, as well as an ID that belonged to her husband, Jimmy Perez. Perez was in jail at the time, and he had asked Esquivel to hold onto his ID for him.
At some point during her stay, Esquivel noticed that Perezs ID was no longer in her purse. In August, she reported to the police that Perezs ID was missing, and in September, in a statement to the police, she reported that she had stayed at the University Inn from July 28 through July 30, and that her husbands ID was stolen during that time.
On the night of July 29, Esquivel and appellant slept in the same room. On the morning of July 30, appellant took items—clothes, pillows, pillow cases and towels—from the room and put them in the back of a pickup truck; these items were "mainly in a big bag ...."
Esquivel never gave appellant permission to take Perezs ID, and she did not trade the ID for drugs.
DISCUSSION
As indicated above, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of violating section 496(a). There is no merit to this contention.
"In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence." (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) "[W]e do not reweigh the evidence; the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trier of fact." (People v. Stewart (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 785, 790.)
Section 496(a) provides, in relevant part: "Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year."
Thus, the elements of the offense of receiving stolen property are (1) that property was obtained by theft or extortion; (2) that the accused knew that the property had been obtained in this manner; and (3) that the property was received, concealed or withheld by the accused or the accused aided in receiving, concealing or withholding it. (People v. Grant (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 579, 596.)
Although, as indicated above, section 496(a) can be violated in a variety of ways other than receiving stolen property—including withholding or concealing such property—receiving stolen property is the common short-hand designation for the offense. (See People v. Mitchell (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 442, 462.)
There is no dispute that the evidence was sufficient to establish the first two of these elements. As indicated above, evidence adduced at trial included the following: Esquivel testified (1) Perezs ID disappeared from the motel room she shared with appellant, (2) she neither traded the ID for drugs nor gave appellant permission to take it, and (3) appellant took a bag of items from their shared room and put those items in a pickup truck; Perez testified he had not given appellant permission to possess his ID; and appellant had the ID in his possession approximately one month after it was stolen. In addition, based on Perezs testimony, the court reasonably could have inferred that appellant lied to police when he stated Perez gave him the ID to hold. Based on this inference and the evidence summarized above, the court reasonably could have concluded that (1) Perezs ID had been stolen, and (2) appellant was the thief and was thus aware of its character as stolen property. (Cf. People v. Citrino (1956) 46 Cal.2d 284, 289 [false statement regarding receipt of stolen property, considered in conjunction with recent possession of stolen property, supported burglary conviction].)
Appellants challenge is directed at the third element of the offense. He first argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish he was concealing or withholding the stolen property because "Perez testified that he did not know appellant, so it would not have been easy to for appellant to contact him ...." There is no merit to this contention. Regardless of any difficulty appellant might have faced in getting in touch with Perez—and we presume it would not have been great, given that, we assume, the ID bore Perezs address—the evidence supports the conclusion that appellant withheld and concealed stolen property, and thus violated section 496(a), in at least two ways: He failed to contact the police in approximately one month following the theft of the ID, and he lied to the police as to how he came to be in possession of Perezs card.
Appellant suggests that the court unreasonably concluded he was lying because "[he] clearly knew Perezs wife, Denise Esquivel, because they used controlled substances together, and this likely explained why appellant believed that Perez was a friend." That appellant and Esquivel used drugs together may provide some tenuous support for the claim that appellants statement that Perez was a friend was something other than a lie, but this factor in no way suggests an innocent interpretation for his statement that Perez asked him to hold the ID card for him. Moreover, more fundamentally, appellants argument on this point is nothing more than a claim that we should reweigh the evidence. This, of course, as indicated above, we may not and will not do. (People v. Stewart, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 790.) As demonstrated above, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Perezs ID was stolen, and that appellant, knowing it was stolen, concealed and withheld it from Perez. Therefore, substantial evidence supports appellants conviction of violating section 496(a).
We do not address appellants contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish a violation of section 496(a) on the basis of receiving, as distinct from concealing or withholding, stolen property.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.